There is a profound and uncomfortable irony at the heart of modern Iranian politics.
Many outside observers assume that external pressure—especially from Israel or the United States—will weaken the Islamic Republic and hasten its collapse. Sanctions, covert operations, cyberattacks, and military confrontation are often justified on the assumption that they will push Iranian society toward revolt.
But inside Iran, the political dynamic often works in exactly the opposite direction.
The uncomfortable truth is this: external enemies frequently strengthen the very regime they are meant to destroy.
In fact, one could argue that if the Israeli confrontation disappeared from the geopolitical landscape, the Islamic Republic would face far greater danger from its own people.
That is the great irony.
Iran’s Regime Is Weak at Home
Despite the image of a rigid and tightly controlled system, the Islamic Republic faces deep and persistent dissatisfaction inside the country.
Over the past two decades, Iran has experienced repeated waves of unrest:
- the Green Movement
- the 2017–2018 Iranian protests
- the Mahsa Amini protests
These protests were not marginal disturbances. They involved millions of people, spanned dozens of cities, and encompassed a wide range of grievances.
The anger inside Iran is structural.
Young people face chronic unemployment. Inflation has eroded living standards. Corruption scandals regularly surface among political elites. Social restrictions—especially on women—generate constant tension with younger generations.
Iran’s population is also extremely young and highly educated. Millions of Iranians are globally connected through the internet and acutely aware of the gap between their aspirations and the reality of life under the current system.
In a purely domestic context, these pressures could easily generate sustained revolutionary momentum.
But Iran rarely operates in a purely domestic context.
The Rally-Around-the-Flag Effect
Whenever a country faces a visible external threat, internal politics change dramatically. Political scientists call this the “rally-around-the-flag” effect.
In moments of perceived national danger, societies often suspend internal conflicts and unite against the outside adversary.
Iran is no exception.
Many Iranians may strongly dislike their government, but they also possess a powerful sense of national identity that predates the Islamic Republic by thousands of years.
Criticizing the government is one thing.
Appearing to side with foreign adversaries attacking the country is something very different.
This distinction matters enormously in Iranian political culture.
Iran’s Long Memory of Foreign Interference
Iranian nationalism is shaped by a deep historical memory of foreign intervention.
Perhaps the most powerful example is the 1953 Iranian coup d’état, when British and American intelligence agencies helped overthrow Iran’s elected prime minister.
For many Iranians—across the political spectrum—this episode remains a defining national trauma.
It reinforced the belief that powerful outside actors repeatedly attempt to manipulate Iran’s internal politics.
When external pressure rises today, that historical memory resurfaces quickly. Even critics of the regime often become wary of appearing aligned with foreign agendas.
As a result, external confrontation tends to reframe domestic politics as a question of national survival rather than government legitimacy.
Israel as the Regime’s Strategic Narrative
Opposition to Israel occupies a central role in the ideological architecture of the Islamic Republic.
It serves several purposes simultaneously.
First, it provides religious legitimacy by positioning Iran as a defender of Muslim lands.
Second, it sustains the regime’s revolutionary identity.
Third, it elevates Iran’s geopolitical relevance across the Middle East.
But there is also a crucial domestic dimension.
The Israeli confrontation provides the regime with a powerful narrative framework: Iran is under siege by hostile external forces. More than this, Israel has been supporting separatist networks inside and outside Iran, and there is a real belief that Israel’s goal is not democratization but the balkanization of Iran i.e. to destroy Iran. And this is very scary to most Iranians.
This narrative allows the government to frame dissent in a very particular way.
Critics are no longer simply opposing government policy; they can be portrayed as weakening the nation in the face of foreign enemies.
In this environment, internal revolt becomes far more difficult to sustain.
The Power of Iranian Nationalism
One of the most common misunderstandings outside Iran is the assumption that opposition to the government automatically translates into support for foreign pressure against the country.
In reality, many Iranians hold two positions simultaneously:
They oppose the Islamic Republic.
But they oppose foreign attacks on Iran even more.
Iranian identity is rooted in a long civilizational history stretching back millennia—far beyond the Islamic Republic or even the modern Iranian state.
When the country faces external threats, that deeper national identity can quickly override internal political divisions.
This dynamic repeatedly shields the regime from the full force of domestic discontent.
War Has Strengthened the Regime Before
History provides an important precedent.
The Iran–Iraq War played a decisive role in consolidating the Islamic Republic during its fragile early years.
The conflict created a powerful atmosphere of national mobilization. Revolutionary institutions strengthened their control over the state, opposition movements were suppressed, and the regime built enduring political legitimacy through wartime sacrifice.
External conflict did not weaken the revolutionary government.
It solidified it.
Similar dynamics can reappear whenever Iran faces intense geopolitical confrontation.
What Happens If the External Enemy Disappears?
Now imagine a very different scenario.
Imagine the Israeli confrontation disappears from the geopolitical equation.
Imagine external pressure declines dramatically.
In that environment, the regime loses its most powerful political shield.
Public debate would no longer focus on national defense or geopolitical confrontation. Instead, attention would shift inward toward domestic issues:
economic stagnation
corruption among elites
social restrictions
political repression
generational frustration
Without the constant external threat narrative, the government would struggle to justify extraordinary security measures or economic sacrifice.
The anger that is currently redirected outward would increasingly flow inward.
This is the paradox.
The Islamic Republic’s greatest vulnerability lies inside Iran—but external confrontation often helps neutralize that vulnerability.
The Strategic Miscalculation
For decades, many policymakers have assumed that pressure from outside the country will weaken the Iranian system and accelerate internal revolt.
But political systems under external threat rarely behave that way.
External pressure can strengthen nationalist sentiment, delegitimize domestic opposition movements, and allow governments to frame dissent as betrayal.
In some cases, internal reform movements become stronger when external pressure decreases. Lower tensions create political space for society to focus on internal accountability rather than national survival. In a strange way, it paves the way for continuous reforms that can snowball into major change.
This strategy was abandoned after the US walked out of the JCPOA agreement, which was designed to enable the reform movement to blossom. Instead, they had eggs on their faces and were completely delegitimized.
The war today will make it harder for these forces to re-emerge. The decapitation of the regime has led to hardliners taking over in large numbers and a de facto coup by the IRGC of Iran’s government.
The Great Irony
This brings us back to the central irony.
The Islamic Republic faces deep dissatisfaction among its own people.
Yet the presence of powerful external adversaries—especially Israel—often reinforces the regime’s ability to survive.
The more visible the external confrontation becomes, the easier it is for the government to rally society around national defense.
And the quieter that confrontation becomes, the more exposed the regime is to the frustrations of its own citizens.
In other words:
The Islamic Republic’s greatest weakness is internal.
But the presence of external enemies frequently protects it from that weakness.
That is the great irony of Iran.
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