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There is a profound and uncomfortable irony at the heart of modern Iranian politics.

Many outside observers assume that external pressure—especially from Israel or the United States—will weaken the Islamic Republic and hasten its collapse. Sanctions, covert operations, cyberattacks, and military confrontation are often justified on the assumption that they will push Iranian society toward revolt.

But inside Iran, the political dynamic often works in exactly the opposite direction.

The uncomfortable truth is this: external enemies frequently strengthen the very regime they are meant to destroy.

In fact, one could argue that if the Israeli confrontation disappeared from the geopolitical landscape, the Islamic Republic would face far greater danger from its own people.

That is the great irony.

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Iran’s Regime Is Weak at Home

Despite the image of a rigid and tightly controlled system, the Islamic Republic faces deep and persistent dissatisfaction inside the country.

Over the past two decades, Iran has experienced repeated waves of unrest:

• the Green Movement
• the 2017–2018 Iranian protests
• the Mahsa Amini protests

These protests were not marginal disturbances. They involved millions of people, spanned dozens of cities, and encompassed a wide range of grievances.

The anger inside Iran is structural.

Young people face chronic unemployment. Inflation has eroded living standards. Corruption scandals regularly surface among political elites. Social restrictions—especially on women—generate constant tension with younger generations.

Iran’s population is also extremely young and highly educated. Millions of Iranians are globally connected through the internet and acutely aware of the gap between their aspirations and the reality of life under the current system.

In a purely domestic context, these pressures could easily generate sustained revolutionary momentum.

But Iran rarely operates in a purely domestic context.

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The Rally-Around-the-Flag Effect

Whenever a country faces a visible external threat, internal politics change dramatically. Political scientists call this the “rally-around-the-flag” effect.

In moments of perceived national danger, societies often suspend internal conflicts and unite against the outside adversary.

Iran is no exception.

Many Iranians may strongly dislike their government, but they also possess a powerful sense of national identity that predates the Islamic Republic by thousands of years.

Criticizing the government is one thing.

Appearing to side with foreign adversaries attacking the country is something very different.

This distinction matters enormously in Iranian political culture.

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Iran’s Long Memory of Foreign Interference

Iranian nationalism is shaped by a deep historical memory of foreign intervention.

Perhaps the most powerful example is the 1953 Iranian coup d’état, when British and American intelligence agencies helped overthrow Iran’s elected prime minister.

For many Iranians—across the political spectrum—this episode remains a defining national trauma.

It reinforced the belief that powerful outside actors repeatedly attempt to manipulate Iran’s internal politics.

When external pressure rises today, that historical memory resurfaces quickly. Even critics of the regime often become wary of appearing aligned with foreign agendas.

As a result, external confrontation tends to reframe domestic politics as a question of national survival rather than government legitimacy.

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Israel as the Regime’s Strategic Narrative

Opposition to Israel occupies a central role in the ideological architecture of the Islamic Republic.

It serves several purposes simultaneously.

First, it provides religious legitimacy by positioning Iran as a defender of Muslim lands.
Second, it sustains the regime’s revolutionary identity.
Third, it elevates Iran’s geopolitical relevance across the Middle East.

But there is also a crucial domestic dimension.

The Israeli confrontation provides the regime with a powerful narrative framework: Iran is under siege by hostile external forces. More than this, Israel has been supporting separatist networks inside and outside Iran, and there is a real belief that Israel’s goal is not democratization but the balkanization of Iran i.e. to destroy Iran. And this is very scary to most Iranians.

This narrative allows the government to frame dissent in a very particular way.

Critics are no longer simply opposing government policy; they can be portrayed as weakening the nation in the face of foreign enemies.

In this environment, internal revolt becomes far more difficult to sustain.

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The Power of Iranian Nationalism

One of the most common misunderstandings outside Iran is the assumption that opposition to the government automatically translates into support for foreign pressure against the country.

In reality, many Iranians hold two positions simultaneously:

They oppose the Islamic Republic.

But they oppose foreign attacks on Iran even more.

Iranian identity is rooted in a long civilizational history stretching back millennia—far beyond the Islamic Republic or even the modern Iranian state.

When the country faces external threats, that deeper national identity can quickly override internal political divisions.

This dynamic repeatedly shields the regime from the full force of domestic discontent.

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War Has Strengthened the Regime Before

History provides an important precedent.

The Iran–Iraq War played a decisive role in consolidating the Islamic Republic during its fragile early years.

The conflict created a powerful atmosphere of national mobilization. Revolutionary institutions strengthened their control over the state, opposition movements were suppressed, and the regime built enduring political legitimacy through wartime sacrifice.

External conflict did not weaken the revolutionary government.

It solidified it.

Similar dynamics can reappear whenever Iran faces intense geopolitical confrontation.

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What Happens If the External Enemy Disappears?

Now imagine a very different scenario.

Imagine the Israeli confrontation disappears from the geopolitical equation.

Imagine external pressure declines dramatically.

In that environment, the regime loses its most powerful political shield.

Public debate would no longer focus on national defense or geopolitical confrontation. Instead, attention would shift inward toward domestic issues:

economic stagnation
corruption among elites
social restrictions
political repression
generational frustration

Without the constant external threat narrative, the government would struggle to justify extraordinary security measures or economic sacrifice.

The anger that is currently redirected outward would increasingly flow inward.

This is the paradox.

The Islamic Republic’s greatest vulnerability lies inside Iran—but external confrontation often helps neutralize that vulnerability.

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The Strategic Miscalculation

For decades, many policymakers have assumed that pressure from outside the country will weaken the Iranian system and accelerate internal revolt.

But political systems under external threat rarely behave that way.

External pressure can strengthen nationalist sentiment, delegitimize domestic opposition movements, and allow governments to frame dissent as betrayal.

In some cases, internal reform movements become stronger when external pressure decreases. Lower tensions create political space for society to focus on internal accountability rather than national survival. In a strange way, it paves the way for continuous reforms that can snowball into major change.

This strategy was abandoned after the US walked out of the JCPOA agreement, which was designed to enable the reform movement to blossom. Instead, they had eggs on their faces and were completely delegitimized.

The war today will make it harder for these forces to re-emerge. The decapitation of the regime has led to hardliners taking over in large numbers and a de facto coup by the IRGC of Iran’s government.

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The Great Irony

This brings us back to the central irony.

The Islamic Republic faces deep dissatisfaction among its own people.

Yet the presence of powerful external adversaries—especially Israel—often reinforces the regime’s ability to survive.

The more visible the external confrontation becomes, the easier it is for the government to rally society around national defense.

And the quieter that confrontation becomes, the more exposed the regime is to the frustrations of its own citizens.

In other words:

The Islamic Republic’s greatest weakness is internal.

But the presence of external enemies frequently protects it from that weakness.

That is the great irony of Iran.

Wars are often sold as brief episodes of coercion. A few strikes, a few demonstrations of force, a few calculated escalations — and then, supposedly, the other side folds. That appears to have been the original fantasy behind the American war on Iran: strike hard, move fast, intimidate Tehran, and finish the campaign before oil markets fully grasped what was happening. This was, after all, the template for Venezuela that worked so well. Netanyahu, Witkoff, and Kushner had Trump’s ear, and they made the case that this would be a slam-dunk, and Trump bought it. He had also made promises to demonstrators in Iran and faced a massive loss of credibility (which meant he had to do something).

But the fantasy he bought into is now colliding with reality.

The losses the United States is incurring in this war are beginning to accumulate in ways that can no longer be dismissed as trivial friction. Iran has reportedly managed to destroy at least ten radar installations across the Middle East. Most were American-owned, while the rest had been supplied to U.S. allies. That matters far beyond symbolism. Early-warning radar is what gives a missile defense network depth and reaction time. When those installations are knocked out, more Iranian missiles slip through the defensive curtain. That means greater vulnerability not only for

American bases, but for regional infrastructure and for Israel as well.

The air war, too, is proving more difficult than the public mythology of American dominance would suggest. U.S. Central Command reportedly acknowledged that Iranian air defenses managed to hit at least one F-35 stealth fighter. The pilot was reportedly injured, and the aircraft made what was described as a “hard landing” — diplomatic language that may conceal a far more serious loss. Whatever the precise details, the broader significance is clear. It punctures the old Lockheed Martin fantasy of invisibility and undermines the convenient claim that Iran has somehow lost control of its own airspace. If Iranian defenses are still capable of threatening advanced American aircraft, then Washington cannot simply shift to cheap gravity bombing and routine strike packages. It must continue to rely on expensive and scarce standoff munitions, which means the war remains both militarily constrained and financially costly.

Elsewhere, the attrition is mounting by inches. The aircraft carrier Ford reportedly had to leave the region for repairs after a fire destroyed some six hundred berths aboard the ship. Already infamous for technical problems, the vessel may now require a far longer overhaul than anyone wants to admit. A second carrier has reportedly been pulled back to the southern Arabian Sea for fear that it, too, could be exposed to Iranian attack. That retreat creates another problem: distance. The farther carriers are pushed from the battlespace, the more American air operations depend on time-consuming aerial refueling.

And even that refueling architecture is showing signs of strain. Some five U.S. KC-135 tankers were reportedly hit during an Iranian strike on Saudi Arabia. Another was lost, and another was damaged, in an in-air collision. At least three F-15s are said to have been destroyed in alleged friendly-fire incidents near Kuwait. Of the hundred MQ-9 Reaper drones the United States has acquired, roughly ten have reportedly been lost in recent reconnaissance missions over Iran.

None of this, taken individually, would cripple a military as large as that of the United States. But wars are not measured only by catastrophic single events. They are measured by accumulation. And this war is still only in its third week. Losses that seem manageable on day twenty-one can look very different on day sixty, day ninety, or day one hundred and twenty.

Against that background, Washington is moving more forces toward the theater. An Amphibious Readiness Group of three ships carrying roughly 2,200 Marines has reportedly been ordered from Japan to the Middle East, while another is expected to leave San Diego. Yet these deployments are less impressive than the headlines suggest. Each ARG — effectively a Marine Expeditionary Unit — contains only about 800 troops suited for actual ground combat operations. The rest are support and logistics personnel. These are forces designed for raids, beach assaults, seizures of landing strips, and short-duration expeditionary missions. They can support themselves for perhaps a week before they require relief by larger conventional forces. Those follow-on forces are still missing.

That is why the speculation surrounding dramatic American landing operations deserves much more skepticism than it has received. There has been chatter about seizing Kharg Island, the key terminal from which Iranian oil is loaded for export. But to reach Kharg, U.S. amphibious forces would have to pass through the Strait of Hormuz under intensely dangerous conditions. And taking the island would be only the beginning. Holding it under Iranian artillery, missiles, and drone attack would be a profoundly costly undertaking — less a clean operation than a suicide mission.

The smaller Iranian islands within the Strait are often discussed as easier alternatives. They are not. They, too, lie well within Iranian strike range. Occupying any of them would require a sustained campaign and a willingness to absorb losses on a scale that Washington has shown little appetite for in recent years.

The same goes for the loud talk of reopening the Strait of Hormuz by escorting civilian shipping. In theory, of course, the United States can do this. In practice, the forces required are simply not in place. A genuine convoy-protection mission would need roughly a dozen destroyers, minesweepers, and substantial aerial support. Yet at least two of the three U.S. minesweepers that should be in the Middle East are reportedly in Malaysia, while most available destroyers are already tied up protecting carriers. Reopening Hormuz is therefore not a matter of issuing orders and hoisting flags. It is a matter of assembling capabilities that may take weeks or even months to put into place.

This is where the war begins to reveal its true structure. The Trump administration, by all appearances, hoped to finish the Iran campaign before oil prices truly moved. It wanted a coercive demonstration without a global energy shock. But Iran did not submit, and the chance for Washington simply to “chicken out” has narrowed sharply. It takes two sides to stop a war, and Iran has little incentive to make concessions while under attack. Yet even now, the administration appears not fully reconciled to the reality that it has wedged itself into a long, expansive conflict.

Its desperate efforts to suppress oil prices make that plain.

Under normal conditions, the world consumes roughly 100 million barrels of crude oil per day. With the Strait blocked or severely constrained, around 15 million barrels per day are effectively missing. The first market response to such a shock is to draw down reserves and stored inventories. Washington has reportedly lifted sanctions on Russian oil stored at sea and is considering doing the same for some 140 million barrels of floating Iranian reserves. Strategic petroleum reserves may also be tapped. But these are stopgaps, not solutions. The decisive issue in an oil shock is not merely the volume of reserves, but the flow rate — how much can be delivered to market per day. U.S. salt-cavern reserves can release around 1.2 million barrels a day. Total global reserve flow is around 2 million barrels a day. Against a 15-million-barrel daily shortfall, that is little more than a bandage on a severed artery.

Paper prices are already diverging from physical reality. Futures may still hover around $100 a barrel, but product markets reportedly already exceed $150. Saudi forecasts point to $180 in early April, with $200 by mid-month no longer sounding far-fetched. Natural gas and LPG prices are likely to rise even more sharply, because roughly one-fifth of total capacity is now missing. And the problem does not end with fuel. Nearly half the global helium supply — essential for chip production — is disrupted. Sulfur becomes scarce. Urea and other fertilizers become far more expensive. Jet fuel and naphtha, both critical to modern industrial systems, are beginning to vanish from a reliable supply.

This is what makes the Gulf War so dangerous: it is never only about oil.

When jet fuel becomes scarce, air travel contracts. When fertilizers become scarce, food production suffers. When food prices rise, poorer societies do not merely complain — they fracture. Hunger creates unrest, riots, and revolt. The public may grumble first about gasoline prices, but the deeper consequences of a Gulf war arrive later, when the cost of food, transport, chemicals, manufacturing, and daily life begins to climb all at once.

And yet this crisis is unfolding in a region whose supposed American partners are themselves among the world’s most fragile states.

There is much loose talk about drawing the world’s most fragile states, the Gulf Arab monarchies, more directly into the war against Iran. But this language betrays a fundamental ignorance of what those states actually are. They are rich, yes. They possess formidable financial assets, glittering skylines, and impressive procurement contracts. But wealth is not the same as resilience.

Demographically, they are brittle. In much of the Gulf, native citizens are either a narrow majority or a minority in their own states. The labor force, the service sector, construction, logistics, and even many strategic industries depend heavily on expatriate populations with no deep stake in national military projects. These are not societies built around mass mobilization, national sacrifice, or prolonged war-making capacity. They are societies built around rent distribution, managed consumption, imported labor, and political quiet.

Geographically, they are exposed to almost unbelievable extremes. They are flat, urbanized, coastal, and intensely concentrated. Their critical infrastructure — ports, airports, oil terminals, desalination plants, petrochemical complexes, financial districts, luxury real estate, and tourist hubs — sits within reach of Iranian missiles and drones. They lack strategic depth. They cannot trade space for time. They cannot absorb sustained attack and simply retreat inland, because in many cases, there is scarcely any meaningful inland refuge to retreat into.

Economically, they are even more vulnerable than they appear. Their two great industries are energy and tourism. Both are exquisitely sensitive to instability. Energy infrastructure can be struck directly. Tourism can be killed by fear alone. A missile landing near a luxury hotel, a drone over a skyline, a disruption at an airport, a refinery fire visible on social media — any of these can shatter the carefully cultivated image of safety on which Gulf tourism depends. The very sectors that generate wealth in the Gulf are the most easily disrupted sectors by war.

In other words, the Gulf states are not in any serious position to take on Iran in a prolonged conflict. To ask them to do so would not be a strategy. It would be an invitation to economic self-destruction and perhaps internal instability.

That, in turn, is why the United States will have trouble simply walking away.

For decades, Washington has functioned as the armed guarantor of the Gulf order. It protects shipping lanes, underwrites the survival of monarchies, and provides the strategic umbrella beneath which oil exports, tourism, finance, and elite consumption can continue. If the Gulf states cannot themselves bear the burden of confrontation with Iran — and they cannot — then any escalation that threatens the regional system falls back, almost automatically, onto the United States.

This is the trap.

Washington cannot easily escalate to a decisive victory because Iran is too large, too armed, too capable of retaliation, and too integrated into the geography of Gulf disruption. But neither can Washington easily disengage, because the states it has spent decades protecting are structurally incapable of replacing American power. The Gulf monarchies are not Sparta with sovereign wealth funds. They are fragile commercial city-states with hydrocarbon rents, imported populations, exposed coastlines, and few real wartime options.

The Trump administration would prefer a compliant but still resourceful Iran — weakened enough to submit, intact enough to remain useful. Israel and its American lobby seem to want something far more radical: the destruction of Iran and perhaps the broader shattering of the Gulf order itself. That is why there are increasing efforts to incite the Persian Gulf’s Arab states, and even Turkey, into openly joining the war. If these states can be dragged into direct confrontation, the battlefield widens, the burdens spread, and Washington may hope eventually to reduce its own visible role while continuing to supply weapons from behind the lines.

That is a familiar pattern. It is also an extraordinarily dangerous one.

Because if even one Gulf state takes the suicidal step of fighting Iran with its own means, it will not produce a neat anti-Iran coalition. It will produce cascading vulnerabilities across the peninsula, strikes on infrastructure, capital flight, a collapse in tourism, export disruptions, political anxiety, and the possibility that some of the world’s richest states begin to discover how little strategic depth money can buy.

This is why the war on Iran is becoming something larger than a campaign. It is becoming a test of whether the entire Gulf order can survive sustained conflict. The United States is already paying military costs. It is sliding toward energy, economic, and strategic costs. Its local partners are too fragile to take over. Its enemies are too capable of being dismissed. And the assumptions that governed the opening days of the war — quick victory, manageable escalation, stable oil, intimidated Iran, secure Gulf allies — are dissolving one by one.

What remains is the harsher truth.

The region will never be the same. The region may never recover. This is very bad news globally, with many regions, i.e., Europeans and South Asians, heavily affected by the drop in trade with the region. They will never forgive Israel or the United States. And, American consumers facing higher energy costs, will also not forget that this was a war of choice.

America is no longer fighting a war it can neatly win, and it is no longer free to leave a war whose consequences it can safely ignore. This is a huge strategic blunder with potentially catastrophic consequences and no off-ramp.

Introduction: The Fragility of The Region

A new geopolitical architecture has quietly emerged in the region over the past decade. Unlike the alliance systems and ideological rivalries that defined much of the twentieth century, this newer order rests increasingly on capital flows, sovereign wealth, reconstruction finance, and cross-border economic integration. At the center of that network, unusually, sits Jared Kushner. After leaving government in 2021, Kushner founded Affinity Partners, an investment firm that went on to attract major backing from Gulf sovereign wealth. Reuters reported that by March 2025, the firm’s assets under management had risen to $4.8 billion after a fresh $1.5 billion injection from the Qatar Investment Authority and Abu Dhabi’s Lunate, on top of the earlier $2 billion commitment from Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund described by congressional investigators.

That financial structure matters because the same Gulf states backing Kushner’s firm are also widely expected to fund a large share of Gaza’s eventual reconstruction. The World Bank, the United Nations, and the European Union estimated in early 2025 that rebuilding Gaza would cost more than $50 billion, and later estimates put the figure even higher. In other words, the same pool of Gulf capital sits behind two very different projects: private investment vehicles like Affinity Partners and the political economy of postwar reconstruction.

But all this rests on one assumption: regional stability. A major war involving Iran threatens every layer of the arrangement. It threatens shipping routes, energy infrastructure, sovereign wealth deployment, reconstruction planning, and the commercial logic behind firms that depend on Gulf commitments. And with the reported overnight strike on Iran’s South Pars gas field and the subsequent attacks on Gulf energy sites, that threat is no longer theoretical. Reuters reported on March 18 and 19, 2026, that Iranian gas facilities at South Pars and Azaliyah were hit, that Tehran warned Gulf energy sites to evacuate, that Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG hub suffered extensive damage, and that oil prices surged above $110 a barrel.

This is the contradiction at the heart of the new Middle East: the region’s economic future is being financed by states whose wealth depends on a level of security that war with Iran would destroy.

Kushner and the Iran Negotiations Before the War

Before the conflict escalated into open regional warfare, Kushner was reportedly not just a former official with opinions about Iran but an active participant in the late-stage diplomacy. Reuters reported on March 18, 2026, that the final U.S.-Iran negotiations were led by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, with Oman facilitating the talks. Other reporting from The Guardian described those Geneva negotiations as a serious diplomatic effort in which outside observers believed a deal might still have been possible.

The critical hinge appears to have been the interpretation of Iranian intent. Reporting and commentary around the Geneva talks indicate that Kushner and others came away convinced that Iran was stalling. The Guardian reported that on the final day of talks, Iran offered a three- to five-year moratorium, while the U.S. side, after a phone consultation with Trump, returned demanding a ten-year arrangement instead. Negotiations were clearly proceeding.

That matters because the question is not simply whether Kushner had views on Iran. The more important point is that he was reportedly part of the advisory and negotiating process immediately before the decision to escalate militarily, despite ongoing negotiations. In any White House, the judgment of trusted envoys can become decisive when diplomacy is wavering. If the president is told that the other side is negotiating in bad faith, delay begins to look like deception, and military options begin to appear more justified.

Kushner’s every accusation was clearly a confession. The irony of the situation is that while Kushner was quick to assess that the Iranian side was negotiating in bad faith, in fact, Kushner himself was an Israeli pawn with a sub-agenda of torpedoing the negotiations and pushing for the war.

He was never participating in good faith to begin with. His allegiance to Netanyahu’s agenda trumped any considerations of US or any other national interests, including his new partners from the Persian Gulf region, in every venture he is involved with. Kushner has been peddling and leveraging his access to power to great effect over the past 10 years, with tremendous success. Now the war with Iran will be placing all these ventures at risk. How moronic? Trump, too, will see a serious impact on his own business ventures with this Iran war. More on this in a future blog. But for now, let’s analyze Kushner’s exposure to the Iran war he peddled.

Affinity Partners: Gulf Sovereign Wealth Meets Political Capital

Affinity Partners sits exactly where geopolitics and capital intersect. Reuters reported that the firm’s assets jumped to $4.8 billion after new Gulf cash from Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund and Abu Dhabi’s Lunate, while congressional investigators had previously described Saudi Arabia’s $2 billion backing. That means the firm is not merely “Middle East connected” in a vague sense. Its financial spine is Gulf sovereign wealth.

This is unusual not only because the investors are foreign states, but because the fund’s founder is a former senior U.S. policymaker who was deeply involved in Middle East diplomacy. Kushner’s defenders can reasonably say that post-government investing is common and that Gulf states invest widely. His critics can reasonably respond that this is not a generic case: it involves a former White House official whose relationships with Gulf rulers were formed while he was helping shape U.S. regional policy. Both points are true.

What makes the structure fragile is its dependence on long-cycle confidence. Private equity needs committed capital, predictable exits, functioning capital markets, and tolerable political risk. It does not collapse simply because a war starts. But war can freeze deals, depress valuations, shut IPO windows, force investors to preserve liquidity, and make new fundraising materially harder. For a firm as closely tied to Gulf capital as Affinity Partners, regional instability is not background noise. It is a direct threat to the model.

Gaza Reconstruction: The Same Gulf Money

At the same time, the Gulf states backing Affinity are expected to underwrite a large portion of Gaza’s reconstruction. The World Bank, U.N., and EU put early rebuilding needs at over $50 billion, with later figures moving toward $70 billion and then $80 billion in updated scenarios. Western governments have signaled political support for reconstruction, but the practical assumption has long been that Gulf money will bear much of the financial burden.

Qatar has long played a visible role in Gaza financing, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE have often preferred structured or multilateral channels. The point is not that all Gulf states play the same role. The point is that without Gulf sovereign wealth, large-scale reconstruction does not look financially plausible.

That means the same states financing private cross-border investment and the same states expected to fund Gaza’s rebuilding are drawing from the same strategic resource base. If those governments are forced to divert capital toward war-readiness, infrastructure repair, shipping security, or domestic stabilization, both tracks suffer. Gaza reconstruction slows, and global investment platforms tied to Gulf liquidity feel the squeeze.

The Overnight Strike on South Pars and Why Qatar Is Financially Exposed

This is where last night’s attack on South Pars becomes pivotal. Reuters reported that Iranian gas facilities at South Pars and Asaluyeh were hit on March 18, 2026, in the first known strike on Iranian Gulf energy infrastructure in the current war. South Pars matters because it is Iran’s side of the giant offshore gas reservoir shared with Qatar, where it is known as the North Field. Reuters described South Pars as part of the world’s largest gas field shared by Iran and Qatar.

For Qatar, that is not just a geological fact. It is the foundation of the state’s financial model. Qatar’s LNG wealth underpins the national budget, the Qatar Investment Authority, global acquisitions, domestic infrastructure, and diplomatic leverage. When Reuters reported that Qatar had suspended LNG production amid the war and that damage at Ras Laffan threatened roughly a fifth of global LNG supply, it underscored how quickly military escalation can mutate into financial shock.

Even if the Iranian and Qatari installations are technically separate, they are part of the same strategic energy system. A strike on South Pars does at least three things at once. First, it introduces direct risk to the shared basin and raises concerns about production continuity. Second, it creates a security shock across the whole gas complex, because once one side is targeted, the other must assume it may be next. Third, it magnifies the risk to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, where both oil and LNG flows are vulnerable to disruption. Reuters reported that after the strike, Tehran warned facilities in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar to evacuate, and then retaliatory attacks hit Gulf energy infrastructure, including Qatar’s Ras Laffan industrial area.

In financial terms, that means Qatar is not just another Gulf investor in Kushner’s fund. It is a state whose core revenue engine is directly vulnerable to the expansion of war.

The Strategic Contradiction at the Core of the System

Taken together, the contradiction is stark. The Gulf states are expected to finance Gaza’s reconstruction. They also anchor global investment platforms like Affinity Partners. But their sovereign wealth rests on hydrocarbon revenues and energy infrastructure that become acutely vulnerable in a war with Iran. And once those revenues are threatened, the logic of sovereign deployment changes.

In ordinary times, Gulf states can think like long-horizon investors. In wartime, they think like states under threat. Liquidity matters more than expansion. Security matters more than return. Domestic resilience matters more than global dealmaking.

This is why the idea that war and economic integration can proceed in parallel is so unstable. You cannot build a regional order on Gulf money while also courting a war that threatens the source of that money. The same strike that shakes Qatar’s LNG system also shakes the capital base of its sovereign fund. The same escalation that pushes oil and gas prices higher can also force sovereign investors to delay commitments, preserve cash, and rethink political exposure.

The Conflict-of-Interest Debate

That brings the Kushner issue into sharper focus. The most responsible formulation is not that a conflict of interest has been proved. The more precise point is that the overlap is structurally troubling. Kushner helped shape U.S. policy toward the region, cultivated close relationships with Gulf rulers, later founded a firm financed by those states, and was reportedly involved in the diplomacy immediately preceding the present war.

Critics argue that this creates an appearance problem of the highest order: policy, access, capital, and personal business all sit too close together. Supporters reply that his views on Iran are broadly aligned with long-standing hawkish currents in Washington and that there is no evidence that he acted for private gain. That debate will continue. But regardless of where one lands on motive, the architecture itself is clear.

Kushner’s financial fortunes are tied to the very Gulf system now endangered by war. The Iranian side clearly knows this. Trump’s overnight tweet threatened the Iranians with massive retaliation by the US if attacks on Qatar proceeded. This makes further attacks on Qatar even more appealing for the Iranians, because of the linkages to Kushner’s (and Trump’s) personal businesses and aspirations. They do not need to bankrupt the US; they can be more focused and bankrupt Kushner and Trump by shaking Qatar’s core economic interests.

Conclusion: A Financial Order Built on Stability

The story here is larger than Jared Kushner, though he is a revealing focal point. What it shows is that the region is not just a theater of war and diplomacy. It is also a financial order built on sovereign wealth, energy revenue, reconstruction planning, and cross-border investment. Affinity Partners is one expression of that order. Gaza reconstruction is another. Qatar’s North Field wealth is another story.

And all of them depend on stability.

A wider Iran war threatens shipping lanes, energy installations, LNG production, sovereign wealth deployment, reconstruction finance, and the fundraising environment for Gulf-backed private equity. The overnight strike on South Pars and the retaliatory attacks on Gulf energy sites show how quickly the chain reaction can begin.

So, the central question is no longer abstract. It is not whether war might be bad for business in some generic sense. It is whether the same political actors who helped build a Gulf-financed regional order have now helped endanger the financial foundations on which that order rests.

That is the Kushner trap. If the Gulf underwrites the reconstruction, the investment funds, and the regional economic future, then any war that destabilizes Gulf revenue and confidence threatens the entire design at once. And if that continues, the pressure will not stop at oil markets or gas terminals. It will move through sovereign wealth portfolios, stalled reconstruction plans, and every investment vehicle built on the assumption that the Persian Gulf can remain both the engine of regional finance and the battlefield of regional war.

By attacking Iran, Kushner has, in effect, bitten off the hand that fed him. He never appreciated the true value of a deal with Iran. There was an opportunity 10 years ago to provoke change in an ‘evolutionary’ process by leveraging the JCPOA to elevate the moderates inside the regime, push for sustained change inside Iran, and, in the process, draw Iran closer to the West and, slowly but surely, toward a democratic outcome. But that process was squandered by Trump himself.

And now, the U.S. is bogged down in a regional quagmire, with a naïve and simple Trump (with Kushner’s assistance) following Netanyahu’s misguided lead to destroy the regime completely – only to find that the consequences threaten even his own interests. He never thought it through.

He will now be scrambling to make an even worse deal than was already on the table, with people on the other side that may not come to the table at all. He’s in trouble. Iran will not relent. And it’s clear Iran has finally found Trump/Kushner’s underbelly.  

Do not be fooled. Nothing about the current moment is as it appears on the surface. The language is layered, the signals indirect, and the choreography deliberate. Public statements are wrapped in coded phrasing, political theater, and strategic misdirection. Beneath the spectacle of confrontation with Iran lies something far more complex—and far more unsettling. If one listens carefully to the words being spoken, examines the signals being sent, and follows the logic of escalation, a darker possibility begins to emerge that the conflict unfolding may ultimately place Israel, not Iran, at the center of the real strategic outcome.

Consider first the language used by Donald Trump. In a recent statement, he declared that if Iran did not surrender, the United States would use force “twenty-five times greater than what we have used so far on Iran, until they surrender.” On its face, the remark sounds like conventional political bluster. Yet when examined closely, the numbers embedded within the statement raise a more troubling question: what precisely does “twenty-five times” the current level of force mean in technical terms?

To understand this, we must begin with the most powerful weapon the United States has reportedly used thus far in its operations against Iran: the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, often abbreviated as the MOP. The name itself conveys its function. The weapon is a precision-guided bunker-buster bomb weighing roughly 30,000 pounds—approximately 14,000 kilograms—and measuring more than twenty feet in length. Designed specifically to penetrate hardened underground facilities, the bomb can drill through as much as 200 feet of concrete or rock before detonating. Only one aircraft in the American arsenal can carry such a weapon: the B-2 stealth bomber.

In terms of explosive force, the GBU-57 produces a blast roughly equivalent to between eleven and thirty tons of TNT. This places it among the most powerful conventional bombs ever developed. In the reported strike against the bunker complex associated with Iran’s leadership in Tehran, two such bombs were allegedly used.

If we take the upper end of that estimate, the combined explosive yield of two GBU-57 bombs would amount to approximately sixty tons of TNT. This is already an extraordinary amount of destructive power for a conventional strike. But Trump’s statement did not reference doubling or tripling that force. He spoke of multiplying it by twenty-five.

What would that translate to?

When one performs the arithmetic, the answer begins to move out of the realm of conventional weaponry. Twenty-five times sixty tons of TNT would produce a blast yield of roughly 1.5 kilotons. That number is significant, because it corresponds not to a conventional weapon but to the lower threshold of nuclear explosives.

Within the current American nuclear arsenal exists a weapon whose capabilities fall within precisely that range: the W76-2 nuclear warhead. This is considered the smallest nuclear warhead currently deployed in the United States stockpile. Designed as a “low-yield” option, the W76-2 has an explosive power estimated at roughly five kilotons—though it can be configured for lower outputs. It is typically mounted on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, providing the United States with what strategists call a “flexible” or “tailored” nuclear response option. Even at its smallest configuration, however, its destructive power dwarfs that of any conventional bomb.

To place the comparison in perspective, a five-kiloton nuclear explosion would possess roughly one hundred times the explosive force of a 30,000-pound bunker-buster. The arithmetic of Trump’s statement—twenty-five times the force already used—suddenly begins to resemble the threshold between conventional and nuclear warfare.

In other words, the implication embedded in rhetoric is unmistakable: the next step in escalation could involve the use of a small nuclear weapon.

The consequences of such detonation would be catastrophic. A nuclear blast in the kiloton range would not simply destroy the immediate target. The explosion would generate intense radiation capable of contaminating the surrounding region for miles. Depending on atmospheric conditions, lethal radiation exposure could extend outward for approximately seven miles from the detonation point, while radioactive fallout would persist far longer. With radioactive isotopes possessing half-lives measured in decades, the affected area could remain dangerously contaminated for generations. In practical terms, meaningful resettlement might require a century.

Now consider the geography of Tehran. The city stretches across a vast urban basin with a rough radius of approximately twenty miles, constrained to the north by the Alborz mountain range. Its population exceeds ten million people. If the command facilities associated with Iran’s leadership truly lie near the center of that urban area—as has often been reported—then a nuclear strike in that vicinity would devastate the heart of the city and contaminate a substantial portion of the surrounding metropolitan region.

The human consequences would be almost unimaginable.

At the same time, reports have circulated suggesting that key members of Trump’s cabinet have relocated to hardened government facilities, including lead-lined nuclear bunkers designed to protect against radiation exposure. Even if such reports are exaggerated, the symbolism of such preparations sends a clear message: policymakers are contemplating scenarios that extend beyond conventional warfare.

Such signaling carries several possible meanings. On one level, it may simply be intended as psychological pressure on Iran—an attempt to demonstrate seriousness and resolve. On another level, however, it implies that American leadership is not only contemplating the use of nuclear weapons but also anticipating the possibility of a nuclear response.

This expectation leads to another layer of speculation that has circulated in intelligence circles for years. According to long-standing rumors, elements within Iran’s Revolutionary Guard may have acquired nuclear warheads during the chaotic years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the early 2000s, when Ukraine inherited portions of the former Soviet arsenal, the sudden disintegration of centralized authority created opportunities for black-market proliferation. Some reports have claimed that Iranian intermediaries obtained several warheads during this period.

Whether these claims are true remains impossible to verify publicly. Yet the rumors persist. One particularly striking allegation suggests that a device may even have been tested in the Iranian desert near the city of Bam in 2003, providing Iranian engineers with critical knowledge about the design and function of nuclear weapons.

Even if those stories are exaggerated, Iran’s scientific establishment has long demonstrated the capacity to reverse-engineer complex technologies. If Tehran possessed even a handful of warheads—or the technical data associated with them—it would have the knowledge necessary to reproduce such systems over time.

And Iran already possesses the delivery systems. Over the past two decades, the country has invested heavily in the development of ballistic missile technology. Its missiles can reach targets across the region with increasing accuracy and range.

However, there is one place those missiles cannot reach: the continental United States.

This reality introduces a stark strategic calculation. If Tehran were subjected to a nuclear strike, its most plausible retaliatory targets would not lie across the Atlantic. They would lie much closer to home.

They would lie in Israel.

This possibility raises a further question: if American leaders truly anticipate such a scenario, why the visible preparations for sheltering in hardened facilities? One explanation is that these preparations are themselves part of the signaling process—an attempt to demonstrate seriousness while also deterring escalation. Another possibility is darker: that policymakers fear asymmetric retaliation, such as the detonation of a radiological “dirty bomb” within the United States by a covert network or proxy actor.

Yet another possibility is that the anticipated retaliation might come not from Iran alone, but from one of its regional partners or allies.

These possibilities hover in the background as the public narrative continues to unfold.

Meanwhile, political statements in Washington add another layer of complexity. Senator Lindsey Graham recently issued a highly public declaration of unwavering loyalty to Israel “until his dying day.” At the same time, Trump himself has suggested that his decisions regarding Iran were shaped by advice from figures such as Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner – dual national (Israeli-American) individuals directly involved with diplomatic engagement with Iran. In other words, they are signaling that if Israel is destroyed, its not because of us (America), but a war you (Israel) started, a negotiation you (Israel) led, and we are totally loyal to you (Israel).

Political rhetoric often serves multiple audiences simultaneously. Such declarations may reassure Israel, but they also know it inflames critics, and obscures deeper strategic calculations.

After all, American policymakers are acutely aware of one critical reality: if nuclear weapons were used against Iran, Tehran’s retaliation—if it possessed the means—would likely fall upon Israel.

Geography alone makes this clear. Israel is a small country. From the Mediterranean coast to the West Bank border is barely ten miles in many places. A nuclear detonation in a major urban center such as Tel Aviv would have consequences far beyond the immediate blast radius. Given the country’s size and population density, even a single nuclear strike could devastate the nation.

Large portions of the land could become uninhabitable, leaving only sparsely populated regions—such as the Negev desert, parts of the Golan Heights, or the already devastated Gaza Strip—relatively less affected.

Against this backdrop, events within Iran are also evolving rapidly. Following the death of Iran’s previous supreme leader, power has reportedly consolidated around Mojtaba Khamenei. In a recent declaration, he announced that Iran would abandon all remaining international agreements related to its nuclear program.

The symbolism of this decision cannot be ignored. Mojtaba Khamenei is widely believed to have lost close family members in the bunker strike in Tehran—his father, mother, wife, and daughter reportedly among the casualties. The personal dimension of such a loss inevitably shapes political decisions.

By renouncing nuclear agreements, the new leadership effectively clears the path for Iran to openly pursue nuclear weapons development.

At the same time, Israel itself possesses a substantial nuclear arsenal—estimated by many analysts to exceed four hundred warheads. Israeli submarines have reportedly patrolled the waters near Iran for decades, maintaining a second-strike capability designed to ensure deterrence under any circumstances.

Thus, the strategic chessboard is growing ever more complex. The United States could theoretically strike Iran directly with nuclear weapons. Alternatively, it might encourage Israel to act first. Or events might simply spiral beyond the control of any single actor.

Meanwhile, the war that began with conventional bombings continues to unfold. Roughly a week has passed since the renewed strikes against Iran began. Despite a strict media blackout, scattered videos emerging online have shown damage within Israeli cities as well—evidence that Iranian missiles are penetrating the country’s air-defense systems.

The implication is troubling. If conventional missiles are now reaching their targets, a missile carrying a nuclear warhead—should such a weapon exist—would almost certainly do the same.

And that is the shadow now hanging over the region: the possibility that a war which began with bunker-buster bombs could end in nuclear fire. The American use of a nuclear weapon on Iran, (just like conventional bombings today), would result in the annihilation of Israel. Everyone knows this.

Before I begin this analysis of the situation in the Middle East and its consequences, I want to warn people that this examination is going to be largely secular and nuanced, which means people on both sides of the divide are going to complain, and frankly, I don’t care. To be clear, I am not interested in the plight of the Palestinians, the Islamic regime in Iran, or the conspiracy theories on the internet. I find appeals of empathy and compassion to be naïve. I do not waste my time worrying about them. Hence, being cancelled on so many subs.

In fairness, I also do not care about the Israeli government, and I have no vested interest in whether they survive. In the past, Israeli-supported organisations have helped form militant leftist groups and anti-conservative sentiments in the US, and the fact that leftist activists have turned on Israel in recent years is rather poetic. I recognise that many Zionist Christians would disagree with this position, believing that Israel is the only Western ally keeping watch over the Holy Land. I am also aware that numerous disinformation agents online are paid by both sides, as Israel and Islamic governments run these digital operations constantly, expending vast amounts of money to employ armies of social media shills whose singular job is to disrupt sincere discussion and sway American opinion to support one side or the other. This tells me a great deal about how important the US population is to the world’s geopolitical future, as everyone wants us to pick their team or hate their opponent.

What I care about first and foremost is how geopolitical events and our involvement will affect America and American interests (where I live), and what I have learned in recent years is that it is easy enough to predict events but not necessarily outcomes. There are people who believe every international conflict or crisis will end in global doom, yet none of them has been correct so far. Of course, all it takes is the right crisis to trigger a Black Swan, and this is where many of us build lighthouses, warding ships away from the rocky shores of any incident that might become a world-ending singularity.

It is important to understand that dramatic geopolitical shifts can act as linchpins, impacting our lives through a chain of dominoes that is not immediately apparent until years later, and potential does not mean certainty. As I have been pointing out for many years, collapse is a process, not an event. I have predicted the development of an unavoidable war footing between Iran and the US, with Israel as instigator or convenient rationale, and I argued that this would escalate. I predicted the initial air strikes of the primary targets. I predicted Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which has now occurred. I predicted a ground invasion into Lebanon by Israel, which has not yet happened, followed by the eventual ground invasion by US and Israeli forces into Iran.

Immediate consequences could include a spike in oil and gas prices, as over 20% of the world’s oil supply passes through the Strait of Hormuz, as well as the elevated possibility of planned and autonomous terror attacks—the recent mass shooting in Austin, Texas appears to be the first—and there is the danger of a potential military draft should the war carry on for more than a couple of years or if it turns into an occupation dealing with a large insurgency. Finally, there is a growing risk of increased hostility toward Russia and China, potentially catalysing a world war; this is a worst-case scenario view of the conflict and not necessarily the most likely outcome.

For example, in Venezuela, naysayers wailed and raged over Donald Trump’s black-bag operation that resulted in the capture of illegitimate dictator Nicolas Maduro. They claimed with certainty that this action would initiate Vietnam Part II, yet they were entirely wrong. Millions of Venezuelans around the world rejoiced, and the Venezuelan population has done nothing in the name of bringing Maduro back. Trump’s critics ignored the applause from Venezuelan nationals and argued that their opinions do not matter because their support of Trump’s invasion is inconvenient to the narrative that he is a mindless warmonger and that he is betraying his voter base, which is a childish response to complex geopolitical dynamics. Many dictatorships deserve to die, and the libertarian methodology of sitting around and doing nothing while criticising those who act is growing stale. The American public is not inspired by passivity. This does not mean we should go to war with Iran per se, but I think US patriots are done with ego-stroking debates on constitutional and ideological theory and want to see results.

Decapitation

If moral justification is the issue, then there is a fair case to be made for the decapitation of the Islamic regime in Iran, as the Mullahs have engaged in a similar brutal theocratic oppression we have seen with the Taliban in Afghanistan, but on an industrial scale. If you are a woman, a political dissident, or a religious minority in Iran, you have limited rights and can be arrested or murdered for any reason at any given moment. Just because Muslims happen to agree with conservatives that transgender activists are predatory lunatics does not mean we have anything else in common. Most critics will argue that regime change in Iran is only meant to benefit Israel and not the Iranian people, yet it benefits many countries, not just Israel. I would also argue that Trump’s real goal is probably to further isolate China from its international oil sources, while Israel is a secondary concern or a useful excuse. Trump’s decapitation strategy against Venezuela, his policies on the Panama Canal, and his Iran strikes conveniently cut China off from around 20% of its oil resources, which is significant and could change China’s military development efforts dramatically. That said, just because Trump was right on Venezuela does not mean he will be right on Iran.

The US is very good at taking out enemy leadership and blowing things up, but we are completely inept when it comes to occupation, and this is where we always lose. An occupation requires the majority support from the foreign population; without it, there is no point. In Iran, Trump might have it. We must wait and see what the Iranian population does in reaction to the decapitation strikes. If too large a percentage of the populace throws support behind the Islamists, then the limited strikes will have to evolve into a ground war, and a ground war without domestic alliances would turn into a quagmire. Then there is the question of the Strait of Hormuz. Clearing the strait and keeping it operational will be difficult, as Iran can run interference on oil shipping for months merely by targeting tankers with thousands of drones. I do not have to explain what one Shahed drone can do to a ship loaded with combustible oil. If it were my operation, I would target the strait with long-range artillery or ballistic missiles supported by drone spotters. All it takes is one large sunken ship to close the Hormuz for weeks. This is a problem if Trump’s strikes on top officials do not inspire a popular revolution.

The Hormuz closure will mean higher gas prices, though I suspect part of Trump’s strategy is to use Venezuelan oil exports to offset the Hormuz bottleneck. If Trump cannot keep prices relatively low, then the American public will be very unhappy. We have already spent four years suffering under Biden’s inflation. We cannot absorb any more. Russian and Chinese involvement in the region appears to be limited to weapon sales and logistics. Russia has a Strategic Partnership Treaty with Iran, but it does not contain a mutual defence clause. I worry far more that elitists in Europe are doing everything in their power to start a world war with Russia by interfering in Ukraine. Speaking of the other conflict in the east, it is interesting to me that under the Biden Administration, Democrats avidly and rabidly demanded direct confrontation with Russia over Ukraine. Like Iran, it is just another country that has little to do with us, yet they were happy to risk nuclear conflagration over that foreign entanglement. This is why I do not take leftists seriously at all when it comes to their anti-war rhetoric.

Quagmire

As far as Israel is concerned, they make off like bandits in this situation. They know it, and I am sure they are secretly proud of that fact. They would never be able to fight this war alone, but I am not going to cry over the destruction of a Muslim theocracy just because Israel gains something from it. The issue is America, and whether this war will escalate out of control and turn into a global crisis that harms us. I will admit that Trump has displayed a knack for executing limited military operations with far-reaching effects at limited cost. He has proven naysayers wrong on several occasions. Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth asserts that there will be no quagmire. If this is possible to pull off, then it will be the Trump Administration’s greatest magic trick yet. But what started as a limited weekend operation turned into a 4-week minimum program and is now being slated as a 6-month campaign, possibly involving troops on the ground. All the elements for a protracted war and a quagmire are in place.

Balkanization

If we don’t put boots on the ground, then the outcome will be chaos and civil breakdown in Iran, followed by balkanization and widespread insurgency far outside the boundaries of the country. We already know the CIA is preparing the Kurds (and others) for a ground-based invasion. This will not be pretty. The goal, obviously, then, will be to balkanize Iran… but it could also result in a very chaotic outcome (much like Libya, with factions vying for control of major regions – for example, a war between the Kurds and Azeris for major parts of northwestern Iran). Trying to manage and clean up the mess would likely result in the same kind of failed occupation the US experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is a gamble that risks a sharp division within the conservative base. It also risks the left (groups like the MEK) coming into power.

Any major disaster on Trump’s watch could serve the interests of globalists seeking to exploit a crisis to further demonise the concepts of nationalism and conservatism. At that point, the only solution would have to be a total and unrelenting crusade, with or without the Trump Administration. If Iranians want to protect their children and the future in general, the MEK can never be allowed to take power in Iran.

World War III

There is a fourth possibility of the war expanding and seeding a future world war, i.e., China taking advantage of the quagmire and chaos to invade Taiwan, or a Russian invasion of the Balkans… As they say, you strike while the Iron is hot. The war could, for example, ‘push’ China to take kinetic action if its core interests and future are put at risk (which is precisely what might happen if the Straits of Hormuz are shut down).

For now, there is also a fifth outcome. I am erring on the side of the Iranian government staying in power, and a nominal win for Trump after a couple of months of limited strikes and covert operations. There are compelling reasons to maintain the status quo. Let’s never forget that it took 20 years, 4 administrations, trillions of dollars to replace the Taliban with the Taliban. There are compelling arguments for that. First, you can imagine Arabs spending literally trillions of dollars buying arms to protect themselves from Iran. Then, of course, Iran will remain sanctioned and contained, which will eliminate Iran as a global competitor in many key markets like energy and transportation (to name a few). There’s no compelling reason to open Iran up now. It can serve a useful purpose as a regional bogeyman, which can be engaged as needed if anyone in the region steps out of line. And it will probably be the fastest way to end this war without prolonging it, which could collapse the global economy. Yes, I am not putting any bets on the current Iranian opposition outside Iran to save the day.  

In the meantime, until an outcome ensues, I do expect a wave of attempted terror attacks in the West, even more NGO-financed riots by leftist activists, and probably an emergency effort by DHS’s ICE militia to deport more Muslim immigrants from the country to other Minneapolis-type cities like LA, or even New York. The cynics say nothing ever happens, except when something happens, so keep your head on a swivel.