AYATOILET

RIDAN BE KESHVAR, RIDAN BE MARDOM, RIDAN BE ESLAM

Category: Uncategorized

  • Iran War will Undermine the AI Boom (Chokepoints no one knew existed)

    The global boom in artificial intelligence is often portrayed as a race between software companies and semiconductor designers. But the reality is far more physical. Artificial intelligence is not merely code—it is infrastructure. It requires massive data centers, constant electricity, rare industrial gases, semiconductor fabrication plants, and global fiber-optic cable networks capable of moving extraordinary amounts of data across continents.

    In effect, the AI revolution is the largest infrastructure expansion program in human history. Technology companies are projected to spend hundreds of billions of dollars annually building hyperscale data centers and purchasing advanced GPUs to power the next generation of AI models. But this enormous buildout rests on fragile physical systems that depend on energy supply chains, industrial materials, and global telecommunications networks.

    The war involving Iran has exposed just how vulnerable these systems are. What began as a regional military conflict is now rippling through the infrastructure that supports the global digital economy. Energy markets have been disrupted, critical semiconductor inputs have been constrained, major internet cable corridors have been compromised, and for the first time in history hyperscale data centers themselves have become military targets.

    Taken together, these disruptions threaten to slow—or fundamentally reshape—the global AI data center boom.


    1. The Energy Shock: AI’s Hidden Dependence on Natural Gas

    Artificial intelligence has a power problem.

    Training and operating large AI models requires enormous quantities of electricity. Hyperscale AI campuses can consume multiple gigawatts of power—comparable to the energy demand of a medium-sized city. The next generation of AI clusters, designed to support hundreds of thousands of GPUs, will push power demand even higher.

    While renewable energy capacity is expanding rapidly, most AI infrastructure today still depends on reliable baseload electricity. Data centers cannot shut down when the sun sets or when wind output fluctuates. Training runs lasting weeks or months require uninterrupted power.

    For this reason, natural gas has become the default energy source for many new AI facilities. Gas-fired power plants can operate continuously, ramp production quickly, and can be built faster than nuclear reactors or large-scale renewable installations. As a result, a growing number of data center projects are being paired with dedicated gas power plants.

    This creates a direct link between the AI economy and global natural gas markets.

    The war in Iran has placed that energy system under stress. The Persian Gulf is a critical corridor not only for oil but also for liquefied natural gas shipments. Instability in the region raises insurance costs, disrupts shipping routes, and creates uncertainty around future supply.

    When natural gas prices rise, electricity prices follow. For AI companies, energy costs are one of the largest operational expenses. Spiking electricity prices can reduce the profitability of AI training runs, increase inference costs for deployed models, and delay the construction of new data center campuses.

    The AI industry, in other words, is discovering that its growth is tied not just to silicon and software but also to pipelines, LNG terminals, and global energy geopolitics.


    2. The Helium Shortage: A Hidden Threat to Semiconductor Manufacturing

    Energy is not the only vulnerability in the AI supply chain. Another critical dependency lies in a gas that rarely receives public attention: helium.

    Helium is essential to semiconductor fabrication. Ultra-high-purity helium—known as 6N-grade helium—is used to cool silicon wafers during etching in advanced chip manufacturing equipment. Without it, modern semiconductor fabrication simply cannot function.

    Qatar produces roughly 30 percent of the world’s helium supply, much of it from the massive Ras Laffan industrial complex. This facility is one of the few locations on Earth capable of producing helium at the purity levels required by advanced semiconductor fabs.

    The war has disrupted this system. Drone strikes on Ras Laffan infrastructure forced production shutdowns and triggered a global helium shortage. Semiconductor manufacturers in South Korea and elsewhere have already implemented conservation protocols to stretch their remaining supply.

    The consequences are significant. Every advanced GPU powering an AI training cluster—from NVIDIA accelerators to custom AI chips—requires semiconductor fabrication that depends on helium. If helium shortages persist, chip production will slow. And if chip production slows, the pace of AI data center expansion will slow as well.

    This link illustrates the fragility of the AI supply chain. A conflict thousands of miles from Silicon Valley can constrain a rare industrial gas, which in turn affects the production of chips that power artificial intelligence systems worldwide.


    3. The Internet Chokepoint Crisis: 90% of East–West Data Traffic at Risk

    The most serious threat to the AI infrastructure boom, however, may lie in global telecommunications networks.

    Most people understand the Strait of Hormuz as an oil chokepoint. What is less widely understood is that the region also sits at the center of the world’s digital connectivity.

    Multiple submarine cable systems pass through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Even more passed through the Red Sea. These cables form the primary digital bridge between Europe and Asia, carrying most of the intercontinental internet traffic.

    Together, these corridors carry roughly 90 percent of east–west data capacity.

    For the first time in modern telecommunications history, both routes have been effectively compromised simultaneously.

    Military activity, shipping disruptions, and insurance restrictions have turned the Persian Gulf and Red Sea into high-risk zones for cable operations and repair ships. When cables fail or require maintenance, specialized vessels normally perform repairs within days or weeks. In a war zone, those repairs may not happen for months.

    As a result, internet traffic between Europe and Asia is being rerouted through longer paths across the Pacific Ocean and North America.

    This dramatically increases latency. Direct routes that normally take around 130 milliseconds now exceed 250 milliseconds as traffic circles the globe.

    For ordinary internet users, this may mean slower connections or occasional disruptions. For artificial intelligence systems, however, the consequences are far more severe.

    AI infrastructure increasingly depends on distributed computing. Training runs may involve thousands of GPUs spread across multiple data centers in different regions. These clusters must exchange massive amounts of data with minimal latency.

    When latency doubles and bandwidth capacity shrinks, distributed AI training becomes significantly less efficient. In extreme cases, it may become impractical.

    Bandwidth constraints pose an even greater problem. The surviving trans-Pacific cable routes simply do not have enough spare capacity to absorb the loss of major Europe–Asia corridors without congestion.

    This means the AI boom now faces a bottleneck not in computing power but in global network infrastructure.


    4. Data Centers Become Targets: A New Era of Infrastructure Warfare

    Perhaps the most dramatic shift triggered by the Iran conflict is the emergence of data centers as military targets.

    In early 2026, Iranian drones struck several hyperscale data center facilities in the Gulf region, including infrastructure associated with major cloud providers. The attacks damaged power systems and cooling infrastructure and forced operators to shut down parts of their operations.

    This marked the first confirmed kinetic military attack on a hyperscale cloud data center.

    The implications are profound.

    For decades, data centers were treated as purely commercial infrastructure. Even during major conflicts, telecommunications networks were rarely targeted directly. But the role of cloud computing in modern economies—and increasingly in military systems—has changed that calculation.

    Cloud infrastructure now supports everything from banking systems to logistics networks to military data analysis. As a result, it has become strategically valuable.

    The attacks demonstrated that hyperscale data centers are physically vulnerable. Cooling systems, electrical substations, and backup generators are large, exposed pieces of infrastructure that can be disabled with relatively inexpensive weapons such as drones.

    This creates a new risk calculus for the AI industry. Building a $20–$30 billion data center campus in a geopolitically unstable region suddenly looks far less attractive if that facility could become a wartime target.

    Insurance costs, security requirements, and geopolitical risk assessments will now influence where future AI infrastructure is built.


    The AI Boom Meets Geopolitics

    The war involving Iran has revealed a fundamental truth about the artificial intelligence economy: it is built on physical systems that exist in the real world.

    AI depends on energy systems that can be disrupted by geopolitical conflict. It depends on rare industrial materials such as helium that can become scarce overnight. It depends on submarine cable networks that pass through narrow maritime chokepoints. And it depends on massive data center campuses that can be targeted during war.

    For years, the technology industry assumed that its supply chains were insulated from geopolitics. The digital economy seemed weightless, detached from the physical world.

    The war in Iran has shattered that illusion.

    Artificial intelligence may be the most advanced technology ever created. But the infrastructure that supports it remains deeply vulnerable to the oldest forces in human history: geography, conflict, and scarcity.

    The AI boom is not ending. Demand for computing power will continue to grow, and companies will keep building data centers around the world.

    But the conflict has changed the landscape.

    Where those data centers are built, how they are powered, how they connect to global networks, and how secure they are from geopolitical disruption will now matter as much as the algorithms running inside them.

    The economic consequences of derailing AI data center buildouts and operations are massive – far more significant than the energy shock caused by this war. This has not only derailed progress but will also cause significant delays as China continues unabated with its own AI infrastructure build-out. The long-term impact of this will also be profound.  

    The next phase of the AI race may therefore be decided not only in semiconductor fabs and research labs—but also in shipping lanes, energy markets, and contested choke points like the Strait of Hormuz.

  • Trump’s War, Iran’s Windfall (Five Gifts, One Opportunity)

    Wars are usually remembered for their destruction. Cities fall, economies fracture, and lives are lost. Yet wars also reveal truths that years of diplomacy and propaganda can obscure. They expose the structural realities of power, geography, and strategy. In that sense, the recent confrontation between the United States and Iran may ultimately be remembered not simply as another Middle Eastern crisis, but as a moment that clarified the strategic landscape of the region.

    Ironically, many of the lessons revealed by the conflict favor Iran. What was intended to weaken Tehran may instead have strengthened its long-term strategic position. In effect, the war delivered Iran a series of unintended gifts.

    Five, in particular, stand out.


    Gift One: The True Power of the Strait of Hormuz

    The first gift is the renewed understanding of the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz.

    For decades, analysts have acknowledged that the narrow waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean is one of the most critical chokepoints in global commerce. Roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil passes through this corridor each day, along with massive volumes of liquefied natural gas and other commodities.

    Yet even with this knowledge, the full extent of Iran’s leverage was never truly appreciated—perhaps not even within Iran itself.

    The recent crisis demonstrated something extraordinary: Iran does not actually need to close the Strait of Hormuz to disrupt global markets. The mere threat of closure can send shockwaves through the global economy. Oil prices spike, shipping insurance premiums explode, and energy markets become unstable. Governments thousands of miles away suddenly find their economic planning thrown into chaos.

    In other words, the weapon is not missiles or mines—it is uncertainty.

    For Iran, this realization is profound. Geography has handed Tehran a powerful strategic asset that requires relatively little military expenditure to leverage. Simply maintaining the credible ability to disrupt the strait allows Iran to influence global economic conditions.

    Regardless of which political faction governs Tehran in the future, this lesson will endure. The strait is not merely a defensive tool—it is a strategic economic lever that can be monetized diplomatically and politically for decades to come.


    Gift Two: The Fragility of the Gulf Monarchies

    The second gift revealed by the war is the structural vulnerability of the Arab states surrounding the Persian Gulf.

    For years, cities such as Dubai, Doha, and Abu Dhabi have projected an image of unstoppable prosperity. Skyscrapers rise from the desert, luxury airlines connect continents, and sovereign wealth funds deploy trillions of dollars across global markets. The narrative has been one of economic miracle.

    But this prosperity rests on surprisingly fragile foundations.

    The Gulf states share several structural weaknesses:

    • Flat and geographically exposed terrain
    • Heavy dependence on energy exports
    • Massive reliance on expatriate labor populations
    • Economies concentrated in a handful of sectors such as energy, finance, and tourism

    The recent war exposed how vulnerable these systems are to regional instability. Airspace closures, shipping disruptions, and energy market volatility immediately threatened the economic lifelines of these states.

    The contrast with Iran is striking.

    Iran possesses:

    • A vast and defensible geography
    • A large domestic population and labor base
    • Diverse natural resources
    • Strategic location between Europe, South Asia, and East Asia

    In aviation alone, Iran holds inherent advantages. Many of its airports sit at high altitudes that improve aircraft efficiency, and its geography offers shorter routes connecting Europe with Asia. If geopolitical conditions normalize, Iran could become a major hub for global air transport.

    Similar opportunities exist across multiple sectors—from manufacturing and logistics to energy processing and agriculture.

    For decades, sanctions on Iran effectively redirected regional growth toward smaller Gulf states. In many ways, their rise occurred at Iran’s expense. Now the structural weaknesses of those states have been exposed, while Iran’s geographic advantages remain unchanged.

    That realization could reshape the economic future of the region.


    Gift Three: Validation of Asymmetric Warfare

    The third gift lies in military doctrine.

    The United States spends nearly one trillion dollars annually on defense. Its regional allies—including Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar—collectively spend hundreds of billions more.

    Iran, by contrast, operates with a defense budget of roughly $13 billion per year.

    Yet despite this staggering imbalance, Iran has not been defeated. The conflict instead highlighted the effectiveness of Iran’s asymmetric strategy—one developed over decades of sanctions and isolation.

    Unable to purchase advanced Western weapons systems, Iran built a military doctrine based on:

    • indigenous technological development
    • decentralized defense networks
    • missile and drone capabilities
    • naval disruption tactics
    • proxy and irregular warfare strategies

    These tools are designed not to overpower an adversary directly but to raise the cost of confrontation to unacceptable levels.

    In essence, Iran has pursued a strategy of strategic deterrence through disruption rather than dominance.

    The recent conflict validated that approach. Even vastly superior military budgets cannot easily neutralize an opponent that refuses to fight on conventional terms.

    For future Iranian governments, this lesson may prove invaluable. Rather than attempting to compete in expensive arms races, Iran’s security doctrine may continue emphasizing innovation, resilience, and asymmetric leverage.

    Sanctions, ironically, forced the country to develop a unique and effective military model.


    Gift Four: Time

    Perhaps the most valuable gift of all is time.

    Wars are often won not by battlefield victories but by endurance. The side that can sustain pressure longer frequently gains the advantage.

    The Persian Gulf region plays a central role in global supply chains far beyond oil. It is a major source of natural gas, fertilizer components, sulfur, helium, and numerous industrial inputs critical to modern economies.

    Disruptions in the region quickly ripple outward:

    • fertilizer shortages affecting global agriculture
    • rising diesel costs impacting transportation and farming
    • supply disruptions in high-tech manufacturing
    • volatility in global commodity markets

    As the Western Hemisphere moves into planting season, increases in fertilizer and energy costs place immense pressure on farmers and food systems worldwide.

    In this context, Iran does not necessarily need to escalate the conflict militarily. Simply allowing tensions to persist imposes economic costs on the global system—and particularly on countries deeply integrated into global trade networks.

    Time, therefore, becomes a strategic asset.

    Even if the United States were to seize or occupy small islands in the Persian Gulf, maintaining such positions indefinitely would be costly and politically difficult. Would Washington realistically maintain permanent military deployments there for the next century?

    History suggests that prolonged foreign occupations are rarely sustainable.

    Iran, by contrast, is defending its immediate neighborhood. Geography once again favors endurance.


    Gift Five: A Fracture in the Western Coalition

    The fifth gift lies in diplomacy.

    The conflict was launched with limited consultation with key European and regional allies. The result has been a widening rift within the Western alliance structure.

    Many governments are increasingly reluctant to follow Washington into new confrontations in the Middle East. Public opinion across Europe and parts of Asia has grown skeptical of military escalation in the region.

    For Iran, this shift could prove transformative.

    For nearly five decades, international sanctions—particularly those driven by the United States—have severely constrained Iran’s economic engagement with the world. These restrictions have disproportionately harmed ordinary Iranians.

    But if the unity behind those sanctions weakens, opportunities may emerge for Iran to rebuild direct relationships with European and Asian economies.

    Diplomatic space is opening where previously there was only containment.

    Even within the United States, policymakers may begin reassessing long-standing assumptions about regional alliances and intelligence assessments that have shaped policy for decades.

    If the political momentum behind sanctions erodes, Iran’s global economic reintegration could accelerate, with much more space for Iran to operate without the US in the picture.


    But there is “One Huge Opportunity.”

    All these developments lead to a final and perhaps most consequential question: what if this moment becomes an opportunity rather than merely the aftermath of a crisis?

    For the United States, the war may have revealed uncomfortable truths. Decades of containment have not removed Iran from the strategic map. Geography, resources, and demographics ensure that Iran will remain a central player in the region, and that its allies were merely self-interested in proposing the containment and destruction of Iran. The US had not properly assessed the strategic landscape in following their guidance.   

    Rather than perpetual confrontation, Washington could consider a radically different strategic approach.

    Such an approach might include:

    • economic cooperation in Iran’s vast oil and gas sector
    • infrastructure development and reconstruction projects
    • commercial aviation and transportation partnerships
    • joint ventures in nuclear energy for civilian power generation
    • expanded regional security frameworks that include Iran rather than isolate it

    Much like in Venezuela, American involvement in Iran’s oil and gas industry would not only support the continued success of US multinationals but also provide leverage against an energy-hungry China that the US badly needs to engage in favorable partnerships.

    American companies could play a major role in rebuilding Iran’s infrastructure and energy industries. Investment opportunities would be enormous. Remember, Iran has no sovereign debt (because of decades of sanctions). If it opens, it can easily finance trillions of dollars of new projects. Not the least of these would be new transportation corridors in more strategic locations. This could literally mean hundreds of new orders for Boeing and GE. It would provide a massive economic boost to the U.S. Iran could also become a new buyer of US treasuries and support the supremacy of the dollar.  

    A joint enrichment facility between the US and Iran could lead to exports of fuel to Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s nuclear industry and stop them from starting their own enrichment facilities, i.e., pose the same risks Iran appeared to pose these past few decades. Plus, a “joint” venture would fully control Iran’s facilities and make sure they complied with the necessary safeguards.

    Strategically, the United States might even reconsider the structure of its regional military posture. Long-standing bases in smaller Gulf states exist largely because relations with Iran have remained hostile. Iran will also provide a gateway to Central Asia, enabling the US to penetrate another critical strategic region. Iran can become America’s regional policeman – helping improve Afghanistan, for example. A realigned Iran would be an incredible US ally (which, by the way, the Shah once was).

    A different relationship could reshape the entire architecture of American engagement in the region. This would not require abandoning existing allies. Rather, it would involve recalibrating U.S. policy to prioritize American interests over regional rivalries that have often shaped Washington’s decisions.

    History contains surprising precedents. During certain periods in the 1980s and early 2000s, the United States and Iran quietly cooperated on issues related to Afghanistan and Iraq. Strategic engagement has occurred before, albeit behind closed doors.

    The difference now is that such engagement could be overt and transformative.

    A Chinese proverb states that every crisis contains an opportunity. Two sides of the same coin.

    The recent conflict may have unintentionally strengthened Iran’s strategic position. But it also presents a rare chance for a reset in U.S.–Iran relations—one that could stabilize the region and unlock immense economic potential.

    Whether that opportunity is seized depends on political leadership.

    If Washington and Tehran can move beyond decades of mistrust, the next chapter of Middle Eastern history might look very different from the last.

    And what began as a confrontation could ultimately evolve into cooperation. If nothing else, the mullahs are unprincipled opportunists. Faced with the prospect of a massive upside to this relationship, they would not squander a completely new strategic opportunity (especially if they thought they would prosper as a result). Remember, these were the guys who turned 180 degrees on Jimmy Carter and aligned with Ronald Reagan when they realized it was a strategic necessity for survival. I would keep Netanyahu, Kushner, and Witkoff out of it. Frankly, I think Netanyahu’s days are over. His rosy and highly optimistic view of how this war would turn out was his downfall. He’s done. It doesn’t mean the US abandons Israel; it means it finally recognizes what a dog Netanyahu is and has been. If you sleep with dogs, you get up with fleas.

    Now, it’s time for the US to recognize and assert its own interests and make this new “strategic” possibility a reality. The future of this conflict lies in diplomacy, not military maneuvers.  Vance can and should make this happen. He needs to walk in, look at the Iranians on the other side of the table, and say, “We need to look beyond this conflict, and Israel, and be courageous, be historic, and turn this conflict 180 degrees into an alliance. Turn conflict into cooperation.”

  • Imperial Hubris (How the United States Lost Every Extended War of the Past Fifty Years)

    For much of the twentieth century, the United States cultivated the image of an unstoppable military power. From the beaches of Normandy to the Pacific island campaigns of World War II, American forces appeared decisive, overwhelming, and victorious. That image hardened during the Cold War, when Washington built the most sophisticated military apparatus in history—hundreds of overseas bases, carrier strike groups roaming every ocean, intelligence networks spanning the globe, and a defense budget larger than those of the next several countries combined.

    Yet when one looks at the actual record of the past fifty years, a striking pattern emerges. Despite unmatched technological superiority and enormous financial resources, the United States has struggled to achieve decisive victories. Again, American military campaigns have ended not with clear strategic success but with stalemate, withdrawal, or political outcomes far removed from their original objectives.

    The problem has not been a lack of power. It has been something deeper: imperial hubris.

    Vietnam and the End of Invincibility

    The modern story begins with the long shadow of Vietnam.

    When the United States escalated its involvement in the 1960s, American planners believed that superior technology, firepower, and logistics would inevitably defeat the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong insurgency. By the peak of the conflict, more than half a million American troops were deployed. The United States dropped more bombs on Vietnam than had been used in all of World War II.

    None of them produced victory.

    Vietnam revealed a structural problem that would haunt American strategy for decades: military dominance does not automatically translate into political success. The United States could win battles, destroy enemy formations, and temporarily control territory—but it could not impose a stable political order that the local population would accept.

    In 1975, when Saigon fell, and American helicopters evacuated the last personnel from the embassy rooftop, the myth of American invincibility was shattered before the entire world.

    But Washington never fully absorbed the lesson.

    The Mirage of High-Tech War

    For a moment in 1991, the United States appeared to have recovered its aura of dominance during the Gulf War.

    The campaign to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait was swift and devastating. Precision-guided weapons struck targets with unprecedented accuracy. American armored columns swept across the desert and crushed Saddam Hussein’s army in a matter of weeks. Television viewers witnessed what appeared to be the birth of a new era of technological warfare.

    But the Gulf War was something of an illusion.

    The United States deliberately limited its objectives. Saddam Hussein remained in power. Iraq remained unstable. The regional political structure remained unresolved. What appeared to be a decisive victory was a short and tightly constrained military operation—not the kind of complex occupation or nation-building project that would define the wars to come.

    When the United States attempted those larger ambitions, the results proved dramatically different.

    Afghanistan: The Forever War

    After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan with the aim of destroying al-Qaeda and removing the Taliban from power. At first, the operation seemed successful. Within weeks, the Taliban government collapsed, and American officials spoke confidently about building a democratic Afghanistan.

    But the war did not end.

    Instead, it evolved into a grinding two-decade conflict marked by insurgency, corruption, and strategic drift. The United States spent more than two trillion dollars attempting to stabilize the country, train Afghan security forces, and construct democratic institutions.

    Yet the Afghan government never developed the legitimacy or strength required to stand on its own.

    In August 2021, as American forces withdrew, the Taliban swept across the country with astonishing speed. Kabul fell within days. The same movement that the United States had overthrown twenty years earlier returned to power.

    The longest war in American history ended almost exactly where it began.

    Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Country

    If Afghanistan was the longest American war, Iraq may have been the most consequential failure.

    In 2003, the United States invaded Iraq under the claim that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and posed an imminent threat. Iraqi military resistance collapsed quickly under the assault of American forces, and Baghdad fell within weeks.

    But toppling a regime is not the same as building a state.

    The occupation dismantled Iraq’s existing institutions and unleashed a wave of sectarian conflict. Insurgencies multiplied. Militias emerged. Regional powers intervened. Out of chaos, extremist movements arose, including the group that would later call itself ISIS.

    Although American forces eventually withdrew in 2011, Iraq remains politically fragmented and deeply entangled in regional rivalries.

    Once again, battlefield dominance produced no lasting strategic victory.

    The Pattern of Intervention

    Beyond these major wars lies a broader pattern of interventions that achieved little in the way of durable stability.

    In Somalia, American forces entered a humanitarian mission that spiraled into urban combat and ended in withdrawal. In Libya, NATO intervention helped overthrow Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, but the country soon collapsed into rival militias and competing governments. In Syria, American involvement oscillated between counterterrorism operations and proxy warfare, yet the conflict continues with no stable political settlement.

    These episodes reveal a consistent pattern: American military power can dismantle regimes and destroy infrastructure with extraordinary speed, but replacing those systems with stable political orders has proven vastly more difficult.

    Destroying a state is easy. Building one is not.

    The Limits of Military Power

    At the heart of these failures lies a misunderstanding about the nature of modern conflict.

    The United States possesses unparalleled military capabilities—stealth aircraft, satellites, cyber tools, drones, and precision missiles capable of striking targets anywhere on Earth. In a conventional war against another traditional army, those advantages are overwhelming.

    But most modern wars are not conventional wars.

    They are insurgencies, proxy struggles, civil conflicts, and political contests fought among civilian populations. Victory in such conflicts depends less on technology than on legitimacy, alliances, and cultural understanding.

    Local actors fight for identity, history, religion, and power. They can absorb enormous losses and continue the struggle. They can disappear into the population, adapt tactics, and wait for foreign armies whose political patience eventually runs out.

    Time becomes their greatest weapon.

    The Domestic Clock

    Another challenge facing American wars is the domestic political clock.

    Long conflicts require sustained public support, but modern democracies rarely tolerate prolonged wars without clear progress. Casualties accumulate. Costs rise. Political divisions deepen.

    In Vietnam, public opposition eventually forced a withdrawal. In Iraq and Afghanistan, similar fatigue built as Americans increasingly questioned the purpose of wars that seemed endless.

    Meanwhile, the adversaries in these conflicts often operate at entirely different times. Insurgent movements and regional militias can endure hardship indefinitely if they believe foreign forces will eventually leave.

    Often, they are right. What works clearly are short, sharp operations. What doesn’t work are patently long-term military engagements. This has objectively been the pattern. Time is the true enemy of imperial military intervention.  

    The Iran War: A Familiar Path

    The current war with Iran threatens to follow the same trajectory.

    At first glance, the balance of power appears overwhelmingly favorable to the United States. American airpower, intelligence systems, cyber capabilities, and naval forces far exceed anything Iran can deploy. Initial strikes may damage Iranian infrastructure and disrupt its command structures.

    But strategic victory requires more than military superiority.

    Iran does not need to defeat the United States in open battle. It only needs to impose costs—economic, military, and political—until Washington decides the war is no longer worth sustaining.

    And Iran possesses numerous tools to do precisely that.

    Geography alone gives Tehran significant leverage. The country sits beside the Strait of Hormuz, through which a large portion of the world’s oil supply passes. Even partial disruption of that chokepoint can ripple through global energy markets, raising prices and amplifying economic pressure on the West and its allies.

    Iran also specializes in asymmetric warfare. Mines in shipping lanes, waves of drones, anti-ship missiles, cyber-attacks, and proxy militias across the region allow Tehran to escalate gradually without confronting the United States directly in a conventional fight.

    Such strategies favor endurance rather than firepower. What started off as a quick, sharp regime decapitation and change program has turned into an extended war.

    To sustain this operation, the United States must maintain aircraft carriers, missile defenses, troop deployments, and complex supply chains thousands of miles from home. Iran operates in its own neighborhood. Every drone launched, every ship diverted, and every missile intercepted imposes incremental costs on Washington and its allies.

    Even if American strikes degrade Iran’s military infrastructure, the regime itself may survive and adapt—just as adversaries have done in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

    Meanwhile, the geopolitical consequences ripple outward. A prolonged Middle Eastern war diverts American attention and resources from other strategic theaters, particularly Asia. Rising energy prices strain global economies. Domestic political divisions deepen.

    These dynamics should feel familiar by now.

    Imperial Hubris

    Underlying these repeated miscalculations is the phenomenon known as imperial hubris.

    Great powers often assume that their strength allows them to reshape distant societies according to their own designs. They believe that superior technology, wealth, and organization will compensate for cultural distance and political complexity.

    History consistently proves otherwise.

    From the British in Afghanistan during the nineteenth century to the Soviets in the twentieth, powerful states have struggled to control societies whose internal dynamics they barely understood.

    The United States has encountered the same limits.

    Military planners often entered conflicts confident in their tools but insufficiently attentive to the political landscapes they sought to transform. Complex societies were reduced to strategic diagrams. Wars were launched with optimistic timelines and vague end states.

    Reality proved far messier.

    The Lesson of the Past Half-Century

    None of this means the United States lacks power. It remains one of the most formidable military and economic forces on Earth.

    But the record for the past fifty years suggests that overwhelming military capability does not guarantee strategic success.

    The age of easy victories is over. Military strength alone cannot remake societies, resolve ancient political conflicts, or impose legitimacy from the outside.

    Empires often learn this lesson slowly.

    The United States now faces a choice: absorb the experience of Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the emerging realities of the Iran war—or continue repeating the same cycle of intervention, escalation, and eventual withdrawal.

    History suggests that imperial hubris rarely disappears on its own. It usually ends only when reality becomes impossible to ignore. My prediction is that this military campaign in Iran won’t end well, but more importantly, it will have a profound and long-term impact on the status of the United States as an Imperial power.

  • The 47-Year Myth

    In Washington’s political vocabulary, certain phrases become ritual incantations. One of the most common in recent years—especially among allies of Donald Trump—is the claim that “the Iranian regime has been a menace for 47 years.” The phrase is meant to evoke an unbroken arc of hostility stretching from the Iranian Revolution of 1979 to the present day. In this telling, the Islamic Republic has been America’s implacable enemy from the moment the shah fell, and the clerics took power.

    But history is rarely that simple. Beneath the rhetoric lies a far more complicated story—one in which confrontation in public often coexisted with cooperation in private. The relationship between Washington and Tehran since 1979 has been defined not only by hostility, but also by a series of quiet bargains, tactical alignments, and covert understandings.

    The “47-year menace” narrative works politically because it compresses this complexity into a single storyline: permanent war between two irreconcilable systems. Yet the historical record shows something closer to intermittent rivalry punctuated by moments of pragmatic collaboration.

    From Revolution to Secret Channels

    The starting point of the myth is the trauma of 1979. The overthrow of the shah—long a key U.S. ally—and the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran created a foundational image of Iran as an implacable adversary. The hostage crisis dominated American politics and helped propel Ronald Reagan into the White House.

    Yet even before Reagan took office, whispers circulated about backchannel contacts between his campaign and Iranian intermediaries during the closing stages of the hostage crisis—a controversy often referred to as the “October Surprise.” In essence, the Shah was toppled by Jimmy Carter (who sent General “Dutch” Huyser to Tehran to tell the Shah’s military to stand down and support Khomeini). And Khomeini was flown in to Tehran on a French government-chartered Air France 747 from Paris. The Mullahs have been ‘western puppets’ for 47 years since the landing of that 747!!

    There had been a meeting in Guadeloupe where the Shah’s fate had been decided by the US and allies. They had serious grievances with the Shah, plus North Sea and Alaskan oil had come on stream, and they needed Iran’s oil exports curtailed to make room for this new oil and keep prices up. The Shah had been a long-time financial supporter of the Republican Party in the US, and Carter had a bone to pick with him.

    But then, the Mullahs became very suspicious of Carter and turned secretly to supporting Reagan’s campaign (by keeping the Embassy Hostages in place); and the rest, as they say, is history. They released the hostages a few seconds after Reagan assumed office. And there continued to be a multi-decade clandestine channel between Iran and the US, where arms were purchased for the Iran-Iraq war by the Mullahs at a huge premium, to help Reagan’s team fund the contras and buy Cocaine to import into the US (for distribution in swing states).

    This channel was revealed when investigations into the Iran-Contra affair were exposed. That secret contact was unmistakable.

    The Iran-Contra Reality

    The most striking contradiction to the “47-year enemy” narrative came during the Iran–Contra Affair in the mid-1980s. Despite publicly portraying Iran as a terrorist state, elements within the Reagan administration secretly sold weapons to Tehran. The goal was threefold: securing the release of hostages held in Lebanon, funding anti-communist rebels in Nicaragua, and purchase of large quantities of cocaine for importation into the US for distribution in ghettos in swing-states (which led to the incarceration of 10 million African Americans and the complete change in US electoral map, sweeping Republicans into Congress).

    Without Iran’s Mullahs, there would be NO Republican majorities in the House and Senate – because once you have a federal felony (i.e., drug possession), you can never vote again. Even today, 30 years later, there are, for example, in Florida, over 1 million U.S.-born citizens who can not vote because of their prior cocaine (drug possession) felonies.

    The scandal exposed a paradox at the heart of U.S.–Iran relations. Publicly, Washington condemned the Islamic Republic as one of its most dangerous adversaries. Privately, it was willing to trade arms with the very government it denounced. Not to be forgotten is that Israel participated in the toppling of the Shah and provided arms to the Mullahs during the Iran-Iraq war. Also, the Shia in Lebanon were right up to 1982, allied with Israel!

    The episode demonstrated a pattern that would repeat for decades: ideological hostility verbalized, but secret pragmatic engagement was pursued as interests aligned.

    Afghanistan: A Quiet Alliance After 9/11

    Nowhere was this engagement more visible than after the September 11 attacks in 2001. The Taliban government in Afghanistan—an adversary of both the United States and Iran— created a shared strategic objective.

    During the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Iranian officials reportedly provided intelligence, logistical assistance, direct access to fighters via Iranian proxies (i.e., Northern Alliance), and diplomatic cooperation to American forces. Tehran had long viewed the Taliban as a dangerous Sunni extremist movement and had nearly gone to war with them in the late 1990s.

    In the early stages of the war, Iranian diplomats even participated in negotiations that helped shape Afghanistan’s new political structure after the Taliban’s fall.

    Washington and Tehran were effectively aligned against a common enemy. Iran physically delivered ‘cash’ to major US allies on behalf of the US, to help them survive during the transitions.

    Iraq: Parallel Wars

    This pattern repeated itself during the Iraq wars. When the United States toppled Saddam Hussein in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it removed Iran’s most dangerous regional rival.

    The political forces that came to dominate post-Saddam Iraq—many of them Shiite parties and militias—had longstanding ties to Iran. In effect, the war created a new Iraqi political landscape in which American military power and Iranian influence operated simultaneously.

    While Washington and Tehran often competed for influence, they were also working within the same strategic reality: a new Iraq whose political order benefited both sides in different ways.

    This relationship soured when there was intelligence that Iranians had assisted Iraqi militia with roadside bombings of US troops. While Iran was clearly involved, it is also known that Israel clandestinely assisted too, to implicate Iran in these events. Mossad has a long history of this sort of activity, most recently with the bombing of the US embassy in Riyadh (blamed on the Iranians), but later confessions by Mossad operatives who were apprehended revealed Israel’s hand.

    Regardless, Iran provided considerable assistance to Iraq’s post-war stabilization, thereby assisting the US. It provided major commodities like Kerosene, cement, tires, and most crucially, electricity, while Iraq rebuilt its electricity infrastructure due to the bombings. Without Iran, Iraq would have been an even greater quagmire for the United States.

    And remember, there were multiple campaigns in Iraq. And not to be overlooked is the considerable intelligence shared during both campaigns, which ensured the US invasions’ success. The US had no one on the ground in Iraq before the invasions.

    This uneasy overlap again challenges the idea of uninterrupted hostility between the Mullahs and the U.S.

    Intelligence and Shared Interests

    Even beyond battlefield politics, the relationship has periodically involved intelligence exchanges and indirect cooperation through intermediaries. Governments that publicly denounce each other often maintain quiet channels of communication when mutual interests emerge, especially in dealing with extremist groups, regional conflicts, or covert activities. Iranians have provided the U.S. with considerable intelligence on Israeli activities in the U.S., too.

    These contacts rarely become public because they undermine the narratives each side presents to its domestic audience. While Reagan or Rafsanjani called each other evil, they privately exchanged signed Bibles. While Bush called Iran part of the Axis of Evil, he secretly planned invasions with Iran’s military.

    It has become a game. But they are part of the real architecture of international politics.

    The Politics of the “47-Year Enemy.”

    Why, then, does the “47-year menace” narrative persist?

    The answer lies less in history than in political messaging. Portraying Iran as a constant and unchanging enemy simplifies complex geopolitical dynamics into a moral drama: democracy versus theocracy, freedom versus extremism.

    For politicians seeking public support for sanctions, military pressure, or regime-change rhetoric, such simplicity is powerful.

    Yet it obscures a central truth: adversaries often cooperate when circumstances demand it.

    Throughout the past four decades, Washington and Tehran have repeatedly found themselves aligned against common threats—from the Taliban to Saddam Hussein—even while maintaining a posture of public hostility.

    The Real Story

    None of this means the relationship has been a friend-fest. Far from it. The United States and Iran have also clashed across multiple fronts: sanctions, proxy conflicts, nuclear disputes, and regional rivalries.

    But the historical record does not support the idea of a simple, uninterrupted 47-year war.

    Instead, it reveals a far more nuanced pattern—one in which confrontation, covert diplomacy, and occasional cooperation have coexisted.

    The myth of permanent enmity survives because it serves political purposes. In a very tight and difficult political landscape in Israel, enmity with Iran provides a useful enemy and votes. Iran, as a pariah, has helped motivate Arabs to buy literally Trillions of dollars of arms – notably Saudi Arabia and UAE – with minuscule populations ranking 2nd or 3rd globally for every year in the last 20 years, in terms of expenditures on arms exported from the US.

    Indeed, all these Arab states on the Persian Gulf have profited handsomely from Iran’s demise. Iran has been a useful enemy and a strategically useful secret partner. The reality is messy.

    And the story of the past four decades between Washington and Tehran is less a tale of perpetual hostility than one of shifting alignments, hidden negotiations, and pragmatic bargains conducted behind the scenes.

    In other words, the “47-year menace” narrative may be rhetorically powerful—but as history shows, it is far from the whole truth.

    The core issue is that Trump has fired almost every Iran expert. It has relied on Israel for narratives (that politically suit Netanyahu), but has no basis within the Administration to verify the information he is given. He’s put a religious fruitcake schoolboy in the Department of War and has no one with any real experience to share on the ‘actual’ history of relations and to do serious diplomacy and war planning.

    The Mullahs in Iran are called the “Ayatoilets”, because they have been nothing but a Western-planted government put in place to shit on Iran. The whole idea has been to keep them in power, use the (false) nuclear pretext to keep them sanctioned and contained, and to force them into subservience as needed.

    Iranians know this. Apparently, Trump doesn’t! He’s completely missed the boat. He’s torn up the guidebook and unleashed a war, with no capacity now to contain events. Not unreasonably, the Mullahs have lost complete trust in their masters! And there will be blowback. Let’s not forget that Osama Bin Laden was a US asset once upon a time, too!

    And the outcome now is a war of choice that has already led to a serious economic catastrophe, with a high probability of further expansion (much to the detriment of US national interests). It’s simply moronic. They have no idea how useful the Mullahs have been for US national interests. The situation today is analogous to the toppling of the Shah, where he had served US national interests for several decades, only to find himself toppled by the U.S., branded as an evil dictator by the very masters he served.

    When they talk about a 47-year menace, they don’t know what they are talking about.  The very best outcome now would be if Mullahs/Netanyahu/Trump simply destroy each other … i.e., a MAD war that provides mutually assured devastation. And then ordinary Iranians and Americans can pick up the pieces, re-establish their democracies, and protect their national interests against Israel’s evil government (not people). Like a gang of killers and thieves sitting around a table: they are ALL evil with a long history of betraying each other.  

  • Turning War into Leverage: Iran, Negotiations, and the Chance for a New Regional Order

    Wars are terrible instruments of policy. But history shows they are also powerful instruments of leverage. When guns fall silent, battlefield advantage can often be converted into diplomatic advantage. The question for Iran, if negotiations emerge from the current crisis, is not merely how to end the war—it is how to use the moment to reshape the political architecture of the Middle East.

    Too often, wars in the region end in narrow arrangements that solve nothing. A ceasefire is declared, the front lines freeze, sanctions remain in place, and the deeper conflicts continue to simmer until the next round of violence erupts. That cycle has defined the region for decades. If diplomacy follows this war, repeating that pattern would be a historic mistake.

    This is a unique opportunity. Neither Israel nor the US expected a protracted war, and their overall calculations regarding their desired outcome have turned out poorly. With the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, it is not only the reduction in oil and natural gas exports that is causing a hike in energy prices, but also the major global dependence on Sulphur, Fertilizers, and Helium exports from the region, which is having a devastating impact. An extended war, or further regional conflict, would be catastrophic. In addition, Iran’s continuous bombing of Israel and its neighbors in the southern Persian Gulf, has been devastating, and shows no sign of abatement.

    Iran, therefore, enters these negotiations in a very strong position with the ability to make several obvious demands. Relief of Sanctions must be on the table; an economy cannot be expected to function indefinitely under a permanent regime of economic siege. Reparations for wartime damage will also be part of the conversation, as they are after nearly every major conflict. And perhaps most importantly from Tehran’s perspective, the presence of U.S. military forces across the region would have to be reconsidered.

    For years, Iran has argued that the vast network of American bases—from Bahrain and Qatar to Iraq and Syria—creates an artificial military pressure system around its borders. Whether one agrees with that view or not, the argument will almost certainly be central in any negotiations. If the war produces a diplomatic settlement, Tehran will push for a reduction or withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region as part of a broader security arrangement.

    But if Iran limits its ambitions to sanctions relief and troop withdrawals, it will have missed a much larger opportunity. The underlying causes of the conflict need to be considered. There must be a systematic approach to the problem. This war did not emerge from a vacuum. It is embedded in a regional structure that has been unstable for generations: unresolved territorial disputes, the absence of a Palestinian state, competing military alliances, and a nuclear imbalance that remains largely unaddressed.

    If negotiations are going to happen anyway, the moment should be used to address those structural problems rather than postpone them yet again. Indeed, if the Ukraine peace negotiations are to serve as a useful case study, there were multiple “Minsk (Peace) Agreements” that were completely undermined by the United States, Europe, and Ukraine’s dual national (Israeli-Ukrainian) Leader (Zelensky). Peace negotiations with the United States or its allies are useless; their record of honoring agreements is very poor. Indeed, Iran was in the midst of two separate negotiations with the US, which apparently were running smoothly, when, surprisingly, war broke out each time.

    Without these underlying issues being addressed, the deals mean nothing.

    At the center of that conversation sits Israel and its regional conflicts. For decades, the international community has treated it as a problem to be managed rather than resolved. Endless rounds of talks have produced interim agreements, temporary arrangements, and partial understandings—but never a final settlement.

    A serious diplomatic framework emerging from this war would have to revisit that question directly. The creation of a fully independent Palestinian state alongside Israel remains the only solution that has ever commanded broad international support. Yet the political will to implement it has repeatedly evaporated.

    If negotiations are underway, that issue cannot remain permanently deferred. The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is not merely a local dispute; it is one of the central fault lines shaping politics across the Middle East. Any attempt to build a durable regional peace that ignores it is unlikely to succeed.

    Closely tied to this question are the territories whose status remains unresolved: Gaza, the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and contested areas along the Lebanese border. These places have served as flashpoints for decades. Any genuine regional settlement would have to address their status within a broader framework of security guarantees and internationally recognized borders.

    Another possibility— periodically proposed in diplomatic circles—is the internationalization of Jerusalem, under UN jurisdiction.

    Few cities in the world carry the symbolic weight of Jerusalem. It is sacred to multiple faiths and claimed politically by competing national movements. For that reason, some have argued that the city might ultimately function better as an international district rather than the exclusive capital of any single state.

    Under such a model, Jerusalem would be administered under a United Nations mandate, with protections for all religious communities and guaranteed access to holy sites. In a more ambitious version of the idea, the city could become a permanent international hub for diplomacy, hosting major UN institutions – such as the Security Council and the General Assembly – as well as global forums. Jerusalem is uniquely positioned to support major business time zones around the world. It is a natural site for a reformed and transformed United Nations.

    It is time to revisit the overall structure of the United Nations, which has been completely unable to address these regional conflicts and Israel’s continuous defiance of its resolutions. I will save it for another blog, but I believe the UN should be transformed into a United Unions (with 12 Unions [US, Russia, China, India, EU, CANZUK, AU, AL, UNASUR, ASEAN, MEDIA, etc] at the Security Council, and all its agency activities distributed to 12 Union Capitals around the world). The UN is too large, too bureaucratic, and too ineffective. It’s time for a major change.

    The symbolism of Jerusalem would be powerful: a city that has been fought over for centuries can become a center of international governance.

    History shows that seemingly impossible proposals sometimes become feasible in the aftermath of major geopolitical shocks. The creation of the United Nations itself was born from the devastation of World War II.

    A broader regional settlement would also have to confront the nuclear question.

    For decades, diplomats have discussed the possibility of the overall region becoming free of nuclear weapons. The idea appears regularly in international forums but has never been realized. The region today exists in a strange strategic imbalance: some states operate under strict nuclear restrictions while others are widely believed to possess nuclear capabilities outside the formal non-proliferation framework. It is patently unbalanced to ask Iran to abandon any nuclear ambitions without Israel having to do the same.

    Any long-term security arrangement would eventually have to address that imbalance. A credible regional denuclearization framework—if it could be negotiated—would require unprecedented transparency, verification mechanisms, and security guarantees from the world’s major powers.

    None of this would be easy. In fact, most of it would be extraordinarily difficult.

    But the alternative is to repeat the same pattern that has defined regional diplomacy for generations: end the war, patch together a temporary arrangement, and leave the underlying conflicts unresolved until the next explosion.

    Moments of crisis sometimes create narrow openings for structural change. Political leaders who were unwilling to compromise in normal times may become more flexible when confronted with the costs of prolonged instability.

    If negotiations follow this war, the real question will not simply be how to end a particular confrontation between Iran, Israel, and the United States.

    The real question will be whether the moment is used to rethink the regional order itself.

    History rarely offers such opportunities. When it does, the decisions made in those moments can shape the geopolitical landscape for decades to come.

  • The Great Irony of Iran: Why Israel’s plan backfired. (External Enemies Keep the Islamic Republic Alive)

    There is a profound and uncomfortable irony at the heart of modern Iranian politics.

    Many outside observers assume that external pressure—especially from Israel or the United States—will weaken the Islamic Republic and hasten its collapse. Sanctions, covert operations, cyberattacks, and military confrontation are often justified on the assumption that they will push Iranian society toward revolt.

    But inside Iran, the political dynamic often works in exactly the opposite direction.

    The uncomfortable truth is this: external enemies frequently strengthen the very regime they are meant to destroy.

    In fact, one could argue that if the Israeli confrontation disappeared from the geopolitical landscape, the Islamic Republic would face far greater danger from its own people.

    That is the great irony.


    Iran’s Regime Is Weak at Home

    Despite the image of a rigid and tightly controlled system, the Islamic Republic faces deep and persistent dissatisfaction inside the country.

    Over the past two decades, Iran has experienced repeated waves of unrest:

    • the Green Movement
    • the 2017–2018 Iranian protests
    • the Mahsa Amini protests

    These protests were not marginal disturbances. They involved millions of people, spanned dozens of cities, and encompassed a wide range of grievances.

    The anger inside Iran is structural.

    Young people face chronic unemployment. Inflation has eroded living standards. Corruption scandals regularly surface among political elites. Social restrictions—especially on women—generate constant tension with younger generations.

    Iran’s population is also extremely young and highly educated. Millions of Iranians are globally connected through the internet and acutely aware of the gap between their aspirations and the reality of life under the current system.

    In a purely domestic context, these pressures could easily generate sustained revolutionary momentum.

    But Iran rarely operates in a purely domestic context.


    The Rally-Around-the-Flag Effect

    Whenever a country faces a visible external threat, internal politics change dramatically. Political scientists call this the “rally-around-the-flag” effect.

    In moments of perceived national danger, societies often suspend internal conflicts and unite against the outside adversary.

    Iran is no exception.

    Many Iranians may strongly dislike their government, but they also possess a powerful sense of national identity that predates the Islamic Republic by thousands of years.

    Criticizing the government is one thing.

    Appearing to side with foreign adversaries attacking the country is something very different.

    This distinction matters enormously in Iranian political culture.


    Iran’s Long Memory of Foreign Interference

    Iranian nationalism is shaped by a deep historical memory of foreign intervention.

    Perhaps the most powerful example is the 1953 Iranian coup d’état, when British and American intelligence agencies helped overthrow Iran’s elected prime minister.

    For many Iranians—across the political spectrum—this episode remains a defining national trauma.

    It reinforced the belief that powerful outside actors repeatedly attempt to manipulate Iran’s internal politics.

    When external pressure rises today, that historical memory resurfaces quickly. Even critics of the regime often become wary of appearing aligned with foreign agendas.

    As a result, external confrontation tends to reframe domestic politics as a question of national survival rather than government legitimacy.


    Israel as the Regime’s Strategic Narrative

    Opposition to Israel occupies a central role in the ideological architecture of the Islamic Republic.

    It serves several purposes simultaneously.

    First, it provides religious legitimacy by positioning Iran as a defender of Muslim lands.
    Second, it sustains the regime’s revolutionary identity.
    Third, it elevates Iran’s geopolitical relevance across the Middle East.

    But there is also a crucial domestic dimension.

    The Israeli confrontation provides the regime with a powerful narrative framework: Iran is under siege by hostile external forces. More than this, Israel has been supporting separatist networks inside and outside Iran, and there is a real belief that Israel’s goal is not democratization but the balkanization of Iran i.e. to destroy Iran. And this is very scary to most Iranians.

    This narrative allows the government to frame dissent in a very particular way.

    Critics are no longer simply opposing government policy; they can be portrayed as weakening the nation in the face of foreign enemies.

    In this environment, internal revolt becomes far more difficult to sustain.


    The Power of Iranian Nationalism

    One of the most common misunderstandings outside Iran is the assumption that opposition to the government automatically translates into support for foreign pressure against the country.

    In reality, many Iranians hold two positions simultaneously:

    They oppose the Islamic Republic.

    But they oppose foreign attacks on Iran even more.

    Iranian identity is rooted in a long civilizational history stretching back millennia—far beyond the Islamic Republic or even the modern Iranian state.

    When the country faces external threats, that deeper national identity can quickly override internal political divisions.

    This dynamic repeatedly shields the regime from the full force of domestic discontent.


    War Has Strengthened the Regime Before

    History provides an important precedent.

    The Iran–Iraq War played a decisive role in consolidating the Islamic Republic during its fragile early years.

    The conflict created a powerful atmosphere of national mobilization. Revolutionary institutions strengthened their control over the state, opposition movements were suppressed, and the regime built enduring political legitimacy through wartime sacrifice.

    External conflict did not weaken the revolutionary government.

    It solidified it.

    Similar dynamics can reappear whenever Iran faces intense geopolitical confrontation.


    What Happens If the External Enemy Disappears?

    Now imagine a very different scenario.

    Imagine the Israeli confrontation disappears from the geopolitical equation.

    Imagine external pressure declines dramatically.

    In that environment, the regime loses its most powerful political shield.

    Public debate would no longer focus on national defense or geopolitical confrontation. Instead, attention would shift inward toward domestic issues:

    economic stagnation
    corruption among elites
    social restrictions
    political repression
    generational frustration

    Without the constant external threat narrative, the government would struggle to justify extraordinary security measures or economic sacrifice.

    The anger that is currently redirected outward would increasingly flow inward.

    This is the paradox.

    The Islamic Republic’s greatest vulnerability lies inside Iran—but external confrontation often helps neutralize that vulnerability.


    The Strategic Miscalculation

    For decades, many policymakers have assumed that pressure from outside the country will weaken the Iranian system and accelerate internal revolt.

    But political systems under external threat rarely behave that way.

    External pressure can strengthen nationalist sentiment, delegitimize domestic opposition movements, and allow governments to frame dissent as betrayal.

    In some cases, internal reform movements become stronger when external pressure decreases. Lower tensions create political space for society to focus on internal accountability rather than national survival. In a strange way, it paves the way for continuous reforms that can snowball into major change.

    This strategy was abandoned after the US walked out of the JCPOA agreement, which was designed to enable the reform movement to blossom. Instead, they had eggs on their faces and were completely delegitimized.

    The war today will make it harder for these forces to re-emerge. The decapitation of the regime has led to hardliners taking over in large numbers and a de facto coup by the IRGC of Iran’s government.


    The Great Irony

    This brings us back to the central irony.

    The Islamic Republic faces deep dissatisfaction among its own people.

    Yet the presence of powerful external adversaries—especially Israel—often reinforces the regime’s ability to survive.

    The more visible the external confrontation becomes, the easier it is for the government to rally society around national defense.

    And the quieter that confrontation becomes, the more exposed the regime is to the frustrations of its own citizens.

    In other words:

    The Islamic Republic’s greatest weakness is internal.

    But the presence of external enemies frequently protects it from that weakness.

    That is the great irony of Iran.

  • Trump is Trapped – This is a War America Cannot Exit Easily!

    Wars are often sold as brief episodes of coercion. A few strikes, a few demonstrations of force, a few calculated escalations — and then, supposedly, the other side folds. That appears to have been the original fantasy behind the American war on Iran: strike hard, move fast, intimidate Tehran, and finish the campaign before oil markets fully grasped what was happening. This was, after all, the template for Venezuela that worked so well. Netanyahu, Witkoff, and Kushner had Trump’s ear, and they made the case that this would be a slam-dunk, and Trump bought it. He had also made promises to demonstrators in Iran and faced a massive loss of credibility (which meant he had to do something).

    But the fantasy he bought into is now colliding with reality.

    The losses the United States is incurring in this war are beginning to accumulate in ways that can no longer be dismissed as trivial friction. Iran has reportedly managed to destroy at least ten radar installations across the Middle East. Most were American-owned, while the rest had been supplied to U.S. allies. That matters far beyond symbolism. Early-warning radar is what gives a missile defense network depth and reaction time. When those installations are knocked out, more Iranian missiles slip through the defensive curtain. That means greater vulnerability not only for

    American bases, but for regional infrastructure and for Israel as well.

    The air war, too, is proving more difficult than the public mythology of American dominance would suggest. U.S. Central Command reportedly acknowledged that Iranian air defenses managed to hit at least one F-35 stealth fighter. The pilot was reportedly injured, and the aircraft made what was described as a “hard landing” — diplomatic language that may conceal a far more serious loss. Whatever the precise details, the broader significance is clear. It punctures the old Lockheed Martin fantasy of invisibility and undermines the convenient claim that Iran has somehow lost control of its own airspace. If Iranian defenses are still capable of threatening advanced American aircraft, then Washington cannot simply shift to cheap gravity bombing and routine strike packages. It must continue to rely on expensive and scarce standoff munitions, which means the war remains both militarily constrained and financially costly.

    Elsewhere, the attrition is mounting by inches. The aircraft carrier Ford reportedly had to leave the region for repairs after a fire destroyed some six hundred berths aboard the ship. Already infamous for technical problems, the vessel may now require a far longer overhaul than anyone wants to admit. A second carrier has reportedly been pulled back to the southern Arabian Sea for fear that it, too, could be exposed to Iranian attack. That retreat creates another problem: distance. The farther carriers are pushed from the battlespace, the more American air operations depend on time-consuming aerial refueling.

    And even that refueling architecture is showing signs of strain. Some five U.S. KC-135 tankers were reportedly hit during an Iranian strike on Saudi Arabia. Another was lost, and another was damaged, in an in-air collision. At least three F-15s are said to have been destroyed in alleged friendly-fire incidents near Kuwait. Of the hundred MQ-9 Reaper drones the United States has acquired, roughly ten have reportedly been lost in recent reconnaissance missions over Iran.

    None of this, taken individually, would cripple a military as large as that of the United States. But wars are not measured only by catastrophic single events. They are measured by accumulation. And this war is still only in its third week. Losses that seem manageable on day twenty-one can look very different on day sixty, day ninety, or day one hundred and twenty.

    Against that background, Washington is moving more forces toward the theater. An Amphibious Readiness Group of three ships carrying roughly 2,200 Marines has reportedly been ordered from Japan to the Middle East, while another is expected to leave San Diego. Yet these deployments are less impressive than the headlines suggest. Each ARG — effectively a Marine Expeditionary Unit — contains only about 800 troops suited for actual ground combat operations. The rest are support and logistics personnel. These are forces designed for raids, beach assaults, seizures of landing strips, and short-duration expeditionary missions. They can support themselves for perhaps a week before they require relief by larger conventional forces. Those follow-on forces are still missing.

    That is why the speculation surrounding dramatic American landing operations deserves much more skepticism than it has received. There has been chatter about seizing Kharg Island, the key terminal from which Iranian oil is loaded for export. But to reach Kharg, U.S. amphibious forces would have to pass through the Strait of Hormuz under intensely dangerous conditions. And taking the island would be only the beginning. Holding it under Iranian artillery, missiles, and drone attack would be a profoundly costly undertaking — less a clean operation than a suicide mission.

    The smaller Iranian islands within the Strait are often discussed as easier alternatives. They are not. They, too, lie well within Iranian strike range. Occupying any of them would require a sustained campaign and a willingness to absorb losses on a scale that Washington has shown little appetite for in recent years.

    The same goes for the loud talk of reopening the Strait of Hormuz by escorting civilian shipping. In theory, of course, the United States can do this. In practice, the forces required are simply not in place. A genuine convoy-protection mission would need roughly a dozen destroyers, minesweepers, and substantial aerial support. Yet at least two of the three U.S. minesweepers that should be in the Middle East are reportedly in Malaysia, while most available destroyers are already tied up protecting carriers. Reopening Hormuz is therefore not a matter of issuing orders and hoisting flags. It is a matter of assembling capabilities that may take weeks or even months to put into place.

    This is where the war begins to reveal its true structure. The Trump administration, by all appearances, hoped to finish the Iran campaign before oil prices truly moved. It wanted a coercive demonstration without a global energy shock. But Iran did not submit, and the chance for Washington simply to “chicken out” has narrowed sharply. It takes two sides to stop a war, and Iran has little incentive to make concessions while under attack. Yet even now, the administration appears not fully reconciled to the reality that it has wedged itself into a long, expansive conflict.

    Its desperate efforts to suppress oil prices make that plain.

    Under normal conditions, the world consumes roughly 100 million barrels of crude oil per day. With the Strait blocked or severely constrained, around 15 million barrels per day are effectively missing. The first market response to such a shock is to draw down reserves and stored inventories. Washington has reportedly lifted sanctions on Russian oil stored at sea and is considering doing the same for some 140 million barrels of floating Iranian reserves. Strategic petroleum reserves may also be tapped. But these are stopgaps, not solutions. The decisive issue in an oil shock is not merely the volume of reserves, but the flow rate — how much can be delivered to market per day. U.S. salt-cavern reserves can release around 1.2 million barrels a day. Total global reserve flow is around 2 million barrels a day. Against a 15-million-barrel daily shortfall, that is little more than a bandage on a severed artery.

    Paper prices are already diverging from physical reality. Futures may still hover around $100 a barrel, but product markets reportedly already exceed $150. Saudi forecasts point to $180 in early April, with $200 by mid-month no longer sounding far-fetched. Natural gas and LPG prices are likely to rise even more sharply, because roughly one-fifth of total capacity is now missing. And the problem does not end with fuel. Nearly half the global helium supply — essential for chip production — is disrupted. Sulfur becomes scarce. Urea and other fertilizers become far more expensive. Jet fuel and naphtha, both critical to modern industrial systems, are beginning to vanish from a reliable supply.

    This is what makes the Gulf War so dangerous: it is never only about oil.

    When jet fuel becomes scarce, air travel contracts. When fertilizers become scarce, food production suffers. When food prices rise, poorer societies do not merely complain — they fracture. Hunger creates unrest, riots, and revolt. The public may grumble first about gasoline prices, but the deeper consequences of a Gulf war arrive later, when the cost of food, transport, chemicals, manufacturing, and daily life begins to climb all at once.

    And yet this crisis is unfolding in a region whose supposed American partners are themselves among the world’s most fragile states.

    There is much loose talk about drawing the world’s most fragile states, the Gulf Arab monarchies, more directly into the war against Iran. But this language betrays a fundamental ignorance of what those states actually are. They are rich, yes. They possess formidable financial assets, glittering skylines, and impressive procurement contracts. But wealth is not the same as resilience.

    Demographically, they are brittle. In much of the Gulf, native citizens are either a narrow majority or a minority in their own states. The labor force, the service sector, construction, logistics, and even many strategic industries depend heavily on expatriate populations with no deep stake in national military projects. These are not societies built around mass mobilization, national sacrifice, or prolonged war-making capacity. They are societies built around rent distribution, managed consumption, imported labor, and political quiet.

    Geographically, they are exposed to almost unbelievable extremes. They are flat, urbanized, coastal, and intensely concentrated. Their critical infrastructure — ports, airports, oil terminals, desalination plants, petrochemical complexes, financial districts, luxury real estate, and tourist hubs — sits within reach of Iranian missiles and drones. They lack strategic depth. They cannot trade space for time. They cannot absorb sustained attack and simply retreat inland, because in many cases, there is scarcely any meaningful inland refuge to retreat into.

    Economically, they are even more vulnerable than they appear. Their two great industries are energy and tourism. Both are exquisitely sensitive to instability. Energy infrastructure can be struck directly. Tourism can be killed by fear alone. A missile landing near a luxury hotel, a drone over a skyline, a disruption at an airport, a refinery fire visible on social media — any of these can shatter the carefully cultivated image of safety on which Gulf tourism depends. The very sectors that generate wealth in the Gulf are the most easily disrupted sectors by war.

    In other words, the Gulf states are not in any serious position to take on Iran in a prolonged conflict. To ask them to do so would not be a strategy. It would be an invitation to economic self-destruction and perhaps internal instability.

    That, in turn, is why the United States will have trouble simply walking away.

    For decades, Washington has functioned as the armed guarantor of the Gulf order. It protects shipping lanes, underwrites the survival of monarchies, and provides the strategic umbrella beneath which oil exports, tourism, finance, and elite consumption can continue. If the Gulf states cannot themselves bear the burden of confrontation with Iran — and they cannot — then any escalation that threatens the regional system falls back, almost automatically, onto the United States.

    This is the trap.

    Washington cannot easily escalate to a decisive victory because Iran is too large, too armed, too capable of retaliation, and too integrated into the geography of Gulf disruption. But neither can Washington easily disengage, because the states it has spent decades protecting are structurally incapable of replacing American power. The Gulf monarchies are not Sparta with sovereign wealth funds. They are fragile commercial city-states with hydrocarbon rents, imported populations, exposed coastlines, and few real wartime options.

    The Trump administration would prefer a compliant but still resourceful Iran — weakened enough to submit, intact enough to remain useful. Israel and its American lobby seem to want something far more radical: the destruction of Iran and perhaps the broader shattering of the Gulf order itself. That is why there are increasing efforts to incite the Persian Gulf’s Arab states, and even Turkey, into openly joining the war. If these states can be dragged into direct confrontation, the battlefield widens, the burdens spread, and Washington may hope eventually to reduce its own visible role while continuing to supply weapons from behind the lines.

    That is a familiar pattern. It is also an extraordinarily dangerous one.

    Because if even one Gulf state takes the suicidal step of fighting Iran with its own means, it will not produce a neat anti-Iran coalition. It will produce cascading vulnerabilities across the peninsula, strikes on infrastructure, capital flight, a collapse in tourism, export disruptions, political anxiety, and the possibility that some of the world’s richest states begin to discover how little strategic depth money can buy.

    This is why the war on Iran is becoming something larger than a campaign. It is becoming a test of whether the entire Gulf order can survive sustained conflict. The United States is already paying military costs. It is sliding toward energy, economic, and strategic costs. Its local partners are too fragile to take over. Its enemies are too capable of being dismissed. And the assumptions that governed the opening days of the war — quick victory, manageable escalation, stable oil, intimidated Iran, secure Gulf allies — are dissolving one by one.

    What remains is the harsher truth.

    The region will never be the same. The region may never recover. This is very bad news globally, with many regions, i.e., Europeans and South Asians, heavily affected by the drop in trade with the region. They will never forgive Israel or the United States. And, American consumers facing higher energy costs, will also not forget that this was a war of choice.

    America is no longer fighting a war it can neatly win, and it is no longer free to leave a war whose consequences it can safely ignore. This is a huge strategic blunder with potentially catastrophic consequences and no off-ramp.

  • Boomerang: Kushner’s business plans in US and Israel Depend on Gulf Capital that is now at risk because of the Iran War (that he Peddled for Israel)!

    Introduction: The Fragility of The Region

    A new geopolitical architecture has quietly emerged in the region over the past decade. Unlike the alliance systems and ideological rivalries that defined much of the twentieth century, this newer order rests increasingly on capital flows, sovereign wealth, reconstruction finance, and cross-border economic integration. At the center of that network, unusually, sits Jared Kushner. After leaving government in 2021, Kushner founded Affinity Partners, an investment firm that went on to attract major backing from Gulf sovereign wealth. Reuters reported that by March 2025, the firm’s assets under management had risen to $4.8 billion after a fresh $1.5 billion injection from the Qatar Investment Authority and Abu Dhabi’s Lunate, on top of the earlier $2 billion commitment from Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund described by congressional investigators.

    That financial structure matters because the same Gulf states backing Kushner’s firm are also widely expected to fund a large share of Gaza’s eventual reconstruction. The World Bank, the United Nations, and the European Union estimated in early 2025 that rebuilding Gaza would cost more than $50 billion, and later estimates put the figure even higher. In other words, the same pool of Gulf capital sits behind two very different projects: private investment vehicles like Affinity Partners and the political economy of postwar reconstruction.

    But all this rests on one assumption: regional stability. A major war involving Iran threatens every layer of the arrangement. It threatens shipping routes, energy infrastructure, sovereign wealth deployment, reconstruction planning, and the commercial logic behind firms that depend on Gulf commitments. And with the reported overnight strike on Iran’s South Pars gas field and the subsequent attacks on Gulf energy sites, that threat is no longer theoretical. Reuters reported on March 18 and 19, 2026, that Iranian gas facilities at South Pars and Azaliyah were hit, that Tehran warned Gulf energy sites to evacuate, that Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG hub suffered extensive damage, and that oil prices surged above $110 a barrel.

    This is the contradiction at the heart of the new Middle East: the region’s economic future is being financed by states whose wealth depends on a level of security that war with Iran would destroy.

    Kushner and the Iran Negotiations Before the War

    Before the conflict escalated into open regional warfare, Kushner was reportedly not just a former official with opinions about Iran but an active participant in the late-stage diplomacy. Reuters reported on March 18, 2026, that the final U.S.-Iran negotiations were led by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, with Oman facilitating the talks. Other reporting from The Guardian described those Geneva negotiations as a serious diplomatic effort in which outside observers believed a deal might still have been possible.

    The critical hinge appears to have been the interpretation of Iranian intent. Reporting and commentary around the Geneva talks indicate that Kushner and others came away convinced that Iran was stalling. The Guardian reported that on the final day of talks, Iran offered a three- to five-year moratorium, while the U.S. side, after a phone consultation with Trump, returned demanding a ten-year arrangement instead. Negotiations were clearly proceeding.

    That matters because the question is not simply whether Kushner had views on Iran. The more important point is that he was reportedly part of the advisory and negotiating process immediately before the decision to escalate militarily, despite ongoing negotiations. In any White House, the judgment of trusted envoys can become decisive when diplomacy is wavering. If the president is told that the other side is negotiating in bad faith, delay begins to look like deception, and military options begin to appear more justified.

    Kushner’s every accusation was clearly a confession. The irony of the situation is that while Kushner was quick to assess that the Iranian side was negotiating in bad faith, in fact, Kushner himself was an Israeli pawn with a sub-agenda of torpedoing the negotiations and pushing for the war.

    He was never participating in good faith to begin with. His allegiance to Netanyahu’s agenda trumped any considerations of US or any other national interests, including his new partners from the Persian Gulf region, in every venture he is involved with. Kushner has been peddling and leveraging his access to power to great effect over the past 10 years, with tremendous success. Now the war with Iran will be placing all these ventures at risk. How moronic? Trump, too, will see a serious impact on his own business ventures with this Iran war. More on this in a future blog. But for now, let’s analyze Kushner’s exposure to the Iran war he peddled.

    Affinity Partners: Gulf Sovereign Wealth Meets Political Capital

    Affinity Partners sits exactly where geopolitics and capital intersect. Reuters reported that the firm’s assets jumped to $4.8 billion after new Gulf cash from Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund and Abu Dhabi’s Lunate, while congressional investigators had previously described Saudi Arabia’s $2 billion backing. That means the firm is not merely “Middle East connected” in a vague sense. Its financial spine is Gulf sovereign wealth.

    This is unusual not only because the investors are foreign states, but because the fund’s founder is a former senior U.S. policymaker who was deeply involved in Middle East diplomacy. Kushner’s defenders can reasonably say that post-government investing is common and that Gulf states invest widely. His critics can reasonably respond that this is not a generic case: it involves a former White House official whose relationships with Gulf rulers were formed while he was helping shape U.S. regional policy. Both points are true.

    What makes the structure fragile is its dependence on long-cycle confidence. Private equity needs committed capital, predictable exits, functioning capital markets, and tolerable political risk. It does not collapse simply because a war starts. But war can freeze deals, depress valuations, shut IPO windows, force investors to preserve liquidity, and make new fundraising materially harder. For a firm as closely tied to Gulf capital as Affinity Partners, regional instability is not background noise. It is a direct threat to the model.

    Gaza Reconstruction: The Same Gulf Money

    At the same time, the Gulf states backing Affinity are expected to underwrite a large portion of Gaza’s reconstruction. The World Bank, U.N., and EU put early rebuilding needs at over $50 billion, with later figures moving toward $70 billion and then $80 billion in updated scenarios. Western governments have signaled political support for reconstruction, but the practical assumption has long been that Gulf money will bear much of the financial burden.

    Qatar has long played a visible role in Gaza financing, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE have often preferred structured or multilateral channels. The point is not that all Gulf states play the same role. The point is that without Gulf sovereign wealth, large-scale reconstruction does not look financially plausible.

    That means the same states financing private cross-border investment and the same states expected to fund Gaza’s rebuilding are drawing from the same strategic resource base. If those governments are forced to divert capital toward war-readiness, infrastructure repair, shipping security, or domestic stabilization, both tracks suffer. Gaza reconstruction slows, and global investment platforms tied to Gulf liquidity feel the squeeze.

    The Overnight Strike on South Pars and Why Qatar Is Financially Exposed

    This is where last night’s attack on South Pars becomes pivotal. Reuters reported that Iranian gas facilities at South Pars and Asaluyeh were hit on March 18, 2026, in the first known strike on Iranian Gulf energy infrastructure in the current war. South Pars matters because it is Iran’s side of the giant offshore gas reservoir shared with Qatar, where it is known as the North Field. Reuters described South Pars as part of the world’s largest gas field shared by Iran and Qatar.

    For Qatar, that is not just a geological fact. It is the foundation of the state’s financial model. Qatar’s LNG wealth underpins the national budget, the Qatar Investment Authority, global acquisitions, domestic infrastructure, and diplomatic leverage. When Reuters reported that Qatar had suspended LNG production amid the war and that damage at Ras Laffan threatened roughly a fifth of global LNG supply, it underscored how quickly military escalation can mutate into financial shock.

    Even if the Iranian and Qatari installations are technically separate, they are part of the same strategic energy system. A strike on South Pars does at least three things at once. First, it introduces direct risk to the shared basin and raises concerns about production continuity. Second, it creates a security shock across the whole gas complex, because once one side is targeted, the other must assume it may be next. Third, it magnifies the risk to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, where both oil and LNG flows are vulnerable to disruption. Reuters reported that after the strike, Tehran warned facilities in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar to evacuate, and then retaliatory attacks hit Gulf energy infrastructure, including Qatar’s Ras Laffan industrial area.

    In financial terms, that means Qatar is not just another Gulf investor in Kushner’s fund. It is a state whose core revenue engine is directly vulnerable to the expansion of war.

    The Strategic Contradiction at the Core of the System

    Taken together, the contradiction is stark. The Gulf states are expected to finance Gaza’s reconstruction. They also anchor global investment platforms like Affinity Partners. But their sovereign wealth rests on hydrocarbon revenues and energy infrastructure that become acutely vulnerable in a war with Iran. And once those revenues are threatened, the logic of sovereign deployment changes.

    In ordinary times, Gulf states can think like long-horizon investors. In wartime, they think like states under threat. Liquidity matters more than expansion. Security matters more than return. Domestic resilience matters more than global dealmaking.

    This is why the idea that war and economic integration can proceed in parallel is so unstable. You cannot build a regional order on Gulf money while also courting a war that threatens the source of that money. The same strike that shakes Qatar’s LNG system also shakes the capital base of its sovereign fund. The same escalation that pushes oil and gas prices higher can also force sovereign investors to delay commitments, preserve cash, and rethink political exposure.

    The Conflict-of-Interest Debate

    That brings the Kushner issue into sharper focus. The most responsible formulation is not that a conflict of interest has been proved. The more precise point is that the overlap is structurally troubling. Kushner helped shape U.S. policy toward the region, cultivated close relationships with Gulf rulers, later founded a firm financed by those states, and was reportedly involved in the diplomacy immediately preceding the present war.

    Critics argue that this creates an appearance problem of the highest order: policy, access, capital, and personal business all sit too close together. Supporters reply that his views on Iran are broadly aligned with long-standing hawkish currents in Washington and that there is no evidence that he acted for private gain. That debate will continue. But regardless of where one lands on motive, the architecture itself is clear.

    Kushner’s financial fortunes are tied to the very Gulf system now endangered by war. The Iranian side clearly knows this. Trump’s overnight tweet threatened the Iranians with massive retaliation by the US if attacks on Qatar proceeded. This makes further attacks on Qatar even more appealing for the Iranians, because of the linkages to Kushner’s (and Trump’s) personal businesses and aspirations. They do not need to bankrupt the US; they can be more focused and bankrupt Kushner and Trump by shaking Qatar’s core economic interests.

    Conclusion: A Financial Order Built on Stability

    The story here is larger than Jared Kushner, though he is a revealing focal point. What it shows is that the region is not just a theater of war and diplomacy. It is also a financial order built on sovereign wealth, energy revenue, reconstruction planning, and cross-border investment. Affinity Partners is one expression of that order. Gaza reconstruction is another. Qatar’s North Field wealth is another story.

    And all of them depend on stability.

    A wider Iran war threatens shipping lanes, energy installations, LNG production, sovereign wealth deployment, reconstruction finance, and the fundraising environment for Gulf-backed private equity. The overnight strike on South Pars and the retaliatory attacks on Gulf energy sites show how quickly the chain reaction can begin.

    So, the central question is no longer abstract. It is not whether war might be bad for business in some generic sense. It is whether the same political actors who helped build a Gulf-financed regional order have now helped endanger the financial foundations on which that order rests.

    That is the Kushner trap. If the Gulf underwrites the reconstruction, the investment funds, and the regional economic future, then any war that destabilizes Gulf revenue and confidence threatens the entire design at once. And if that continues, the pressure will not stop at oil markets or gas terminals. It will move through sovereign wealth portfolios, stalled reconstruction plans, and every investment vehicle built on the assumption that the Persian Gulf can remain both the engine of regional finance and the battlefield of regional war.

    By attacking Iran, Kushner has, in effect, bitten off the hand that fed him. He never appreciated the true value of a deal with Iran. There was an opportunity 10 years ago to provoke change in an ‘evolutionary’ process by leveraging the JCPOA to elevate the moderates inside the regime, push for sustained change inside Iran, and, in the process, draw Iran closer to the West and, slowly but surely, toward a democratic outcome. But that process was squandered by Trump himself.

    And now, the U.S. is bogged down in a regional quagmire, with a naïve and simple Trump (with Kushner’s assistance) following Netanyahu’s misguided lead to destroy the regime completely – only to find that the consequences threaten even his own interests. He never thought it through.

    He will now be scrambling to make an even worse deal than was already on the table, with people on the other side that may not come to the table at all. He’s in trouble. Iran will not relent. And it’s clear Iran has finally found Trump/Kushner’s underbelly.  

  • Trump’s Real (Nuclear) War Is in Fact Against Israel—Not Iran

    Do not be fooled. Nothing about the current moment is as it appears on the surface. The language is layered, the signals indirect, and the choreography deliberate. Public statements are wrapped in coded phrasing, political theater, and strategic misdirection. Beneath the spectacle of confrontation with Iran lies something far more complex—and far more unsettling. If one listens carefully to the words being spoken, examines the signals being sent, and follows the logic of escalation, a darker possibility begins to emerge that the conflict unfolding may ultimately place Israel, not Iran, at the center of the real strategic outcome.

    Consider first the language used by Donald Trump. In a recent statement, he declared that if Iran did not surrender, the United States would use force “twenty-five times greater than what we have used so far on Iran, until they surrender.” On its face, the remark sounds like conventional political bluster. Yet when examined closely, the numbers embedded within the statement raise a more troubling question: what precisely does “twenty-five times” the current level of force mean in technical terms?

    To understand this, we must begin with the most powerful weapon the United States has reportedly used thus far in its operations against Iran: the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, often abbreviated as the MOP. The name itself conveys its function. The weapon is a precision-guided bunker-buster bomb weighing roughly 30,000 pounds—approximately 14,000 kilograms—and measuring more than twenty feet in length. Designed specifically to penetrate hardened underground facilities, the bomb can drill through as much as 200 feet of concrete or rock before detonating. Only one aircraft in the American arsenal can carry such a weapon: the B-2 stealth bomber.

    In terms of explosive force, the GBU-57 produces a blast roughly equivalent to between eleven and thirty tons of TNT. This places it among the most powerful conventional bombs ever developed. In the reported strike against the bunker complex associated with Iran’s leadership in Tehran, two such bombs were allegedly used.

    If we take the upper end of that estimate, the combined explosive yield of two GBU-57 bombs would amount to approximately sixty tons of TNT. This is already an extraordinary amount of destructive power for a conventional strike. But Trump’s statement did not reference doubling or tripling that force. He spoke of multiplying it by twenty-five.

    What would that translate to?

    When one performs the arithmetic, the answer begins to move out of the realm of conventional weaponry. Twenty-five times sixty tons of TNT would produce a blast yield of roughly 1.5 kilotons. That number is significant, because it corresponds not to a conventional weapon but to the lower threshold of nuclear explosives.

    Within the current American nuclear arsenal exists a weapon whose capabilities fall within precisely that range: the W76-2 nuclear warhead. This is considered the smallest nuclear warhead currently deployed in the United States stockpile. Designed as a “low-yield” option, the W76-2 has an explosive power estimated at roughly five kilotons—though it can be configured for lower outputs. It is typically mounted on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, providing the United States with what strategists call a “flexible” or “tailored” nuclear response option. Even at its smallest configuration, however, its destructive power dwarfs that of any conventional bomb.

    To place the comparison in perspective, a five-kiloton nuclear explosion would possess roughly one hundred times the explosive force of a 30,000-pound bunker-buster. The arithmetic of Trump’s statement—twenty-five times the force already used—suddenly begins to resemble the threshold between conventional and nuclear warfare.

    In other words, the implication embedded in rhetoric is unmistakable: the next step in escalation could involve the use of a small nuclear weapon.

    The consequences of such detonation would be catastrophic. A nuclear blast in the kiloton range would not simply destroy the immediate target. The explosion would generate intense radiation capable of contaminating the surrounding region for miles. Depending on atmospheric conditions, lethal radiation exposure could extend outward for approximately seven miles from the detonation point, while radioactive fallout would persist far longer. With radioactive isotopes possessing half-lives measured in decades, the affected area could remain dangerously contaminated for generations. In practical terms, meaningful resettlement might require a century.

    Now consider the geography of Tehran. The city stretches across a vast urban basin with a rough radius of approximately twenty miles, constrained to the north by the Alborz mountain range. Its population exceeds ten million people. If the command facilities associated with Iran’s leadership truly lie near the center of that urban area—as has often been reported—then a nuclear strike in that vicinity would devastate the heart of the city and contaminate a substantial portion of the surrounding metropolitan region.

    The human consequences would be almost unimaginable.

    At the same time, reports have circulated suggesting that key members of Trump’s cabinet have relocated to hardened government facilities, including lead-lined nuclear bunkers designed to protect against radiation exposure. Even if such reports are exaggerated, the symbolism of such preparations sends a clear message: policymakers are contemplating scenarios that extend beyond conventional warfare.

    Such signaling carries several possible meanings. On one level, it may simply be intended as psychological pressure on Iran—an attempt to demonstrate seriousness and resolve. On another level, however, it implies that American leadership is not only contemplating the use of nuclear weapons but also anticipating the possibility of a nuclear response.

    This expectation leads to another layer of speculation that has circulated in intelligence circles for years. According to long-standing rumors, elements within Iran’s Revolutionary Guard may have acquired nuclear warheads during the chaotic years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the early 2000s, when Ukraine inherited portions of the former Soviet arsenal, the sudden disintegration of centralized authority created opportunities for black-market proliferation. Some reports have claimed that Iranian intermediaries obtained several warheads during this period.

    Whether these claims are true remains impossible to verify publicly. Yet the rumors persist. One particularly striking allegation suggests that a device may even have been tested in the Iranian desert near the city of Bam in 2003, providing Iranian engineers with critical knowledge about the design and function of nuclear weapons.

    Even if those stories are exaggerated, Iran’s scientific establishment has long demonstrated the capacity to reverse-engineer complex technologies. If Tehran possessed even a handful of warheads—or the technical data associated with them—it would have the knowledge necessary to reproduce such systems over time.

    And Iran already possesses the delivery systems. Over the past two decades, the country has invested heavily in the development of ballistic missile technology. Its missiles can reach targets across the region with increasing accuracy and range.

    However, there is one place those missiles cannot reach: the continental United States.

    This reality introduces a stark strategic calculation. If Tehran were subjected to a nuclear strike, its most plausible retaliatory targets would not lie across the Atlantic. They would lie much closer to home.

    They would lie in Israel.

    This possibility raises a further question: if American leaders truly anticipate such a scenario, why the visible preparations for sheltering in hardened facilities? One explanation is that these preparations are themselves part of the signaling process—an attempt to demonstrate seriousness while also deterring escalation. Another possibility is darker: that policymakers fear asymmetric retaliation, such as the detonation of a radiological “dirty bomb” within the United States by a covert network or proxy actor.

    Yet another possibility is that the anticipated retaliation might come not from Iran alone, but from one of its regional partners or allies.

    These possibilities hover in the background as the public narrative continues to unfold.

    Meanwhile, political statements in Washington add another layer of complexity. Senator Lindsey Graham recently issued a highly public declaration of unwavering loyalty to Israel “until his dying day.” At the same time, Trump himself has suggested that his decisions regarding Iran were shaped by advice from figures such as Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner – dual national (Israeli-American) individuals directly involved with diplomatic engagement with Iran. In other words, they are signaling that if Israel is destroyed, its not because of us (America), but a war you (Israel) started, a negotiation you (Israel) led, and we are totally loyal to you (Israel).

    Political rhetoric often serves multiple audiences simultaneously. Such declarations may reassure Israel, but they also know it inflames critics, and obscures deeper strategic calculations.

    After all, American policymakers are acutely aware of one critical reality: if nuclear weapons were used against Iran, Tehran’s retaliation—if it possessed the means—would likely fall upon Israel.

    Geography alone makes this clear. Israel is a small country. From the Mediterranean coast to the West Bank border is barely ten miles in many places. A nuclear detonation in a major urban center such as Tel Aviv would have consequences far beyond the immediate blast radius. Given the country’s size and population density, even a single nuclear strike could devastate the nation.

    Large portions of the land could become uninhabitable, leaving only sparsely populated regions—such as the Negev desert, parts of the Golan Heights, or the already devastated Gaza Strip—relatively less affected.

    Against this backdrop, events within Iran are also evolving rapidly. Following the death of Iran’s previous supreme leader, power has reportedly consolidated around Mojtaba Khamenei. In a recent declaration, he announced that Iran would abandon all remaining international agreements related to its nuclear program.

    The symbolism of this decision cannot be ignored. Mojtaba Khamenei is widely believed to have lost close family members in the bunker strike in Tehran—his father, mother, wife, and daughter reportedly among the casualties. The personal dimension of such a loss inevitably shapes political decisions.

    By renouncing nuclear agreements, the new leadership effectively clears the path for Iran to openly pursue nuclear weapons development.

    At the same time, Israel itself possesses a substantial nuclear arsenal—estimated by many analysts to exceed four hundred warheads. Israeli submarines have reportedly patrolled the waters near Iran for decades, maintaining a second-strike capability designed to ensure deterrence under any circumstances.

    Thus, the strategic chessboard is growing ever more complex. The United States could theoretically strike Iran directly with nuclear weapons. Alternatively, it might encourage Israel to act first. Or events might simply spiral beyond the control of any single actor.

    Meanwhile, the war that began with conventional bombings continues to unfold. Roughly a week has passed since the renewed strikes against Iran began. Despite a strict media blackout, scattered videos emerging online have shown damage within Israeli cities as well—evidence that Iranian missiles are penetrating the country’s air-defense systems.

    The implication is troubling. If conventional missiles are now reaching their targets, a missile carrying a nuclear warhead—should such a weapon exist—would almost certainly do the same.

    And that is the shadow now hanging over the region: the possibility that a war which began with bunker-buster bombs could end in nuclear fire. The American use of a nuclear weapon on Iran, (just like conventional bombings today), would result in the annihilation of Israel. Everyone knows this.