One of the more remarkable aspects of American policy toward Iran is that it seems to rest on the belief that ordinary Iranians will eventually reject their government and embrace an alternative leadership favored by Washington. This assumption has survived multiple administrations, countless policy failures, and decades of evidence to the contrary. Yet what makes it particularly curious is that the same people who hold this belief often behave in ways that virtually guarantee that any American-backed alternative will be viewed with suspicion by large segments of the Iranian population.
If one were deliberately attempting to alienate ordinary Iranians, it would be difficult to improve upon the strategy pursued in recent years.
Consider the treatment of Iran’s national soccer team. To many outsiders, Team Melli is simply a sports team. To many Iranians, it is something far more important. It is one of the few institutions that belongs to the entire nation. Political views, religious beliefs, ethnic backgrounds, and social divisions all disappear for ninety minutes when the national team takes the field. The players do not represent a political faction. They represent Iran.
Yet over the years, Iranian players have repeatedly found themselves dragged into political controversies, subjected to scrutiny that athletes from many other countries never experience, and treated less as sportsmen than as symbols of a geopolitical dispute. Most recently, this team was told they had to come and go the same day for games and not allowed to prepare for games inside the U.S. This is abhorrent and completely unprecedented in the World Cup. Whether intentional or not, the message many Iranians receive is that even their athletes cannot escape political hostility. Americans often underestimate how deeply this resonates. When a country’s national team is treated disrespectfully, people do not see it as an insult directed at politicians. They see an insult directed at the nation itself.
The same principle applies to the increasingly common attempts to rename the Persian Gulf. To many Americans this may appear to be a trivial matter, an argument over geography or terminology. To Iranians it is neither. The name Persian Gulf has existed for a millennium (indeed, it appears on the same map that originally named America) or more and is deeply intertwined with Iran’s historical identity. For many Iranians, hearing politicians, commentators, or media organizations deliberately substitute “Arabian Gulf” feels less like a cartographic correction and more like an attempt to erase part of their history. Imagine if foreign governments suddenly decided to rename the Gulf of Mexico, the Mississippi River, or the Rocky Mountains for political reasons. Americans would not shrug and move on. They would rightly interpret it as an unnecessary and provocative gesture. The reaction in Iran is no different.
Then there are the threats. Over the past several years, discussions of bombing Iran have become disturbingly casual in American political discourse. Politicians and commentators speak about military strikes as though they are routine policy instruments rather than acts of war with profound consequences for millions of people. References to regime change, destruction of infrastructure, and even the collapse of the Iranian state are made with a frequency that would be considered extraordinary if directed at almost any other nation.
What is striking is not merely that such threats are made, but that those who make them often seem surprised when ordinary Iranians react negatively. Americans would never separate repeated threats against the United States from broader attitudes toward America itself. If foreign leaders routinely discussed bombing American cities or overthrowing the American government, few Americans would interpret those statements as narrowly targeted criticisms of elected officials. They would see them as threats against their country. Iranians are no different.
What follows from all of this is a profound misunderstanding of nationalism. American policymakers often seem to assume that dissatisfaction with a government naturally translates into support for outside pressure against Iran or Iranians. History suggests precisely the opposite. People can be deeply critical of their leaders while fiercely opposing foreign interference. In fact, external pressure often strengthens national solidarity by transforming domestic political disagreements into questions of sovereignty and dignity.
Iran offers a textbook example. Many Iranians may disagree with aspects of their government. They may favor reforms, different policies, or different leaders. But that does not mean they wish to see their country’s future determined in Washington, Tel Aviv, London, or Brussels. Nor does it mean they are inclined to support political figures perceived as aligned with foreign powers that have spent years threatening, sanctioning, and lecturing their country.
This is where the contradictions become impossible to ignore. The same policymakers who speak about supporting the Iranian people often endorse policies that make life more difficult for ordinary Iranians. The same commentators who claim to admire Iranian culture casually discuss military action against Iranian cities. The same political figures who insist they want friendship with the Iranian people show little sensitivity toward symbols that many Iranians consider fundamental to their identity, whether that symbol is the Persian Gulf or the national soccer team.
The result has been a long series of strategic miscalculations. Policymakers repeatedly underestimated Iranian nationalism. They assumed sanctions would produce political surrender. They predicted internal collapse. They imagined that pressure would weaken support for the system rather than reinforce concerns about foreign interference. Again, reality proved more complicated than the theories.
What is perhaps most surprising is that after decades of these mistakes, the underlying assumption remains unchanged. There is still a belief in some quarters that ordinary Iranians will eventually rally behind an American-approved alternative. Yet trust cannot be built through threats. Respect cannot be cultivated through humiliation. Goodwill cannot be generated by attacking national symbols and historical identity. The truth the US has lost credibility with Iranians.
Nations are not persuaded by being insulted. They are not won over by being threatened. They do not become more sympathetic because their athletes are politicized or their history is rewritten. If anything, such actions tend to produce the opposite effect.
The tragedy of American policy toward Iran is not simply that it has often been confrontational. Nations have disagreements, and disagreements are inevitable. The deeper problem is that American policymakers frequently behave as though they can simultaneously threaten a nation and win its affection, disrespect its symbols and gain its trust, undermine its dignity and secure its cooperation.
If the objective was to lose friends and influence in Iran, the strategy has been remarkably successful.
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