The modern world has been built on a bet: that efficiency is strength.

Over the last four decades, globalization has not merely expanded trade. It rationalized the physical architecture of civilization. Supply chains became lean, inventories became minimal, shipping became synchronized, and production systems became distributed across borders in the name of cost optimization. In place of redundancy, this system embraced precision. In place of buffers, it embraced velocity. The result is an economic order that looks sophisticated in peacetime—yet reveals itself as brittle when exposed to chokepoints.

The Strait of Hormuz is the most concentrated expression of this fragility. It is not just a strategic waterway; it is a geographic monopoly embedded inside the machinery of world industry. A narrow maritime corridor—measured in miles—contains within it the fate of energy prices, fertilizer production, industrial chemicals, shipping insurance, sovereign budgets, grid stability, and political order in dozens of import-dependent states.

If the Strait were to experience a true “zero-flow” closure—whether by mines, missile threats, insurance withdrawal, or any credible war-risk regime that deters commercial shipping—the disruption would not remain an “energy shock.” It would function as a systemic shock: a cascade in which the failure of one corridor propagates outward through real material dependencies until the crisis becomes economic, then fiscal, then political, and finally geopolitical in a much harder sense—meaning states begin to treat resources, shipping routes, and industrial inputs as security assets rather than tradable commodities.

This is what makes the scenario dangerous. The risk is not simply that oil becomes expensive. The risk is that the world’s logistical constitution—its hidden infrastructure of social peace—begins to fracture.

Efficiency as a Form of Concentrated Vulnerability

The ideology of modern supply chains is often narrated as progress: fewer frictions, cheaper goods, tighter integration, and global specialization. Yet integration has a darker counterpart: interdependence without slack. When a system is optimized to minimize cost, it also minimizes resilience. It removes spare capacity because spare capacity is “waste.” It consolidates suppliers because consolidation is “efficiency.” It moves production to the cheapest jurisdiction because labor arbitrage is “rational.”

All of this works—until it doesn’t.

The structural error is that efficiency is being treated as strength when it is often only the appearance of strength during stable periods. Under stress, what matters is not optimization but redundancy. What matters is not cost minimization but survivability. And survivability depends on physical constraints: pipes, ports, vessels, chemical inventories, grid stability, and time.

Hormuz concentrates those constraints into one point.

When the Strait is open, the system treats it like a normal route—one artery among many. When it closes, the system discovers it was never one artery among many. It was a main artery, and the alternatives were partial bypasses that cannot carry the load.

The Closure Is Not a “Blockade.” It’s a Reveal

The initial public framing of a Hormuz crisis would likely be conventional: a maritime standoff, a naval escalation, an oil market panic. But the deeper meaning is more consequential. A closure would expose that global civilization is not an abstract “services economy” floating above material reality. It is a heavy industrial economy with digital layers built on top.

Energy is not just what powers cars; it powers everything that makes modern life stable: electricity grids, fertilizer, mining, manufacturing, shipping, refrigeration, hospitals, telecom, and defense supply chains. LNG is not simply a fuel; it’s baseload reliability for power-hungry industrial systems. Oil is not merely gasoline; it is petrochemical feedstock, freight mobility, and—through state revenues—political stability in producer regions and importers.

The closure would therefore operate like a stress-test applied to the entire global system at once. It would not produce one shortage, but a sequence of shortages, each one feeding the next.

The First Material Reality: Stranded Energy and the Limits of Bypass

In a zero-flow scenario, the immediate economic fact is simple: a massive volume of oil and LNG becomes physically trapped behind a war-risk barrier. Markets will try to compensate. Governments will try to reassure. Analysts will point to bypass pipelines.

But pipelines are not magic. They are fixed-capacity physical infrastructure. Even at maximum diversion, bypass routes cannot absorb anything close to the full volume of Gulf exports. That mismatch creates a structural deficit that cannot be “priced away” in the short term, because the underlying issue is not demand preference—it is physical delivery.

Once markets understand that the deficit is real, the crisis enters its second reality: logistics becomes finance.

War-risk insurance premiums surge or coverage is canceled. Shipowners refuse to send hulls into risk zones. Freight rates explode. The global shipping system—already strained by concentrated vessel supply—begins to distort. Even when oil exists somewhere, it becomes harder to move, harder to insure, and slower to deliver. This is where the panic gains momentum. The crisis is not just that barrels are missing; it’s that the physical ability to transport energy safely becomes impaired.

At that point, price becomes less a mechanism of equilibrium and more a signal of desperation.

The Economic Shock Becomes a Chemical Shock

In popular imagination, energy shocks are about fuel prices. In reality, they are also about chemistry.

A large share of crude moving through Hormuz is “sour,” meaning it contains significant sulfur. When that crude is refined, sulfur is removed to meet environmental standards—and the industrial system thereby produces elemental sulfur as a byproduct. That sulfur is not a trivial side stream. It is a feedstock for sulfuric acid, one of the most important industrial chemicals on the planet.

This is where the cascade begins to feel counterintuitive to most observers. You close a maritime strait, and suddenly copper extraction is threatened. You interrupt crude supply, and suddenly water treatment chemicals tighten. You reduce sour crude flows, and suddenly fertilizer production, mining leach operations, and industrial processing begin to experience a chemical famine.

Sulfuric acid is not easily substituted. It is toxic, corrosive, and constrained by transport rules. Inventories are thin. Production cannot be scaled instantly. The result is not merely higher prices but real bottlenecks: operations that require constant acid input simply slow or stop.

This is the point where “energy shock” becomes “industrial shock.”

From Sulfuric Acid to Copper: The Electrification Trap

Once the sulfuric acid constraint emerges, it strikes at the heart of the global electrification agenda: copper and cobalt.

Much of modern copper extraction—particularly solvent extraction and electrowinning for oxide ores—and cobalt/nickel processing through acid-intensive methods depend on sulfuric acid. If acid availability tightens, output tightens. If output tightens, the supply of copper tightens. If copper tightens, everything that depends on copper tightens: power grids, transformers, motors, EVs, data center buildouts, and industrial electrification projects.

This creates a grim paradox. The world has been accelerating electrification as a response to geopolitical energy risk. Yet the electrification system itself is materially dependent on mining, chemicals, and heavy manufacturing that are vulnerable to the same supply shocks.

A closure at Hormuz therefore produces not only an oil panic, but a second-order assault on the infrastructure meant to reduce oil dependence. That is the systemic irony: the transition infrastructure is itself fragile.

Grid Hardware: Where Time Becomes the Enemy

Even without a Hormuz crisis, heavy electrical equipment is already constrained. Large power transformers and high-voltage switchgear have long lead times, concentrated manufacturing, and limited surge capacity. These are not products that can be quickly “scaled” by software-like agility. They are physical monoliths made of specialized steel, copper windings, and slow curing processes.

When copper tightens, transformer manufacturing tightens. When transformer manufacturing tightens, grid expansion tightens. When grid expansion tightens, everything that is trying to add load—AI data centers, electrified transport, industrial reshoring—collides with time.

This is where the crisis stops being a “shock” and starts becoming a structural arrest. The economy can tolerate price spikes for a while. What it struggles to tolerate is the inability to build, repair, and expand critical infrastructure at the speed demanded by energy insecurity and digital growth.

And this is precisely where a maritime closure reaches into the most modern layer of civilization: compute.

Semiconductors and Compute: The Myth of Weightless Modernity

The digital economy is widely described as “immaterial.” But semiconductors are among the most material products humans make. They require ultra-stable power, ultra-pure chemical inputs, high-purity gases, precision machinery, and enormous energy reliability. Even momentary voltage disruptions can ruin batches. Even small supply interruptions in photoresists, substrates, or specialty chemicals can ripple through yields and lead times.

In a severe energy and LNG disruption scenario, power reliability becomes less certain in key manufacturing regions. The semiconductor supply chain then becomes a casualty not because chips are “optional,” but because the production environment is intolerant of instability.

When chips tighten, the consequence is not merely consumer electronics inflation. It impacts automobiles, telecom networks, medical devices, industrial controls, and defense hardware. Modern states cannot treat this as a market inconvenience. They treat it as strategic vulnerability.

At that moment, the political economy begins to change. States intervene more aggressively. Export controls multiply. Stockpiling accelerates. Governments begin to treat components the way they treat ammunition: something you secure, ration, and allocate, not something you simply buy.

Inflation as a Political Weapon: The Food–Fuel Fuse

Yet the most politically explosive chain is not semiconductors. It is food.

Natural gas is the feedstock for ammonia, and ammonia is the basis of nitrogen fertilizers. Fertilizer costs translate into crop yields and food prices within a single planting cycle. If energy and fertilizer inputs rise sharply, food inflation rises with lagged certainty.

When food prices rise rapidly, subsidy systems crack. Import-dependent states burn through reserves. Governments face a choice between fiscal ruin and social unrest. For many, the choice is not real: they lack the fiscal space to subsidize indefinitely, and they cannot endure the unrest that follows subsidy withdrawal.

This is where the Hormuz shock becomes a global political contagion. Blackouts, food inflation, and currency collapse converge into a destabilization engine.

Populations do not riot because they’ve read shipping analytics. They riot because bread is unaffordable, diesel is rationed, and the lights go out. Modern legitimacy is sustained through uninterrupted provision: stable prices, stable power, stable availability. When these fail, legitimacy fails.

What emerges is not merely hardship but regime stress—especially in states already burdened by debt, import dependency, and political polarization. In that sense, a Hormuz closure is not just a global inflation event; it is an uprising risk multiplier.

A “globalized Arab Spring” is not a metaphor here. It is a structural possibility.

Credit, FX, and Sovereign Stress: Where Economics Becomes Geopolitics

As the shock widens, capital markets respond. Industrial firms face margin compression. High-yield spreads widen. Emerging market currencies weaken under dollarized energy costs. FX reserves drain as governments attempt to import survival inputs.

At this stage, crises that once looked separate begin to merge. An energy shock becomes a balance-of-payments crisis. A balance-of-payments crisis becomes sovereign distress. Sovereign distress becomes political instability. Political instability triggers export bans, hoarding, and defensive trade policy—feeding back into the shortages.

This is the moment when the system stops behaving like a “market” and starts behaving like a contest for survival.

And survival contests are geopolitical.

The New Order: From Markets to Administrative Triage

If the closure persists long enough, states will abandon the assumption that neutral market price is the primary allocator of resources. They will move toward command allocation—formal or informal. Export controls will expand. Emergency powers will become routine. Militarized shipping corridors will become normalized. Strategic stockpiles will be treated as instruments of coercion rather than insurance.

The global economy will not simply “recover” back into its prior shape. It will mutate.

This is the deepest consequence: the political economy of efficiency gives way to the political economy of security.

Under that doctrine, redundancy becomes rational. Reshoring becomes justified. Subsidizing domestic capacity becomes necessary. The inflationary costs of duplicating supply chains become accepted as the price of sovereignty.

But the world cannot reshoring everything at once. Global shipbuilding capacity is finite. Heavy electrical equipment capacity is finite. Mining projects take years. Chemical production expansions take time. So the transition period becomes one of scarcity management.

Scarcity management is not the same as prosperity. It is triage.

The Civilizational Claim

The terminal risk, in this framework, is not one shortage, nor one recession, nor even one war-risk premium. It is the structural transition into a world where scarcity is permanent enough that coercion becomes routine.

In such a world, hunger, hyperinflation, sovereign failure, technological bottlenecks, and militarized trade corridors are no longer “crises.” They become normal features of the operating environment.

The closure of Hormuz is therefore significant not simply because it raises oil prices, but because it exposes the hidden constitution of the global order: the supply chain architecture that quietly underwrites social peace.

That is why, if such a closure were credible, the entire world would be pressured—immediately—to support efforts to restore flow. Not out of moral clarity, but out of systemic necessity. Even rivals would face incentives to cooperate, because the alternative is a fragmentation spiral no one can fully control.

A multipolar world is not automatically a stable world. It is a complex world, and complexity under scarcity is dangerous. When the global system is forced to choose between ideology and survival, it will choose survival. And survival politics is rarely gentle.

This is the risk: not simply that a strait closes, but that the world discovers its efficiency was concentrated fragility— and that the era of effortless integration is over.

In the long and tragic history of the Middle East, few peoples have been summoned to revolt as often—and abandoned as quickly—as the Kurds. Today, amid escalating tensions between the United States, Israel, and Iran, a familiar pattern appears to be re-emerging. Reports that Donald Trump recently held sensitive calls with Kurdish leaders—including Masoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Bafel Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan—raise a troubling question: are the Kurds once again being encouraged to rise against a powerful state only to face the consequences alone?

According to reporting about the discussions, the outreach came after months of quiet lobbying by Benjamin Netanyahu. Israel has long cultivated ties with Kurdish factions across Iraq, Syria, and Iran, seeing them as potential allies against regional adversaries. The idea, reportedly entertained in strategic conversations, is that Kurdish groups might “come out of the woodwork” and rise up against the Iranian state during a broader confrontation.

On paper, such thinking fits neatly within the geopolitical chessboard. Kurdish militias possess local knowledge, hardened fighters, and an existing history of insurgency against Tehran. In strategists’ minds, they represent a potential internal pressure point against Ali Khamenei’s government.

But for the Kurds themselves, the calculation is not theoretical—it is existential.

A History of Encouraged Revolts

For decades, Kurdish movements have been courted by external powers whenever regional conflict intensifies. During the Cold War, Kurdish uprisings were intermittently supported, only to be abandoned when larger diplomatic deals were struck. One of the most infamous examples occurred in 1975, when Kurdish forces in Iraq—encouraged by the United States and Iran to rebel against Baghdad—were abruptly cut off after the signing of the Algiers Agreement (1975). Within days, the revolt collapsed, and tens of thousands of Kurds fled.

A similar dynamic has repeated itself many times since. Kurdish fighters were critical partners of the United States in the war against the Islamic State. Yet when geopolitical priorities shifted, support proved conditional and fragile. The lesson learned in Kurdish political circles is stark: alliances with major powers are often tactical, temporary, and ultimately expendable.

The Strategic Temptation

From a strategic perspective, the logic behind courting Kurdish insurgency against Iran is clear. Iran contains several Kurdish regions, particularly in its northwest along the Iraqi border. Kurdish militant groups already exist there, including factions opposed to Tehran’s central authority.

If a regional war intensified, encouraging Kurdish uprisings inside Iran could theoretically stretch Iranian security forces, forcing them to fight on multiple fronts. This concept—destabilizing an adversary through internal ethnic or regional pressure has been a familiar tactic in modern geopolitical competition.

But the gap between strategic imagination and political reality is enormous.

Iran has historically responded to Kurdish insurgencies with overwhelming force. Any uprising lacking sustained external backing would likely face swift suppression by Iranian security services, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Unlike in Iraq or Syria, where fragmented state authority created space for Kurdish autonomy, Iran’s central government has proven far more resilient in maintaining territorial control.

In other words, the Kurds could be invited to open a front in a war whose outcome they cannot control.

The Pattern of Abandonment

The fear expressed by many observers—and by Kurds themselves—is that the scenario could follow a familiar script:

First, Kurdish factions are encouraged to believe that geopolitical winds are shifting in their favor.
Second, they mobilize fighters and political networks to challenge the central government.
Third, the larger powers that encouraged the uprising recalibrate their priorities once the costs escalate.

When the dust settles, the Kurdish fighters remain on the battlefield alone.

This is why many Kurdish leaders have historically approached external encouragement with caution. The Kurdish political landscape is fragmented, but the collective memory of betrayal runs deep—from Iraq in the 1970s to Syria in more recent conflicts.

A Dangerous Illusion

There is also another uncomfortable truth behind the strategy. Outside powers often assume that Kurdish groups will automatically align with any initiative directed against a common adversary. But Kurdish movements are not monolithic. They are divided by ideology, geography, and competing political visions.

Some factions seek autonomy within existing states; others pursue independence. Some maintain relations with Western governments; others are wary of foreign manipulation. Assuming that Kurdish groups can be easily mobilized as a unified insurgent force risks misunderstanding the complexity of Kurdish politics.

More importantly, it risks misjudging the cost Kurds themselves would bear if the gamble fails.

The Human Cost

For Kurdish communities living in Iran, any insurgency would not be an abstract geopolitical maneuver—it would be a matter of survival. Iranian Kurdish regions have already experienced cycles of repression, insurgency, and retaliation over the decades.

An externally encouraged revolt could expose civilian populations to severe reprisals, economic isolation, and prolonged instability. Kurdish fighters might once again find themselves portrayed as proxies in a wider conflict between major regional powers.

And when that conflict shifts—as geopolitical conflicts inevitably do—the Kurds may once again discover that their supposed allies have moved on.

The Hard Lesson of Kurdish History

The central tragedy of Kurdish politics is that the Kurdish cause has often intersected with great-power rivalries without ever becoming the central priority of those powers. The Kurds have frequently been valued not as partners but as leverage.

This is why talk of Kurds “coming out of the woodwork” should provoke unease rather than enthusiasm. It echoes the language of past moments when Kurdish aspirations were briefly elevated as useful tools in larger struggles.

The Kurdish people have paid dearly for those moments.

Encouraging them to open another front against Iran—without the guarantee of sustained political, military, and diplomatic backing—risks repeating a familiar and painful cycle. One in which Kurdish fighters are celebrated as courageous allies when useful and quietly forgotten when the strategic map changes.

In that sense, the question posed today is not simply about geopolitics.

It is about whether the world has learned anything from the long history of Kurdish abandonment—or whether the Kurds are once again being shepherded toward another slaughterhouse.

Geopolitical analysis often reduces conflict to systems: deterrence models, force structures, proxy networks, escalation ladders. We speak in abstractions — capabilities, red lines, strategic depth.

But wars are not fought by abstractions. They are fought by human beings.

As a critical side note, in much of the early press coverage surrounding Ayatollah Khamenei’s reported death, it was stated that he was killed alongside his wife, daughter, in-laws, and granddaughter.

His second son, Mojtaba, was not present. Yet Mojtaba is widely understood to exert significant influence over Iran’s Basij militia — a force with branches extending across the region and numbering in the millions when including active members and affiliated networks. He is frequently cited as a likely successor following the temporary appointment of Ayatollah Arafi. Beyond succession speculation, Mojtaba Khamenei already holds meaningful influence within Iran’s security architecture and maintains deep institutional ties to the Basij mobilization structure.

The Basij itself is not a conventional militia. Established in 1979 by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to defend the Islamic Revolution, it now operates under the command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It functions as a hybrid force: paramilitary, ideological, and social-control network. Unlike a traditional armed group confined to barracks, the Basij is embedded throughout Iranian society. It maintains neighborhood units, university branches, workplace organizations, and women’s divisions, granting it localized presence and rapid mobilization capacity.

It has played a central role in suppressing protests, enforcing social codes, mobilizing electoral participation for hardline factions, and providing grassroots intelligence to the regime. Its strength lies not merely in its size — often cited in the millions — but in its distributed structure and ideological cohesion.

Strategically, the Basij remains one of the Islamic Republic’s primary instruments of internal durability. It serves as both deterrent and shock absorber. It can be scaled up during domestic unrest or external confrontation. Rooted in Shi’a revolutionary ideology and the doctrine of defending the Supreme Leader, it frames loyalty as moral duty rather than political preference. Although generational shifts and public dissatisfaction have eroded enthusiasm in parts of society, the Basij remains structurally embedded and operationally significant. Any serious assessment of Iran’s resilience must account for its ability to mobilize, monitor, and consolidate control during moments of instability.

Its influence does not stop at Iran’s borders. Through integration within the IRGC’s broader strategic architecture — particularly via the Quds Force — the Basij model has informed the development of allied militias across the region. Hezbollah in Lebanon, various Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) factions in Iraq, and pro-Iranian militias in Syria reflect similar organizational principles: localized recruitment, ideological indoctrination rooted in resistance narratives, and alignment within Tehran’s broader regional deterrence strategy. The Basij is less an expeditionary army than a prototype — a blueprint for decentralized yet aligned ideological militias across the Middle East.

Now consider the psychological dimension.

When violence becomes personal at the apex of power, the consequences can be far more destabilizing than analysts anticipate.

Before policy, there is grief.
Before doctrine, there is shock.
Before calculation, there is rage.

The violent death of close family members does not remain private when it occurs at the center of a revolutionary state. It becomes narrative. It becomes signal. It becomes fuel.

Iran’s own history provides a powerful example.

In 1977, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s eldest son, Mostafa Khomeini, died suddenly in Najaf while in exile. Many of Khomeini’s supporters believed SAVAK — the Shah’s secret police — was responsible. Whether definitively proven or not, perception carried weight. Khomeini framed his son’s death as martyrdom. It became a moral indictment of the Shah’s regime and helped intensify revolutionary momentum.

Personal loss was transformed into political mobilization.

This transformation was not incidental. Shi’a political theology places martyrdom at its core. The memory of Karbala — the killing of Imam Hussein — is not merely commemorative; it shapes political consciousness. Injustice met with sacrifice deepens resolve rather than diminishes it.

Now apply that historical lens to a contemporary leadership crisis.

If senior members of Iran’s ruling family were killed in an external strike, the regime would not portray it as a tactical setback. It would frame it as an existential assault. The long-standing narrative of encirclement — foundational to the Islamic Republic’s identity — would harden.

Here lies the uncomfortable strategic reality: such an event might consolidate the regime rather than fracture it.

External attacks frequently unify internal factions. Even critics of a government can rally around a perceived foreign threat. National identity can temporarily eclipse political dissatisfaction. In Iran, where memories of foreign intervention remain vivid, that reflex is particularly strong.

The Basij amplifies this dynamic.

It is not simply a militia; it is a mass ideological network embedded across society and linked to regional allies. Its power lies not only in scale, but in cohesion. It is built around the defense of the revolution and the sanctification of sacrifice.

A strike that personalizes conflict at the leadership level would not remain confined to elite mourning. It could cascade into mobilization. Commemoration could evolve into calls for retaliation. Emotional energy could be channeled into disciplined yet intensified asymmetric response.

Importantly, this does not necessarily imply reckless escalation.

Iran’s strategic doctrine has historically favored calibrated retaliation — deniable operations, proxy activation, strategic patience. Leadership understands that full conventional war would threaten state survival.

Yet something fundamental would shift.

When conflict merges with bloodline, compartmentalization becomes harder. Political calculation narrows. Flexibility diminishes. The boundary between defending the nation and avenging family erodes.

Leadership shaped by fresh trauma often hardens. Moderating voices can be sidelined. Security institutions gain leverage. Political space contracts.

History demonstrates that decapitation strategies do not reliably produce collapse. At times, they produce entrenchment.

There is also the question of legitimacy.

Even many Iranians critical of the current system might recoil at the killing of family members. A government perceived as under foreign assault can regain nationalist credibility, even if briefly. External force can validate internal narratives of resistance.

The Islamic Republic itself emerged in part from personal loss reframed as injustice. Khomeini did not retreat after his son’s death; he intensified his moral campaign against the Shah. What may have been intended as intimidation became accelerant.

That precedent should not be ignored.

In moments of escalation, policymakers often assume that pressure fractures adversaries. Yet when pressure becomes personal at the summit of an ideologically structured regime, it can instead unify and radicalize.

The key question is not whether retaliation would follow. It almost certainly would.

The real question is whether such escalation would precipitate regime collapse — or regime consolidation.

Conflicts are often modeled through hardware: missiles, drones, enrichment levels, troop counts. But at decisive moments, they pivot on psychology.

When grief fuses with ideology and power, decisions cease to be purely strategic. They become existential.

And existential conflicts are the most difficult to contain.

It was not widely reported, but in the days preceding the recent escalation—before the bombing campaign began—there were claims circulating that approximately one hundred operatives affiliated with the MEK attempted to seize control of a compound associated with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Tehran. Reports described an armed confrontation and alleged that the operation was crushed with total casualties among the attackers. Whether fully accurate or not, the story itself is revealing—not because of tactical details, but because of what it suggests about the broader strategic landscape now unfolding around Iran.

For those unfamiliar, the MEK (Mujahedin-e-Khalq) occupies a uniquely controversial place in modern Iranian political history. Founded in the 1960s as a hybrid Islamic-Marxist revolutionary movement, the group violently opposed the Shah’s regime prior to 1979. After initially aligning with the revolutionary wave that toppled the monarchy, it quickly fell into direct conflict with Ayatollah Khomeini’s emerging theocracy. Brutally suppressed, the organization fled Iran and later aligned itself with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War—an association that permanently damaged its legitimacy among many Iranians. Today the MEK is headquartered in Albania and presents itself as a democratic alternative to the Islamic Republic.

Over the decades, Tehran has consistently accused the MEK of cooperating with Western and Israeli intelligence services. Whether every accusation is true is beside the point. What matters is that the perception of operational overlap exists. The group’s alleged involvement in intelligence gathering and targeted sabotage—such as operations against Iranian nuclear scientists—has long been cited as evidence of deep coordination with Mossad. Regardless of the precise details, the strategic logic is clear: Israel sees Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat, and any actor capable of operating on the ground inside Iran becomes strategically valuable.

At the same time, Israel has not confined its engagement to the MEK. In recent years, it has been visibly supportive of Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last Shah. Pahlavi has positioned himself as a secular nationalist figure advocating democratic transition. His 2023 visit to Israel was particularly symbolic. During that trip, he promoted the idea of a “Cyrus Accords,” invoking Cyrus the Great—an ancient Persian ruler celebrated in Jewish history for allowing the Jewish people to return to Jerusalem after Babylonian exile. The symbolism was unmistakable: ancient Persia and Israel as historical partners, contrasted with the ideological hostility of the Islamic Republic.

For Israel, such imagery is powerful. It offers a narrative in which regime change in Tehran could unlock normalization, cooperation, and strategic alignment. For Pahlavi, the calculation is equally strategic. International legitimacy is currency. By engaging Israel openly, he signals to Western policymakers and diaspora communities that a future Iran under his leadership would abandon confrontation and integrate into a pro-Western regional order.

Yet this alignment raises profound contradictions. The monarchist tradition represented by Pahlavi once suppressed and imprisoned MEK members. The MEK, in turn, violently opposed the Shah. Kurdish and Baluchi separatist groups do not necessarily envision a centralized Iran at all; some seek autonomy, others independence. Azeri groups hold their own distinct nationalist aspirations. Ideologically, these actors are not merely different—they are historically antagonistic.

And yet they converge around a single axis: opposition to the Islamic Republic.

Israel, for its part, views the Iranian theocratic regime as its most formidable long-term adversary. Since 1979, Tehran has transformed from a quiet regional partner into a declared ideological enemy. Iran’s support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and various militias across Syria and Iraq has positioned it as the central architect of Israel’s northern and southern security dilemmas. Add to this the development of ballistic missiles and nuclear enrichment capabilities, and Israel’s security doctrine inevitably treats Iran as an existential threat.

Against this backdrop, Israel seeks not only deterrence but leverage. One dimension of that leverage involves cultivating ties—covertly or overtly—with forces capable of pressuring Tehran from within its own borders.

Historically, Israel’s “periphery doctrine” encouraged alliances with non-Arab actors on the margins of hostile Arab states. In the 1960s and 1970s, Israel supported Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani in Iraq as part of a broader strategy to counterbalance regional adversaries. That logic did not disappear with time; it evolved.

In the Iranian context, engagement with Kurdish, Baluchi, Azeri, and other minority groups creates strategic friction inside Iran’s internal geography. Ethnic minority provinces require constant security investment from Tehran. Pressure along those fault lines can serve as indirect deterrence.

But here is where the contradiction becomes acute.

On an ideological basis, none of these alliances cohere. A monarchist restoration movement, an Islamic-Marxist exile organization, and ethnonationalist separatist factions do not share a unified blueprint for Iran’s future. They share only a negative objective: the removal of the current regime.

On a practical governance level, the contradictions are even sharper. If the Islamic Republic were to collapse under combined external and internal pressure, who governs the day after?

Would Reza Pahlavi preside over a unified constitutional monarchy or republic? Would MEK operatives assume command positions within security structures? Would Kurdish or Baluchi regions demand immediate autonomy? Would Azeri groups push for federal restructuring? Would Iran fragment into a Balkanized landscape of competing militias and provisional authorities?

These are not abstract questions. They are structural fault lines.

Israel’s engagement with these actors may be strategically rational in the short term. Weakening Tehran reduces the operational capacity of Hezbollah. Disrupting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure buys time. Encouraging internal dissent strains the regime’s resources.

But the long-term scenario is far less predictable.

If disparate opposition groups—each with distinct visions—are empowered simultaneously without a coherent transitional architecture, the result could be profound instability. Power vacuums rarely produce orderly democratic transitions. More often, they produce factional competition, parallel security structures, and fragmented authority.

It is here that your core concern emerges: the “day after” problem.

In the event of theocratic collapse, Iran would not be an empty canvas. It is a vast, multi-ethnic, historically centralized civilization-state with deeply embedded institutions. Sudden regime implosion, especially under external pressure, could produce cascading power struggles.

In such a scenario, Israel’s role would not necessarily end with regime change. Quite the opposite. If multiple opposition groups rely on Israeli intelligence, funding, diplomatic backing, or operational support during the struggle, those relationships do not simply disappear. Influence persists.

This does not automatically translate into colonial control. The Middle East is not governed by 19th-century imperial frameworks. However, sustained dependency relationships can produce asymmetric influence. If post-regime actors owe their survival to external coordination, the external actor inevitably retains leverage.

The perception of such leverage could be as destabilizing as the reality.

Iranian nationalism remains potent. The memory of foreign interference—most notably the 1953 coup—still shapes political consciousness. Any post-theocratic government perceived as externally engineered or externally beholden would face legitimacy challenges from day one.

This is where the fragility of the current alignment becomes apparent.

Israel’s relationship with Iranian opposition movements is best understood not as a simple alliance, but as a layered convergence of interests. Israel seeks to counter a hostile regime. Opposition groups seek international backing. Tehran seeks to portray all of them as foreign proxies.

Each actor operates within this narrative battlefield.

The idea of the “Cyrus Accords” attempts to elevate the discussion beyond tactical maneuvering. It imagines a civilizational reset. It suggests that hostility between Israel and Iran is not inevitable, but contingent on the current political order.

Yet even if normalization were achievable, the path to it would likely be turbulent.

Regime resilience in Iran has proven durable over decades of sanctions, covert sabotage, and internal unrest. Opposition movements remain fragmented. There is no unified command structure among them. No agreed constitutional roadmap. No consolidated transitional council recognized across ideological lines.

If collapse comes abruptly—especially amid escalating war—the vacuum could be explosive.

My central warning is therefore not about ideology but about structural coherence. What shape will Iran take if the Islamic Republic falls? A centralized secular republic? A restored monarchy? A federal system? A fractured state? Who commands the armed forces? Who controls the nuclear infrastructure? Who secures the borders?

In the absence of answers to these questions, the removal of one regime does not guarantee stability—it may simply inaugurate a new struggle.

The uncomfortable possibility is that multiple externally supported factions could compete for authority simultaneously. That scenario would not serve Iranian sovereignty, Israeli security, or regional stability.

Whether one views Israel’s current strategy as prudent containment or dangerous overreach depends largely on how one answers the “day after” question.

If there is a coordinated transitional framework, broad-based internal legitimacy, and a clear national consensus, the outcome could be transformative.

If there is not, then the outcome could be chaos.

And chaos in a nation of Iran’s size, complexity, and strategic importance would reverberate far beyond its borders.

That is the real issue. Not simply whether Israel engages opposition groups. Not whether the MEK operates covertly. Not whether Reza Pahlavi courts international support.

The real issue is governance. Surely, they have been promised ‘something’ by Israel’s Mossad. What role will the MEK take after the theocratic regime falls? Will MEK become Reza Pahlavi’s new secret police? How will the separatists be satisfied?

Because wars do not end when regimes fall. They end when a stable political order replaces them.

And without a coherent, unified vision among these disparate forces, the collapse of the theocracy could mark not the beginning of renewal, but the beginning of fragmentation. Israel would remain involved behind the scenes, coordinating governance with the groups it has long supported. Iran would become a de facto colony, much like the region was controlled by European powers in earlier centuries. Israel would claim, as the British did (in India), that without their ‘hand’ the country would fall apart. And then India splintered after the British left, largely by British design. Kicking out Israeli colonization would likely be very difficult. And in the end, lead to the Balkanization of Iran.

That possibility—more than any individual alliance—is what deserves serious consideration.

U.S. President Donald Trump has managed to maneuver himself into a position that makes a long war on Iran all but inevitable.

About two days ago I was still betting on Trump to chicken out of a war with Iran. The military buildup in the Middle East was insufficient but for a short in-out air campaign on Iran with no discernible value.

But over the last days the U.S. military has sent many more air refueling tankers, dozens of more fighter planes and – most importantly – command and control elements to the Middle East. The force is sufficient for a large air campaign that could be sustained for at least two weeks. An additional carrier strike force has entered the Mediterranean and will be positioned west of Israel by the end of the week. A second carrier strike group is deployed in the Arabian Sea.

Deploying such a large force is extremely costly. Pressure will increase quickly to use it or to stand down.

The last negotiations between The U.S. and Iran went well but ended without any results. Iran promised to come back in maybe two week with a detailed plan on how to proceed:

“We were able to reach a general agreement on a set of guiding principles, based on which we will proceed from now on, and move toward drafting a potential agreement,” Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told state TV after talks with US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff in Geneva.

The two sides will each draft and exchange texts for a deal before setting a date for a third round of talks, he said, cautioning that the next stage would be “more difficult and detailed.”

Two weeks is a long time and the military clock is now ticking faster than the diplomatic one.

The U.S. military is reported to have told Trump that it will be ready to strike by this weekend:

Top national security officials have told President Trump the military is ready for potential strikes on Iran as soon as Saturday, but the timeline for any action is likely to extend beyond this weekend, sources familiar with the discussions told CBS News.

Mr. Trump has not yet made a final decision about whether to strike, said the officials, who spoke under condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive national matters.

With the forces deployed and ready to strike Trump is no longer in a position to avoid a war if Israel wants one. If Netanyahoo were to strike Iran the U.S. would immediately have to intervene to lower the consequences of Iran’s inevitable retaliation.

The deployment of refueling tankers in the Middle East points to the necessity for the U.S. to avoid stationing planes within the reach of Iran’s short range missile forces. Fighters and bombers will have launch from further away, tank up, run their turn on Iran, tank up again and land to reload. The number of sorties that can generated by this will be only half of what a ‘normal’ air campaign would look like.

Any attack will likely start with the firing of one or two hundred cruise missiles. They will be followed by stealth bombers which will try to destroy Iranian air defenses. After that is more or less achieved, waves of strike planes will launch missiles from safe distances to strike at Iranian military and civilian command elements as well as infrastructure in Iran.

Iran will retaliate with waves of drones and older missiles. The aim will be to exhaust U.S. missile defenses. During last years 12-day war it took Iran about eight days to achieve that. Thereafter it used newer missiles which were able to hit their targets in Israel will unexpected precision.

Iran will also use its shorter range missiles to destroy any U.S. element, be it on ground, air or sea, that is within its reach. Irregular forces aligned with Iran in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen may join the campaign.

Iran is expected to be be helped by Chinese and Russian intelligence. During the war in Ukraine the U.S. established the norm that the supply of intelligence to one party of a war is insufficient to make oneself a combatant. Chinese satellite intelligence will allow Iran to have at all times a clear picture of its enemies disposals.

Iran however is undoubtedly the underdog in this fight. It can not win a war against a country that is several thousand miles away from its shores. The damage a sustained U.S. air campaign will cause will be real and very painful. The real threat is not a one off campaign but a constant deterioration of the Iranian state should the U.S. decide to wage a long campaign of attrition against it as it did against Iraq between the two Gulf wars.

The only way to prevent that is for Iran to use the economic power that comes with its control of the Strait of Hormuz. A blockade of the Strait would raise global oil prices to the north of $100 per barrel. With energy prices going through the roof, and the collateral economic damage cause by it, the chance of the Republicans winning the midterms will go down to nil.

It is doubtful though that Trump still cares about that.

China is still recovering from what it refers to as a century of humiliation (1839-1949).

Chinese remember – still – the induced addiction and severe military losses from the Opium Wars (involving imported Opium and mass addiction caused by the Jewish Sassoon family (now Israeli) under British direction and protection; great famine and rebellions sponsored by foreign intervention; the Sino-Japanese wars; and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. The list of humiliating defeats is endless. But let’s be clear, this humiliation, in many ways, led to the demise of the emperor, Mao’s rise, and China’s Cultural Revolution, which involved severe radicalization and endemic anti-Westernism. Indeed, Western relations with China were frozen for decades. At the time, China had a per capita GDP lower than that of Kenya and Tanzania. It was a third-world state.

Finally, in 1978, Deng Xiaoping came to power (following Mao Zedong’s death). He outmaneuvered his rival Hua Guofeng by promoting the idea that “practice is the sole criterion for testing truth.” Deng’s philosophy was famously summarized by the maxim, “It doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice,” which emphasized practical results over strict communist ideology. He introduced the concept of “One Country, Two Systems,” which led to the eventual return of Hong Kong and Macau, allowing them to maintain their capitalist systems under Chinese sovereignty. He was practical and pragmatic, and thus able to reconcile with the West (including Japan), which had led to so much suffering in China. It was a tactical move.

Today, China has risen to being the largest economy globally on a PPP basis. Don’t get me wrong, the Chinese even today still feel an enduring humiliation that continues to motivate them. In many ways, because of the humiliation they experience, they continue to make massive technological and economic leaps (to supersede the West).

Iran, too, has been humiliated. Three Western-sponsored coups in one hundred years – destroying Iran’s democratic constitution of 1906/1907 (mashrutiat movement). From Reza-Khan’s rise in the 1920s, to Operation Ajax in 1952, to the toppling of the Shah by Khomeini, who usurped power in 1979, establishing almost 50 years of darkness in Iran under the rule of the Mullahs. The splintering of Iran, with the losses in the Caucasus, Central Asia (including Afghanistan), sponsored by Russia and the Brits. Two vast famines during the two world wars led to millions of Iranian deaths, which the Allies confiscated to feed their troops. Not to mention the Reuters concession, which effectively led to the de facto confiscation of Iranian agriculture. The non-payment of royalties by BP for extracting Iranian resources for over 50 years. And the sponsoring of Saddam Hussein in his invasion of Iran, which led to millions of casualties.

Not to be forgotten is the massive importation of Opium into Iran from Afghanistan during America’s control of Afghanistan to diminish and destroy Iran these past 20 years, much like the Brits in China. Interestingly, it was Iran’s proxy (the Northern Alliance) that significantly assisted the US in its Afghan invasion, only to have “W” call Iran Evil right after the Invasion. And then, Opium plantations in Afghanistan jumped from near Zero under the Taliban to over 100,000 MT under the US!? At one point, not long after the invasion, one in seven Iranian adults became a regular Opium smoker!

I also think it’s humiliating when people call the Persian Gulf the Arabian Gulf (a term initially coined and promoted by Lord Belgrave of Britain) and when Shia Muslims are called Shiites (a subtle derogatory inversion designed to sound innocent, in a very typical British schoolboy manner). Even the term Middle East is a Western reference to Britain (so middle from where, Far East, far from where? Near East, Near to whom?).

What was once the most prosperous, progressive, and successful nation in the region has been reduced to a backward, theocratic nation with serious economic issues and outdated infrastructure, characterized by limited water and power supplies. Iran’s air is severely polluted. The per-capita GDP has been reduced to one of the lowest in the world. Iran has been sanctioned, isolated, and contained.

Iran needs new leadership. Much like Deng Xiaoping, a new leader must emerge who can reshape Iran’s destiny.

Humiliated Iranians need to take a page out of China’s book. Like the Chinese, Iranians can not and should not forget or forgive this systematic humiliation, but there has to be a serious resetting of tactics.

Much like the communist party in China, strict adherence to dogma – religious dogma in Iran’s case – has led to massive setbacks in Iran. There must be openness to pragmatic and practical policies that can lead to change – regardless of dogma. A transformation led from within is feasible and necessary. There should be serious reforms, and the energy of Iranians (both at home and abroad) must be harnessed to bring about significant changes in Iran. There must be wholesale liberalization.

Women should be able to dress as they wish. There should be freedom of the press, and people must be allowed to voice their views – even if they disagree with the regime. Dissidence cannot be a crime. Indeed, dissidents should be allowed to return and invest in Iran’s economy.

There is, in fact, security and confidence in being able to absorb differing views. Massive economic liberalization, in fact, requires openness to new ideas. Economic liberalization implies the creation of new markets for ideas! Iran needs to transform into an intensely pragmatic and practical nation.

If the regime doesn’t transform, the regime itself will be gone. Iranians will not continue to accept this level of economic backwardness in an age of the internet and open global communications – despite the regime’s censorship. If a Deng Xiaoping doesn’t emerge, the regime itself will be gone – soon. Be warned. It’s time. Iran needs a transformation, now.

Iran needs to move to a new age of enlightenment and democratic plurality.

I keep saying it, and I will keep saying it like a broken record. Iranians need to transition to a new age of enlightenment. Iranians need to move away from a patriarchal past to a new age of plurality. There needs to be a fundamental shift.

Whether it’s the Mullahs, the Mujahedin, and Monarchists, patriarchal governance is fundamentally authoritarian, with significant restriction of rights, and resistance to diverse ideas and progress.

The Bankruptcy of the Past

There is one thing in common about the various alternatives presented to Iranians as Iran inevitably transitions away from the Mullahs. In that case, it’s either a unitarian “supreme leader” among the theocrats, or a “president for life” among the Rajavists (who have led the Mujahedin for over 40 years), or a unitarian “royalty” being passed down from father to son. There are no term limits.

No matter who leads, patriarchal authoritarianism often overlaps with a rejection of political competition and an emphasis on strong central power, which can undermine democracy. In every case, a non-elected institution controlled by a unitarian leader – whether it’s a cleric, a Mujahid, or a royal head – ends up dominating elections, selecting candidates. We don’t want that to go forward.

You don’t have to take my word for it; the bankruptcy of these authoritarian regimes is self-evident.

Mullahs

In the current theocratic system, power is ultimately controlled by the Supreme Leader and a clerical elite, who dominate over elected bodies. The Guardian Council, for example, vets’ candidates to ensure loyalty to the Islamic Republic, which thwarts meaningful democracy.

The government violently suppresses widespread protests, such as the “Woman, Life, Freedom”. Security forces have used lethal force against demonstrators, resulting in hundreds of deaths and thousands of arrests.

The regime is one of the world’s leading executioners, with massive numbers of dissidents jailed, including journalists, and the routine punishment of minorities (even for peaceful activities, preventing the free exercise of belief and expression. Detainees are routinely raped, tortured, and sexually assaulted while in custody.  Internet access is often restricted during protests.

The net outcome has been a virtual collapse of a once-prosperous state. There are severe shortages of basic resources and utilities, including power and water. I read today that Iran’s capital has less than two weeks of water supply remaining. This past summer, there were rolling blackouts. This is while oil exports have hit record volumes of over 5 million barrels of oil per day – despite sanctions. There is widespread mismanagement and corruption. Over 70% of the economy is in the hands of religious institutions and entities like the Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Iran faces high rates of unemployment, particularly among young people and university graduates, alongside high inflation and a depreciating currency. Public funds are often seen as being directed towards repression and proxy wars rather than domestic development.

The Supreme Leader and his cohorts are reported to be sitting on over $90 billion in assets outside Iran, i.e., the ‘system’ has basically channeled wealth to the Supreme Leader at the expense of the nation’s prosperity.

The situation is so bad under the Mullahs that people are now craving for the Shah’s return, which in itself is ridiculous, because there were serious issues with the Shah’s rule. In fact, I am often quoted as saying that one of the very reasons why the Shah cannot and must not return is that he paved the way for the Mullahs to assume power. It was his very policies and the political culture he pervaded that produced the Mullahs.

Monarchists

After the CIA/MI6 coup in 1953, the Shah established a “royal dictatorship” that suppressed all forms of political dissent and opposition parties, including secular nationalists and leftists. In 1975, he formally established a single-party state under the Rastakhiz (Resurgence) Party, which required all Iranians to join.

The Shah relied on the brutal secret police, SAVAK, to monitor and eliminate opposition. SAVAK was known for using surveillance, arbitrary arrests, torture, and execution to maintain control, creating a climate of fear across the country.

The Shah often violated the Iranian Constitution of 1906, which had initially been intended to establish a constitutional monarchy with a powerful parliament (Majlis), concentrating power in the hands of the people.

Similar to the Mullahs, despite Iran’s significant oil wealth, particularly after the 1973 oil boom, the wealth gap between the rich and poor widened, and many ordinary Iranians suffered from inflation and a lack of social services, while the Shah and his elite circle lived in visible opulence and luxury. Like the mullahs, pervasive corruption existed within the government and the royal family, along with extravagant spending (such as the 1971 Persepolis vanity celebrations for the 2,500th anniversary of the Persian Empire), which angered a large portion of the population struggling with poverty, but also made Iran a laughing stock of the global elite who were invited to witness the celebration.

Many Iranians widely saw the Shah as a puppet of the United States and the United Kingdom. His close alignment with Western powers, especially after the 1953 CIA- and MI6-backed coup that overthrew the popular, democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, fueled intense nationalist and anti-foreign sentiment.

The Shah’s policies clashed with Iran’s traditional Shi’a Muslim identity. Unnecessary policies like banning the conventional Islamic dress (hijab) and replacing the Islamic calendar with an imperial one were seen as an assault on traditional values.

These compounding issues created an environment of widespread discontent that unified a diverse opposition, including the clergy, intellectuals, students, and the urban poor – as well as opponents among foreign powers who had their own grudges against the Shah (for his arrogant interactions with them, unwillingness to renew oil production contracts with western companies and the financial support of political parties outside Iran). Ultimately, a Paris-based Iranian cleric (Khomeini) usurped power and led the downfall of the monarchy.

All the economic progress made under the Shah was severely undermined by his approach to governance and his inability to create a democratic system in the country, despite holding power for over 25 years.

Mujadedin

Not to be overlooked is the MEK (Mujahedin-e-Khalgh) opposition group in Albania. The MEK had partnered with Khomeini to usurp power but then fell out with the clerics, escaping to Iraq. The MEK had a history of violence, including assassinating Americans and Iranians, and partnered with Saddam Hussein in its war against Iran. Its violence included assassinating three U.S. military officers and three U.S. civilian contractors in Iran in the 1970s. After their alliance with Saddam Hussein, they also assisted him in suppressing Iraqi Kurds.

They have been led by Massoud Rajavi and his wife, Maryam Rajavi, since the Iranian Revolution (46 years ago). They have ‘commanded’ an army of supporters that are reported to be cult-like in their activities, including isolating members from their families. Allegations of abuse against its own members, such as ideological indoctrination and restricting contact with outsiders, have been a serious concern for many years.

Despite claiming to be the most popular Iranian opposition movement, polls and studies indicate that the MEK has very little support within Iran. The group’s finances have been described as opaque and problematic, with the U.S. proxy groups’ tax forms appearing to be incomprehensible, and the organization reportedly channeling funds to American politicians, according to the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).

There can be no Monopoly on Truth.

The three alternatives being made available to Iran, the Mullahs, Monarchists, and Mujahedin, are inherently authoritarian and patriarchal in nature. None of them has the key elements to help Iran transcend to a new intellectual space – to a new age – to a new transformational future. If you speak to their ‘supporters’, there is a common thread: they all appear to have a monopoly on truth. There is no humility. There is no self-doubt. They are uniquely unable to see other perspectives or accept any responsibility for failures. The problems are always external. They cannot reason.

You can’t put lipstick on a pig and say it’s beautiful. They are ugly. Proven to be ugly. None of them offers what Iran needs.

Iran’s Future Must Be Democratic Plurality Must Be Based on Humility

Iran’s future must be fundamentally different. It needs to be grounded in humility.  Leadership in Iran, across all specters, must exhibit a quality of modesty with a low view of their own importance. They must start with the concept that they are public servants. They should not seek praise or validation as authoritarian leaders but rather be receptive to their constituents and their ideas, embarking on a continuous learning journey to serve the people best.

Leadership begins with valuing the worth and contributions of all individuals, recognizing that each person has something to offer. They need to direct their focus from themselves onto the needs and perspectives of others. A humble person does not act superior to others. Humility means: “No, you don’t know best”, “No, you’re not smarter than everyone else”, “No, you don’t have a monopoly on knowledge or wisdom”, “No, you don’t force your own ‘beliefs’ on others”.

And, yes, you base your actions and policies on irrefutable evidence, on science, on data, and on as much information as possible gained from ‘your people.’ In other words, you are on a constant quest for information, evidence, proof, feedback, and so on. You are constantly probing, visiting, engaging, learning, testing …

Humility is a virtue. Humility allows everyone to connect authentically with others, make better decisions, and pursue personal and national growth.

Secularism

Nothing captures humility better than secularism.

Secularism is a principle that advocates for the separation of government institutions and political affairs from religious institutions and beliefs, ensuring that all citizens are treated equally regardless of their perspectives, religion, or non-religious worldview. It is not inherently anti-religious but focuses on the humility and neutrality of the state in matters of belief.

The concept of secularism typically involves three core principles:

Government institutions do not establish, endorse, or fund any religion, nor do religious institutions directly control political affairs.

All individuals are endowed with the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, which includes the freedom to practice a faith, change religions, or hold non-religious beliefs, without government interference. This right is not absolute and may be subject to restrictions to protect public order, health, morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

The state treats all citizens, regardless of their religious affiliation, as equal before the law, without discrimination.

Secularism aims to create a neutral public sphere where diverse beliefs can coexist, thereby fostering social harmony and upholding human rights. It is a crucial element of modernization. It encourages scientific and rational thinking in policymaking and protects minority rights from the potential dominance of a majority religion. It is fundamentally anti-authoritarian. It advocates against anyone’s monopoly on wisdom, thought, or ideas.

Creating a Marketplace of Ideas

The key to Iran’s future is to create a “marketplace of ideas”.

There must be an open exchange of ideas, where the truth is expected to emerge from the competition of competing beliefs.  The best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.

A good marketplace does not allow the dissemination of misinformation or empower large corporations or foreign adversaries to distort this process. It guards against “idea-market failures” where the best ideas don’t always prevail. This is crucially important and an area where many democratic nations are not doing enough to guard this ‘market’.

The central idea is that in a free and open competition of ideas, the most accurate and truthful ones will prevail. There must be robust protections of free speech and expression. It is a foundational concept.

Freedom of the Press

There must be total freedom of the press.  There must be a clear right to express and publish information, ideas, and opinions without government censorship, interference, or punishment. This right must be guaranteed for all forms of publishers, including newspapers, broadcast media, and digital media. No one I know advocates for total freedom without oversight to ensure that foreign or minority entities do not abuse this fundamental freedom unduly. Restrictions need to be placed on the press, particularly in cases involving severe national security risks.  One criticism of the system in the West, particularly the US and UK, is that Israel controls virtually every aspect of their information diet, with no pushback by governments or the national security apparatus. This is not what Iranians would want or should allow. The marketplace for ideas, like any market, is open to abuse. The government needs to protect this market and ensure its proper operation without distortions (like every market).

The free press acts as a “fourth branch of government,” holding officials accountable by investigating and reporting wrongdoing. No one should be allowed to censor or block news before it is published – unless it is misinformation. The press must be protected from punishment for reporting on controversial topics and cannot be denied access to information based on content.

There must also be freedom to create networks.

Intellectual Property Rights

It is interesting to note that, along with ‘freedom of speech’, the concept often extends to the protection of intellectual property rights for commerce. The US and French patent system followed, not preceded, the American and French revolutions. Interestingly, the Shah and the Mullahs never established a domestic system for protecting foreign intellectual property in Iran, nor did they sign international treaties in this area.

Indeed, there is probably a case for Iran to unite with some of its neighboring countries, like Europe, and create a regional intellectual property system (like the European Intellectual Property system). This whole system will need to be looked at and reviewed in a new Iran, post the toppling of the Mullahs.  But it is fundamental to the concept of creating a marketplace for ideas.

Dispersion of Democratic Institutions

A key element of establishing this marketplace is to disperse power. In the U.S., there are three branches of government: the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches. But there are also 50 states. Each state has its own separate election boards, which determine how the state is best represented on the federal level.

Iran, under the Shah and the Mullahs, has always had a central ‘election’ system. Candidates are vetted centrally and disqualified as the patriarch sees fit.

Iran must disperse power at every level. The power to disqualify must be dispersed. The power to count votes and supervise elections must be dispersed. Power must be separated. Democracy – and the market of ideas – must be protected at different levels.

This is critical. This must be codified in a way that prevents a future wannabe dictator from undermining it.

How do we go forward? (Sazman-e-Azadi – SEA).

The very first step in this process is to have a common acceptance of the basic principles outlined here. Immediately after the mullahs are toppled, a new national security apparatus must be established to guard and enshrine these principles – and in essence – stop the rise of any patriarchal system again.

Call it the Freedom Agency or the National Freedom Organization – whatever it is named – creating it and recruiting agents must be a high priority after the change. This agency must facilitate the establishment of a multi-party system and free and fair elections.

Agents must be sworn adherents to these principles. And they must be willing to give their lives for the core principles outlined here. SAVAMA, IRGC, etc. must all be supplanted with this organization, whose protections of freedoms and this system of governance would be their sole mission.

Iranians must be liberated to lead Iran to a new space beyond the Mullahs, Mujahedin, and the Monarchists.

In the final analysis, Iran’s progress will NOT be a direct function of Iran’s government – but of ordinary Iranians creating their own future – without government impediment. Iranians must be liberated to do so.

Iranians are competent. You only have to look at how much Iranians have achieved outside Iran – in such a short period – to appreciate that, given the right environment and freedoms, Iranians can get on with it.

The age of patriarchal governments must end. Iranians must be truly liberated. A new Iran must be free, enabling Iranians to create their own future. I am confident that if Iranians are liberated, Iran can genuinely become a great nation again – and take pride of place not only among Iranians but also the whole world.

What is the safest country in the world? What country’s passport is welcome – visa-free – in more countries than anywhere else (193 to be precise)? Where is home ownership highest in the world? Which country has the highest per capita income in the world, with no natural resources?

It’s Singapore, Singapore, Singapore, Singapore ….

As we migrate towards an imminent change in Iran, we must ask ourselves a key question: What is the model for a new Iran? Iranians must NOT only win their freedom and topple the Mullahs. Still, they must ultimately create an entirely new civilization —a new way of life — and transcend to the future with the sense that they will build one of the most advanced societies and systems the world has ever witnessed.

The goal for Iran must be much larger. Greater. We need to position the country to be a leading nation on the planet. Create a system that yields the most advanced citizens in the world.

Why?

Because it has been the distinct feature of Iran’s enemies that they wanted (and still want) the demise of Iran and Iranians, they hate us. They want us to be impoverished. They want Iran splintered and torn apart. They cannot stand by and watch Iranians prosper. Their aim with the toppling of the Shah and the placement of these useful idiots in power (the Mullahs) was to destroy Iran. They wanted the destruction of Iran. They planned for a slow, steady, systematic death at the hands of the Mullahs.  

Who are these enemies?

First – Arab Elite. Not ordinary Arabs, but their elite around the Persian Gulf have long dreamed of Iran’s total demise. These are the same folks who funded Saddam Hussein to the tune of billions. These are the same folks who keep harping on the US (in particular) to sanction and contain Iran, so that they can remain transshipment points for trade with Iran (i.e., sanction busters that profit from Iran’s demise) and control Iran’s exports and access to global markets.

Second – the Brits. As key allies of these Arab elites (who are educated in Britain). They’ve never forgiven Iran for nationalizing its oil assets. They still feel entitled to Iran’s wealth. They have carefully schemed the rise of the Mullahs and the containment of Iran so that they can steal Iran’s oil and gas in the Caspian Sea via Azerbaijan and the Persian Gulf via Qatar.

If Iran were open, there would be no Dubai for air services. If Iran were open, there would be no Dubai for shipping goods in the Persian Gulf. If Iran were open, ALL the banking, all the trade, all the stock and commodity markets in the region would be via Iran.

So, what must Iranians do?

Iranians must not only topple the Mullahs but also stick a finger in the eyes of those who hate and envy Iranians. Iranians must prosper and develop a nation that surpasses our enemies. We must succeed beyond any possibility that they can even come close to the level of prosperity of Iran and Iranians. It can only be our success that becomes revenge for the misery they have caused Iran and Iranians. We must not only defeat the mullahs but also defeat our enemies and transform Iran.

There is no better example of a nation that has done just that than Singapore. Singapore must be Iran’s model.

Perhaps it’s helpful to start by explaining that Singapore was once part of Malaysia. In fact, it might surprise you to know that Malaysia basically kicked out Singapore … yes, literally kicked them out (thinking they would collapse). Like a nasty divorce, the Malaysian government, led by Tun Abdul Rahman, saw expulsion as the only solution to the political impasse, i.e., irreconcilable political and economic differences, particularly the escalating racial tensions in 1964. Rahman wanted to punish Singaporeans. How could a small island, with no natural resources (including fresh water), survive without access to the resources of the rest of Malaysia? As one of Singapore’s leaders once stated: “We faced tremendous odds with an improbable chance of survival.”

Today, Singapore boasts a per capita income roughly an order of magnitude higher than Malaysia’s! Singapore ranks highly in key social indicators — education, healthcare, quality of life, personal safety, infrastructure, and housing — with a home-ownership rate of 88 per cent.

Singapore has been on a mission to prove itself since its independence. This is the same mission Iranians must be on – after the Mullahs have been toppled.

Fifty-eight years after independence, this underdeveloped country (Singapore), plagued by poverty, corruption, and insecurity, has become one of the richest and safest in the world. Where does this incredible success come from?

At independence, Singapore had a per capita income of around $500, comparable to Ghana’s in the same year. Today, it stands at $100-130,000, compared with less than $7,000 for Ghana. Singapore is the country where the standard of living has improved the most since it was first measured!

Singapore’s standard of living is now much higher than that of a country like France and should soon rank 1st in the world. Infant mortality, for example, has improved faster than in any other country, as has the human development index. It is the safest country in the world, with the lowest crime rate.

The rise of Singapore as a global powerhouse is indeed remarkable. The visionary leadership of Lee Kuan Yew led this transformation. This is precisely the type of leadership Iran will need.

Lee Kuan Yew’s foresight and astute governance played a pivotal role in transforming Singapore into a thriving economic hub. Amidst this success story, one might ponder how, even in the absence of traditional advantages, Singapore managed to carve out a place on the world stage. Perhaps it’s a testament to the power of strategic planning and effective leadership that resonates beyond geographical boundaries.

The Japanese nearly executed Lee Kuan Yew during the Second World War. He became Prime Minister in 1959 by just one vote. He remained in the post for 30 years, overseeing Singapore’s independence and then the city’s tremendous growth, which was anything but a foregone conclusion.

 In a logic combining planning and liberalism, its development went through 2 major phases. From the 1960s to the 1980s, Singapore relied on its geographical position as a trade crossroads, its status as a poor country with an accessible workforce, and a policy of firmness and stability to distinguish itself in a dangerous region. Iran too enjoys an enviable geographic position – at the trade crossroads of Europe and Asia. Iran, too, has a very accessible, educated workforce – in abundance – like Singapore’s.

For 20 years, the regime focused on developing the island and training its people. From the 1980s onwards, Singapore transformed itself from an emerging to a wealthy country by focusing on excellence, innovation, high-tech industries, and services.

Controversial, Lee Kuan Yew ruled Singapore with an iron fist. But with skilled individuals such as economist Goh Keng Swee, political theorist S. Rajaratnam, and former military man George Yeo, he created a model of effective, development-oriented governance.

Despite its democratic institutions, Singapore is a hybrid regime that some describe as “enlightened despotism” or “benevolent dictatorship”. Lee Kuan Yew claimed to put the long-term collective interest ahead of short-term public satisfaction.

The Singaporean model rests on three pillars: pragmatism, with expertise taking precedence over ideology and even democracy; meritocracy, deemed indispensable to the cohesion of this multicultural society; and long-term vision, even at the expense of democratic vitality. It is interesting to note that mosques, Hindu temples, and churches are scattered around the tiny island, and, most interestingly, that different ethnic groups coexist in housing complexes. There are no ghettos. No segregation.

Despite this, Singapore knows how to reinvent itself to continue: with a focus on meritocracy (an average working week of 44 hours), the country has set up an education system that ranks 2nd in the world in the PISA rankings, particularly 1st in mathematics. Doesn’t this sound familiar to Iranians, who, by the way, consistently rank highly in global mathematics Olympiads?

One of the original features of Singapore’s education system is that children are introduced to logic and mental arithmetic exercises at an extremely early age. Homework or accompanied homework takes up 9 hours a week (3rd worldwide), inspired by the Japanese Heguru system.

On an island of 600 km2 (700 for the whole archipelago) devoid of resources, Singapore’s only wealth is its people, as Lee Kuan Yew used to hammer home. Hence, the emphasis on educational excellence, to ensure a well-trained population, and on ultra-qualified immigration.

Singaporean intellectual Kishore Mahbubani argues that, for many Asians, his country is “the most successful society since the beginning of mankind”.   The “Singapore model” highlights its transformation from an impoverished nation to a wealthy one through strategies like openness to foreign investment, a focus on high-tech industries, and a long-term vision.

Lee Kuan Yew was a pragmatic leader – not bound by ideology. He strived for “good men to have good government”. He would say, however, that even if the system of government is sound, bad leaders will harm their people. He emphasized the importance of high-quality civil servants and supported them well. This is the civil service that devised very clever ways to expand home ownership – but also banned the sale of chewing gum in Singapore, placed controls on smoking in public, imposed capital punishment for drug possession, and created fines for jaywalking and throwing trash in public areas. The place is spotless. You can eat off the sidewalks. It’s amazing!

Singapore is by no means perfect, but there are many lessons to be learned from Singapore for Iran and Iranians.

In the final analysis, bearing in mind the contextual differences and the preconditions for Singapore’s success, policymakers in Iran must have the political will and be prepared to pay the high political and economic price of implementing Singapore-style reforms, with appropriate modifications, to solve Iran’s problems.

I strongly suggest that Iranians of all walks of life travel there and study Singapore’s success. A new Iran would do well to model itself after Singapore.

Seriously, why does it have to be RP? Surely, the Kingdom should be offered to a person like George Washington, who led the revolution for a new Iran. George Washington famously refused the offer of the Kingdom – he was a firm believer in government by the people, for the people.

In my humble view, what Iran needs most now is someone like Atatürk or Lee Kuan Yew. A strong, firm leader who is committed to transcending the role of the mullahs in the governance of the country. A decisive leadership that can take control and make significant things happen, like implementing massive power and water projects across the country. Bring in solid management of resources—a leader who can rebuild global trust in Iranian institutions and foreign investment. Stop this constant, polarizing “Marg bar this, and Marg bar that …” and instead create the conditions for the country’s immediate economic resurgence.

How is RP qualified to do any of these things? He is a failed businessman. He’s lived off his daddy’s money for the past 45 years. He barely has any education to speak of.  What kind of project has he ever undertaken with any degree of success? It’s been 45 years of hot air.  He’s not inspirational. He’s not a fighter. He’s no George Washington, nor Atatürk, nor Lee Kuan Yew.

You know the guy (RP) is a moron when you look at this immediate family, right? How are his kids in any shape or form qualified to lead after him? Again, they barely have college degrees from any university with a pedigree—no real accomplishments. And then, his wife ran off with her tennis instructor.

Look at Singapore before Lee Kuan Yew took over – with a per capita income of $400, now up to $55,0000—a Cambridge-educated lawyer with a brilliant mind who engineered Singapore’s rise as a financial and logistics hub. Singapore, by the way, has almost no fresh water and is a leader in desalination technology. They produce all the power and water the thriving metropolis needs.

Look at the state Turkey was in after the First World War – defeated, destroyed, and decapitated. In comes a French-educated army general with several major battle wins under his belt. Who created the modern Turkish state, which, by the way, without any natural resources, this month posted a GDP larger than Saudi Arabia’s? In Qatar, you see all these major, beautiful highways built by Turkish contractors.

And then you have Iran today, with over 5 million barrels of oil produced daily (a near-record), but with no water or electricity to meet the basic needs of its population.  And tell me: some dude living in a DC suburb with no project management, no real management experience, no real education, and no leadership experience is going to come in and address these issues for a country of 100 million people?  

I like the idea of continuing Iran’s royal heritage. I like the connectivity to the kings of the past—the beautiful royal palaces. But why is Reza Pahlavi and his bankrupt dynasty the right person to carry forward this tradition?

Why can’t this be ‘awarded’ to whoever leads the charge domestically to transform Iran’s governance? To Iran’s George Washington?

And most recently, RP sold his soul to Israel, hoping somehow that they would bring about the change inside Iran that, frankly, Iranians themselves should be inspired to bring about. Of all nations to sell your soul to, Israel is by far the worst. Netanyahu is a proven genocidal scum bag. Israel has not only been funding separatist groups like the Kurds, Azeris, and Baluchis, but also groups like the MEK. It’s just bad company to keep. As they say, sleep with dogs, you’ll get up with fleas. RP is covered with fleas.

Iran and Iranians can do better. The transformation needs to be organic. Led by the people of Iran, and not be destabilizing to the point where suddenly Israel walks in and balkanizes the country (if there is a power vacuum). 

All the manipulation on social media, now proven to have been initiated by Israeli bots, supporting RP, doesn’t cut it on the streets of Iran. The kingdom is a prize to be awarded to whoever topples the mullahs and establishes a strong government that leads Iran into a new century of greatness.

We can not be saddled with the past; Iran needs to look forward to an entirely new intellectual space and a new dimension of governance. New leadership must transform Iran, not take it back another 50 years, after the Mullahs took it back 200. Why must it even be a king? Why not a Queen? Why can’t we think outside the box and introduce an entirely new concept of leadership for the country?

I just returned to the US from a visit to a handful of Persian Gulf states, and all I can think of is how Schizophrenic the relationship between these states and Iran is.

On the one hand, it’s easy to spot massive Iranian influence in the region. Everything from food to culture to business and even simple demographics points to a powerful person-to-person relationship between Iran and these countries. In many cases, the relationships were established literally for several millennia. The ‘presence’ of Iran just can’t be erased – at the whim of the British or American or Arab elite.

Iranians are dominant in the souqs (commercial areas) of major cities in the region. Many of these businessmen have fully integrated into their local communities and now carry local passports. By ‘dominant,’ I mean that Iranian-origin businessmen hold more than 50% of retail units.

Shia Islam is also prevalent in varying degrees across the region. In Bahrain, it’s relatively easy to bump into locals who have visited Iran’s Imam Reza shrine and visited Iraq’s two (Shia) shrines in Karbala and Najaf. In Muscat, there’s a Shia Mosque right next to the Souq. There is, therefore, religious connectivity. What is also very interesting is that there was no evidence of tension between these Shia communities and other groups. In Oman, you can go to jail for verbal abuse involving religious affiliations. There is no tolerance for spiritual abuse.  

In restaurants, Persian recipes exist as part of virtually every menu. Everywhere I go, I take food tours, and it’s fascinating how in some places, Iranian recipes are passed off as local!!

Talking to locals – when I disclosed my Iranian heritage, I was always warmly received. I expected latent, sub-surface distaste for Iran or Iranians, but nowhere was this evident in any form. Iranians are respected.

On the other hand, it’s not hard to spot the massive anti-Iranian elements in the region. The United States has an air force base in Qatar and a naval base in Bahrain. Both bases are now on high alert against Iranian activity in the region.

It really wasn’t that long ago, when ALL these states funded Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran. This funding complemented America’s $400 million line of credit for Saddam’s arms purchases in a very bloody and dirty 8-year war with Iran.

These states are being armed to the hilt. Saudi Arabia recently signed a historic $142 billion defense agreement with the US in May 2025. And this year alone, the UAE purchased $1.4 billion from the U.S. for six CH-47F Chinook helicopters and F-16 parts, and an agreement with Israel for Hermes 900 UAVs. Arms sales these past 10 years to the region have exceeded $1 trillion! Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest importer of arms, spending almost 25% of its budget on defense. And who are they scared of? Iran!!!

The Persian Gulf is always called the Arabian Gulf on the more current maps. But you also see, inside their museums, ancient maps of the region that identify the same body of water as Sinus Persicus. I learned during this trip that it was, in fact, a British advisor to the rulers of Bahrain (Sir Charles Belgrave) who first proposed changing the name of the Persian Gulf to the “Arabian” Gulf. The proposal reached the British Foreign Office and Parliament.  Later, after Iran’s oil nationalization, Britain was desperate to sabotage Iranian interests in the region to avenge its losses. The task of reviving the “Arabian Gulf” project was entrusted to Roderick Owen. Using the cover of a shadowy functionary of the AIOC, Owen was in fact a senior MI6 officer in the Middle East. The primary product of Owen’s campaign was a book called “The Golden Bubble of the Arabian Gulf”. This book constituted the first literary work of any significance to popularize the term “Arabian Gulf”. Thus, the campaign to distort and eventually displace the historical term “Persian Gulf” originates in the retreat and defeat of British colonialism in the Middle East, not Arab locals. In fact, several of our tour guides – who were Arab – used the term Persian Gulf liberally in our presence.

There are no direct flights from Bahrain to Tehran. But there are flights to Kish Island from Bahrain! Bahrainis visiting Mashhad travel via Dubai and board the same planes, i.e., don’t deplane, as they turn around and fly to Iran! While Qatar Airways does fly to Iran, it’s worth noting that its flights to Europe or the US carefully avoid Iranian airspace. The same applies to airlines based in the UAE, like Emirates and Etihad.

It’s all so screwed up.

Clearly, these states are under tremendous Western influence. You can’t help but think that if it weren’t for Western influence, Iran and its neighbors across the Persian Gulf would be warmly engaged, rolling in bed with each other.

 It is, after all, Western Companies and technology that are extracting Oil and Gas from the region and helping fund the massive development of the area. Qatar, my friends, has transformed over the past 10 years. Dubai has transformed within a generation, i.e., 20 years. Every state has seen its GDP multiply by 10 in a handful of years.

It has been sanctions against Iran that have fueled so much of this growth. Iran’s oil and gas exports have been substantially constrained, enabling these states to export their oil and gas resources at higher prices without a significant oil and gas producer (i.e., Iran) in the market.  For example, Qatar and Iran share the Pars Gas field. Today, Qatar has become a massive hub for LNG exports worldwide (from this gas field)—to the tune of over $100 billion per year— while Iran can barely extract enough gas to feed its declining power grid at home.

Iran’s role as a transportation hub has been massively scaled back, enabling the growth of Doha and Dubai as major air hubs and Dubai as a central shipping hub.

Sanction busting via Dubai has been how Iran has ‘survived’. Every item imported into Iran is transshipped via Dubai, with a transfer fee to the UAE government. This is while Iran has a major port across the waterway at Bandar Abbas and one just outside the Persian Gulf – Chah Bahar – which would be better regional shipping hubs, but because of sanctions, cannot be accessed.  

As for air traffic, Tehran is over 1,000 km closer to Western Europe and has a high-altitude airport, which means airplanes would need less fuel to take off and land. Those savings from using Tehran as an air hub are huge – over 20% of aircraft operating costs. And, to boot, Iran has a surplus of airplane mechanics and trained engineers. Iran could serve not only as an air hub but also as a regional aircraft repair center. Iran produces more scientists and engineers each year than Qatar’s entire population! Qatar Airways, Emirates Airlines, Etihad Airways, Gulf Air, Saudia (airlines) … ALL must import mechanics from places like the Philippines, Bangladesh, Pakistan, etc., and personnel to keep flying.

And the fear of Iran has led to massive deployments of arms and Western bases in these countries. Not to be overlooked is the trillion-dollar scale of aircraft purchases by these airlines from the West to operate their vast fleets. Dubai Airport now handles almost 100 million passengers per year, and Qatar’s Doha Airport hit 65 million passengers last year.

It’s as if they are trading planes, becoming a financial hub, massive exports of oil and gas, in exchange for getting the West to extend sanctions against Iran.

It’s clearly not that their populations hate Iran, but just ‘simple business’. On the one hand, Iranians are admired and engaged inside their countries. On the other hand, to advance their economic agenda, these Arab states are deeply involved with the West to undermine Iran (and Iranians). It’s schizophrenic. It’s a love/hate thing. It also paints a digital picture – what is good for them must be bad for Iran.   

I am reminded of the story about Michael Jackson and Paul McCartney (the Beatles). Apparently, there was an auction of the Beatles’ music rights (i.e., the Beatles’ song portfolio) by the estate’s copyright owners (not the Beatles themselves). Paul McCartney was the highest bidder – hoping to win back the rights to the songs he had helped write, only to find himself outbid by his good friend Michael Jackson. When Jackson won the auction, Paul McCartney was enraged. How could you do this to a friend? McCartney screamed across a phone line to Jackson. Michael Jackson replied, ” It’s business, Paul—just Business.

Iran’s relationship with these Persian Gulf states is similar. Iranians have been good neighbors and good friends for a long time. But these same neighbors are clearly in bed with the West to extend sanctions and contain Iran, i.e., depress Iran’s economy, and undermine Iranian prosperity – because it’s in their interests to do so.

There is an anti-Iran industry of government lobbyists in Washington and London. These Persian Gulf states spend lavishly buying influence-peddling anti-Iranian sentiment.

On the one hand, one day they love you – on the other, the next day they peddle hatred. It’s schizophrenic.

The West is happy to oblige these Arabs, because, apparently, for a long time, they thought it was in their interest too, to sell arms and planes and to sell oil and gas.  But this is ending.

Anti-Iran lobbyists in the West have distracted the West. These lobbyists have pulled the American elite’s eyes off the big prize. A few smart analysts in Langley have finally figured out that by sanctioning Iran and Russia, they have inadvertently assisted China’s economy by essentially giving China cheap energy. Americans have finally realized that by supporting these Persian Gulf nations at the expense of their own interests, they are fueling China’s growth. Yes, these Persian Gulf states are big markets for Western products, but this gain is far exceeded by the gains China has made by dealing with Iran!

One hundred million Iranians dwarf the tiny populations of these nations. Iran is huge and vital. Iran and Central Asia are more important than these Arab states.

As you walk around the streets of these countries along the Persian Gulf, you will notice one other very crucial factor: Chinese imports. One of the historic justifications of sanctioning and containing Iran was that the West would have these export markets to itself without interference from Iran’s manufacturing sector nearby. Iranian cars and home appliances would be kept out of these markets. This was true for a decade or two, but China is now eating our lunch! Chinese knockoffs of Land Rover and Range Rover are selling for 25% of the cost of their Western counterparts! These markets have not been protected after all. Yes, Iran has been shut out, but China is in there.

The West has figured out that if Afghanistan and Central Asia are to prosper and become export markets, they need access to Iran’s ports on the north side of the Persian Gulf.

If the West has sold Trillions of dollars’ worth of planes to these Arab state airlines, you must ask yourself: wouldn’t Iran, too, have been an even larger market for the West? Or Airlines in these “Stans”? Haven’t we left it a little late to open Iran up, now that China is producing aircraft equivalent to Boeing 737s at a fraction of the cost of Western planes? Iran not only has a massive logistical and strategic cost advantage at these Persian Gulf airports but may also gain an even greater benefit by buying Chinese planes when it finally opens. At the same time, Arab Airlines will remain saddled with huge fleets and debt that must be paid over the coming decades.

Arab lobbyists have created a digital narrative where the West essentially must choose between partnership with these states versus Iran. And this narrative has been further supported by the Brits, who essentially hate Iran and Iranians. You see from history that it’s been the Brits who have pushed for anti-Iranianism. And the prime beneficiaries of Iran sanctions, beyond these Arab states, have been the Brits, not the U.S. . Shell Oil dominates Qatar’s gas production. BP dominates Azerbaijan’s oil production. British banks and companies dominate Dubai’s financial sector.

But it’s clear now that this has been a false narrative—a false dichotomy. America needs to be shrewdly self-interested and calculating in directing its policies.

It’s becoming increasingly apparent that Iran offers access to Central Asia and a vast national market. Arab states may benefit economically from Iran’s sanctions. But Iran is also – in effect- sanctioning the West, and this is not in the interests of the West.  The West has been locked out of Iran, too—and China is benefiting. China dominates Central Asia.

Qatar’s emir might gift an old plane to Trump, but maybe – just maybe – Trump is shrewd enough to know that this gift comes at a considerable cost.

In many ways, Iran offers far more to the West and its allies than these Arab states can. These Arab states have a schizophrenic relationship with Iran because their strategy is fundamentally unnatural. It’s an artificial situation. It goes against the will of their populations. It goes against their historical linkages.  It’s not good business.

The reality is that growth in these Arab markets has stalled. And the vast opportunities that the region’s building boom once offered no longer exist. These Arab states have also undermined themselves by essentially locking out Iranians from participating and traveling to these countries in droves. Couldn’t Iranians – right across the Persian Gulf – travel to fill stadiums and hotel rooms too? Isn’t there a business case for massive growth in trade between Iran and these countries? I sense the whole dynamic in the region is about to shift. There is a more ‘natural’ state of affairs. The entire situation needs to be reassessed without the undue influence of these lobbyists.

It’s time Iran is ‘opened’ up, and the whole business case recast. You get the sense that these Arab states, while lobbying to sanction Iran, are quietly supporting the Mullahs to maintain their pro-sanctions arguments. Regime change in Iran would destroy these arguments.