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Putting lipstick on a pig is the only way to describe the Trump administration’s systematic failures in dealing with the fallout from a failed Iran War!

This article is part of a five-part series detailing the Trump administration’s total, systemic failures in its Iran campaign. From (1) trying to decapitate Iran, only to engineer Mojtaba Khamenei’s rise, and the emergence of hardline IRGC leadership into key roles governing Iran, to (2) a failed attempt to capture Iran’s Uranium that now, in retrospect, looks more like a Jimmy Carter’s failed desert hostage rescue mission, to (3) the obliteration of US bases in the region with not only billions of dollars of damage but also – more importantly – the serious loss of electronic surveillance and guidance systems which will take years to restore. And then (4) we look at Trump’s failure to blockade the Straits of Hormuz and his aborted series of negotiations.

Trump has made the situation inside Iran much worse. He has added no value to the US or its allies. In a final, (5), conclusive article we explore how, without a visible or viable off-ramp, and a near total collapse of the world (and regional) economies, Trump may choose (or has already chosen) to either – directly or indirectly – nuke Iran, causing devastation on a scale never seen by mankind, leading to the death of over 10 million Iranians and large parts of Iran rendered totally uninhabitable for centuries – and precipitating the start of World War III, and the end of the American empire.

For me, with the evidence so blatant and openly available, what is incredibly baffling is the total lack of congressional oversight and control. How can a rogue President conduct such an expensive, failed campaign for over 60 days without challenge? This is not only a systematic failure of the Trump administration to conduct a campaign against Iran, but also a systematic failure of governance in America – and the whole world (with no real oversight by the UN Security Council, or other allied leadership). It is a failure on an unprecedented scale.

I implore you to read all 5 articles and decide for yourself.

For weeks in March (after the US/Israel start of a bombing campaign in Iran on February 20^th), the public narrative surrounding the war in the Persian Gulf suggested that Iranian retaliation had been largely contained. Official statements emphasized successful missile interceptions and minimal casualties. Pentagon briefings described the strikes as disruptive but limited.

But a growing body of investigative reporting, satellite imagery, and defense analysis now suggests something very different.

Behind the carefully managed headlines, Iranian missile and drone attacks inflicted far greater damage on U.S. military infrastructure across the Gulf than initially acknowledged. Across at least five countries, key radar systems, aircraft, communications networks, and base facilities were destroyed or severely degraded.

Some analysts now estimate that as many as 13 U.S. installations were rendered “uninhabitable” or operationally degraded following Iranian retaliatory strikes in the weeks after the conflict escalated.

The financial cost alone is now estimated in the billions, but the strategic implications may be even more serious.

Because the attacks exposed a vulnerability that has long worried military planners: America’s forward bases in the region are highly concentrated, highly visible, and highly vulnerable.

Below is a summary of what I found online.

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Kuwait: Communications and Radar Hit

One of the most significant clusters of damage occurred in Kuwait, home to multiple U.S. logistics and air support hubs.

Ali Al-Salim Air Base

Satellite imagery reportedly shows collapsed rooftops and destroyed infrastructure near the base’s communications sector. At least eight structures appear to have been damaged or destroyed.

Ali Al-Salim plays a critical role as a staging area for aircraft supporting operations across Iraq, Syria, and the Persian Gulf. Damage to communications and support infrastructure can disrupt coordination between aircraft, drones, and command centers.

Camp Arifjan

At nearby Camp Arifjan—one of the largest U.S. Army bases in the region—three radar radomes were reportedly destroyed in a missile strike.

Radomes protect sensitive radar equipment that supports air defense and surveillance operations. Their destruction can temporarily blind portions of the regional monitoring network.

Reports also indicate that a strike on the facility killed three U.S. service members, marking one of the first confirmed American fatalities in the base attacks.

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Qatar: A Critical Radar System Damaged

Perhaps the most strategically significant damage occurred at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the central command hub for U.S. air operations in the Middle East.

Al Udeid hosts forward headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and acts as a nerve center for coalition air campaigns.

During the Iranian retaliation, one of the base’s most important assets—the AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar—reportedly sustained major damage.

This radar system is designed to detect ballistic missile launches and track long-range threats across the region. With an estimated value exceeding $1.1 billion, it forms a critical component of the Gulf’s missile defense architecture.

Damage to the system significantly degraded the early warning network that protects U.S. forces and allied cities from missile attacks.

In addition, several satellite communication antennas and a specialized satellite operations facility were reportedly destroyed during the strikes.

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Bahrain: Fifth Fleet Infrastructure Targeted

In Bahrain, home of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquarters, Iranian strikes targeted communications and logistics infrastructure.

Two advanced AN/GSC-52B satellite communication systems were destroyed, along with several associated satellite terminals.

These systems are essential for maintaining secure communications between naval forces operating across the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Red Sea.

Warehouses and logistics facilities within the naval compound were also reportedly damaged, disrupting supply chains that support naval operations throughout the region.

Although the Fifth Fleet’s core command structures remained intact, the strikes demonstrated that even heavily protected naval headquarters are vulnerable to precision attacks.

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Saudi Arabia: Aircraft Destroyed on the Ground

One of the most visible losses occurred at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, a major hub for U.S. air operations.

A high-value E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft was reportedly destroyed while parked on the runway during a missile and drone barrage.

AWACS aircraft serve as airborne command centers, coordinating fighter aircraft and monitoring airspace across vast distances. Losing even a single aircraft represents a significant operational setback.

In the same strike, five KC-135 Stratotanker refueling aircraft were damaged, reducing the ability of U.S. forces to sustain long-range air operations.

Air-to-air refueling aircraft are essential for maintaining combat air patrols and extended missions across the region. Damage to these assets can ripple across the entire air campaign.

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United Arab Emirates: Base Facilities Hit

In the United Arab Emirates, Iranian attacks struck Al Dhafra Air Base, which hosts U.S. fighter aircraft and surveillance assets.

Several buildings used for military housing were heavily damaged, with large blast holes visible in satellite imagery.

The strikes forced personnel relocations as commanders attempted to reduce the concentration of troops at vulnerable sites.

Nearby Jebel Ali Port, one of the most important logistics hubs used by the U.S. Navy outside the United States, was also targeted by drone attacks.

Warehouses and a naval recreation area were set ablaze during the strikes, highlighting the vulnerability of non-hardened infrastructure within major logistics ports.

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Casualties and Operational Disruption

Early official statements suggested that U.S. forces had suffered minimal casualties during the Iranian strikes.

But more recent estimates indicate the toll may have been higher.

Current reporting suggests at least 15 U.S. personnel were killed and more than 500 wounded across multiple bases during the barrage of missiles, drones, and other attacks.

Beyond the human cost, the operational disruption was severe.

At several locations, the damage was extensive enough that military personnel were temporarily relocated away from primary base infrastructure.

In some cases, personnel reportedly worked from hotels and temporary facilities outside the bases to avoid becoming concentrated targets for further attacks.

One analyst described forward bases as “lightning rods”—large, fixed targets that are increasingly vulnerable in an era of precision missile warfare.

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Strategic Consequences

The damage forced the Pentagon to make rapid adjustments.

Air defense assets, including THAAD missile defense components, had to be redeployed from other theaters—including South Korea—to reinforce the Middle East.

These moves highlight a broader strategic challenge.

For decades, U.S. military strategy in the region has relied heavily on large forward bases concentrated in allied Gulf states.

But modern missile technology is making these installations increasingly vulnerable.

Iran’s ability to strike multiple bases across several countries simultaneously demonstrates how precision missiles and drones can threaten even heavily defended installations.

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The New Reality of War

The Iranian strikes revealed something that military planners have long understood but rarely seen tested at this scale. Large, fixed bases are no longer sanctuaries. In a conflict against a technologically capable adversary with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones, even the most advanced military installations can be damaged in minutes.

But the reality is, if the US could not defend its bases, how would it defend critical assets held by allies? Desalination plants, huge data centers, internet cables, pipelines, refineries, etc.

The attacks not only destroyed U.S. military power in the region but also exposed a new reality: Iran could devastate critical and key assets in the region without any defensive capabilities. In an extended war, these assets are vulnerable. The impact could be devastating. 

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The Bottom Line

The public narrative of the war suggested that Iranian retaliation had a limited effect. But the emerging picture tells a different story. Across the Persian Gulf, key radar systems, aircraft, communications networks, and logistics infrastructure were damaged or destroyed in coordinated strikes. And this could continue and other critical assets would be hit.

The financial cost will run into billions of dollars. The operational disruption will take months or perhaps years to repair.

And the strategic lesson may linger much longer: in modern warfare, even the world’s most powerful military cannot assume that its forward bases are safe from precision attack.

The war has revealed that reality with startling clarity.

Don’t take my word for it; look at what happened yesterday in Iran. The government announced all schools will transition to online learning effective April 21^st. Why would they do that?

Then, consider that they opened and then closed the Straits (of Hormuz) within 24 hours. The Western press reported that there was a big difference among factions in the government, but maybe, just maybe, they had intelligence on troop movements in the region.

Then there was an announcement by European leaders that suggested that more than a dozen countries were ready to contribute assets to a defensive mission aimed at restoring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Defensive …right? Thus, a multinational defensive armada is heading to the Persian Gulf.  “Reopening ​the strait is a global necessity and a global responsibility,” they declared.

Not too long before the ‘cease-fire’ was announced, the US touted landing on key Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf. The only problem was that there weren’t enough troops and time to integrate logistics in place to do that. The ceasefire has bought time to do this, and there are reports online of systematic shipments to the region from US bases in Europe (and elsewhere). It’s no surprise that the US was not dealing in good faith with the Iranians. The Iranians sensed something, because they diverted their plane to another airport, fearing an attack on them in mid-air!

There is no question that there is a serious multi-lateral plan in place to invade Iran. The question isn’t whether this will happen, it’s exactly how it will take place, and what is the ‘desired outcome’?

To figure this out, we simply must look at ‘history’. There was a previous massive invasion of Iran by Saddam Hussein, at the time backed by the US and its Arab allies. Saddam Hussein visited Riyadh a few months before the invasion and received iron-clad guarantees from the Saudis. The plan was to take all of Iran’s southern (oil-producing) regions.

Today, the Saudis are allied with Pakistan. This is the same ‘peace-making’ Pakistan that brokered a fake negotiation between the US and Iran to buy time for Trump.

Not to be forgotten is Israel, which has an airbase in Azerbaijan and attacked Iran with drones across the Azerbaijan-Iran border. At the same time, Israel has been funding Iranian separatist groups in Kurdistan, Baluchistan, Azerbaijan, etc.

Israel’s strategic perspective (and therefore Trump’s too) is that Iran is a large and complex country sitting at the crossroads of the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia, and should somehow be broken apart to minimize its threat regionally and globally.

Iran occupies one of the most strategically important positions on Earth. It sits astride the Persian Gulf’s energy routes, borders multiple regions of instability, and possesses a large population, deep national identity, and significant military capability.

For decades, adversaries of the Iranian state have wondered whether the country’s internal diversity could be turned into a strategic vulnerability.

Analysts sometimes point to several regions often mentioned in such discussions:

• Baluchistan, in the southeast, bordering Pakistan
• Iranian Azerbaijan, in the northwest
• Khuzestan, an oil-rich province in the southwest
• Kurdish regions in the west

Israeli think tanks have consistently advised that if Iran is placed under severe economic, military, or political pressure, those fault lines might widen.

Israel sees Iran as a mosaic of ethnic, geographic, and political fault lines. From this perspective, Iran’s diversity—Persian, Azeri, Kurdish, Arab, Baluch, and others—becomes less a feature of national identity and more a potential lever of fragmentation.

A smaller, divided Iran would mean:

• Reduced military capacity
• Less influence across the Middle East
• Fragmented control over energy resources
• Weaker ability to project power into Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, or the Gulf

Thus, it is my opinion that the US will align with Arabs, Europeans, and regional separatist groups to not only exert a massive multi-centered and multifaceted invasion of Iran, with the goal of splintering the country.

The Europeans will focus on the straits. The US and Arabs will focus on Iran’s oil terminals and oil (and gas) rich southern provinces. Kurds and Azeris will invade in the north and northwest (largely as a diversion), and Pakistan, with the help of Baluchi separatists, will attack in the Southeast.

The idea – obviously – is to overwhelm Iran, topple the regime, and then create power vacuums that will result in the splintering of Iran – along the same lines as the former Soviet Union. None of these ‘new’ nations will be large enough, powerful enough, or independent enough to pose a threat, not only to Israel, but also to undermine the economies of the Arab states in the Persian Gulf.

In my view, this is a ridiculous plan.

First, the resulting chaos will, in my view, ignite a chain reaction across the region. Non-state actors, militias, and ideological movements that would immediately exploit chaos and be a source of serious destabilization everywhere.  

But also, Iran is not a small or fragile state. It has:

• a population of nearly 90 million
• complex internal political institutions
• extensive military and paramilitary structures
• A long historical memory of foreign intervention

Even powerful states have struggled to impose political outcomes on far smaller countries. Fragmenting Iran would likely be exponentially harder. Iranians will fight back and fight hard.

The analysts in Washington and Tel Aviv should be reminded that what often gets framed as a clean geopolitical strategy in air-conditioned, glass-lined offices not too far from a Starbucks Café — i.e., divide the map, weakening the rival— often collides with reality on the ground.

Destabilizing a country as large and complex as Iran could easily produce consequences far beyond anyone’s control.

History is full of plans that looked brilliant in theory and catastrophic in practice.

The map is one thing. The world beneath it is another.

The war being contemplated will be catastrophic. It is very difficult to imagine how its impact will be contained. How will this fire be put out? The possibility of it evolving into a much larger regional – possibly global – conflict is there. It’s a very high-risk proposition.

The problem is, it’s now impossible to negotiate with Trump, who has shown time and again that he is not a good-faith actor. He tore up the very last attempt to systematically bring Iran into the ‘Anglosphere’ via constructive engagement.  This idea that the US can simply dictate outcomes is somewhat naïve and smacks of arrogance and hubris.

It will take far more than an armada from Europe, and 100,000 multi-lateral and separatist forces to conquer Iran. When they look at a Mercator Projection map, they see a small country – not realizing that the map is distorted. Iran is huge – larger than Spain, France, Germany, and Poland combined. Iran can literally bring millions of fighters to the table. This isn’t going to be easy or pretty.

Is this worth it for America?

Remember, splintering Iran is ALL for Israel and Arab interests. And Israel has already said it will not provide troops for this invasion. One more time, it’s US blood and treasure expended for the benefit of Israel. How does this make sense? Why are we splintering a country when we could just as easily set up base there and conquer the region via Iran? If Iran is so powerful, don’t we want to be leveraging it – instead of splintering it?

None of this makes sense. The US is listening to the wrong people, with their own agendas, instead of standing for US national interests.

Every few years, a familiar story reappears in Western media: negotiations are underway with Iran, diplomacy is back on the table, and a deal may be within reach. Officials speak of “progress.” Diplomats shuttle between capitals. Commentators debate enrichment levels and sanctions schedules.

But beneath this theater lies a far simpler reality.

A genuine agreement between the United States and Iran is extraordinarily unlikely—not because diplomats lack skill or the technical issues are unsolvable, but because too many powerful actors benefit from the conflict continuing.

If a real deal were ever to happen, it would require something very basic: the restoration of Iranian economic sovereignty. That means lifting sanctions, returning frozen Iranian assets, and allowing the country to participate normally in the global economy.

Without those steps, any agreement would be meaningless to Tehran.

And that is precisely why a deal is so difficult to achieve. The geopolitical ecosystem surrounding Iran has evolved in ways that make its continued isolation extremely profitable—and strategically convenient—for several key players.

Israel’s Strategic Imperative

For Israel, Iran represents the only regional state with the population, industrial capacity, and ideological hostility to eventually challenge Israeli military dominance.

From Israel’s perspective, the problem is not simply nuclear enrichment or missile development. The issue is Iran itself.

A large, technologically capable Iran integrated into global markets would gradually accumulate wealth, diplomatic influence, and military capability. Even without nuclear weapons, such a country could eventually alter the regional balance of power.

For decades, Israeli strategy has focused on ensuring that no rival state in the region becomes powerful enough to threaten its security. Iraq once fit that description. Syria once did. Today, Iran occupies that role.

Add to this mix, real economic opportunities to divert oil and gas exports via pipeline to Israel versus through the Straits of Hormuz… billions of dollars of transit fees, capital investment, etc., and the ‘opening’ or normalization with Iran becomes impossible not simply from a security vantage point, but from an economic consideration.

Under this strategic logic, the optimal outcome is not merely a constrained Iran but a permanently weakened one—isolated, sanctioned, and economically contained.

This does not necessarily mean Israeli leaders seek war for its own sake. But it does mean that any agreement that restores Iran’s economic strength carries long-term risks for Israel’s strategic position.

As a result, Israeli influence in Washington consistently pushes U.S. policy toward pressure rather than normalization. The US simply cannot make a deal with the current regime – it would not satisfy Israel.

The Quiet Interests of the Gulf States

The Gulf monarchies publicly frame their rivalry with Iran as a matter of security and ideology. But there is also a quieter economic dimension that receives far less attention.

Iran is one of the most resource-rich countries in the world. It possesses enormous reserves of oil and gas, a large, educated population, and a geographic position connecting Central Asia, the Caucasus, South Asia, and the Middle East.

If sanctions were lifted and Iran re-entered global markets, it could rapidly become one of the most dynamic economies in the region.

Such a development would reshape the Gulf.

Energy markets would face new competition. Aviation hubs in Dubai and Doha would face rivals in Tehran and other Iranian cities. Tourism, finance, logistics, and trade networks could shift.

For decades, Gulf economies have operated within a regional system in which Iran—one of the largest potential competitors—has been heavily constrained.

This has been enormously advantageous.

An open Iranian economy could fundamentally change that balance.

While Gulf leaders may prefer stability over war, the status quo of a contained Iran is economically comfortable. Integration has unpredictable consequences. Iran can – and will – decimate their newly established industries.

From an aviation standpoint, Iran has high-altitude airports that require much less fuel for takeoff and landing. Iran is over 1000 Km closer to Europe and East Asia. It’s a natural, not a fake (politically established) hub. Iran has a vast, highly educated workforce capable of operating and maintaining aircraft. Add to this mix, incredible (and ancient) monuments and tourist attractions, and there would be distinct disadvantages to utilizing these Persian Gulf states as transportation hubs.  

From an industrial standpoint, Iran is not only a huge industrial giant – with a population of almost 100 million – but also possesses vast natural resources, beyond its 2nd-largest oil and gas reserves globally. Copper, zinc, Iran, Uranium … you name it… Iran has it in spades. Then add two more components: its nodal geographic placement, which would enable distribution to landlocked Central Asian nations (all the stans), as a crucial east-west connectivity node; and then add to this, (again) an indigenous, vast and highly educated workforce capable of developing and maintaining industrial facilities. And suddenly, investments in Iran become compelling and significantly ‘superior’ to anything the other states on the Persian Gulf can offer.

Then add to this mix Iran’s ability to take in (and export) shipments from Chah Bahar port outside the Persian Gulf, and there is absolutely no way these states in the Persian Gulf can compete. They (and their European masters) have shrewdly resisted every effort to normalize and integrate Iran into the global economy. They have been the hidden hand escalating a false pretext of Iran’s nuclear ambitions for their own gains.

Strangely, these states prefer that the current regime stay in place – but remain sanctioned and contained.

The Problem of Trust in Washington

Then add this: even if Israel and the Gulf states were not factors, there would still be a central obstacle: U.S. credibility.

Diplomacy requires trust—or at least the expectation that agreements will endure long enough to matter.

From Iran’s perspective, recent history has demonstrated the opposite.

In 2015, Tehran signed a detailed agreement with the United States and several world powers limiting its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. After years of negotiations and intense international scrutiny, the deal was implemented.

Three years later, Washington withdrew.

Regardless of the political debates inside the United States about that decision, the message to Iran was unmistakable: American commitments may not survive changes in administration.

Twice recently, while the U.S. was negotiating with Iran, it decided to bomb Iran while sitting around the negotiating table. The US (along with Israel) has destroyed a whole ‘layer’ of leadership in Iran … including the new Supreme Leader’s father, mother, wife, daughter, and other family members’ deaths. There is simply no good faith on the part of the U.S., and there is a recent history of incapacity to honor agreements (such as a series of Minsk Agreements with Russia on Ukraine).  

Then there is a fundamental dilemma. Iran cannot dismantle major components of its nuclear infrastructure or strategic leverage in exchange for promises that could disappear after the next election.

At the same time, the U.S. political system makes it nearly impossible for any president to offer iron-clad guarantees that future administrations will honor a deal. This structural mismatch means that even well-intentioned negotiations face massive credibility gaps that may be impossible to bridge with the current regime in Tehran.

Iran’s Regional Strategy

There is also the question of Iran’s own strategic doctrine.

Over the past four decades, Iran has built a network of allied groups and partners across the Middle East. These relationships provide Tehran with strategic depth and deterrence.

From Lebanon to Iraq to Yemen, these alliances allow Iran to project influence far beyond its borders while complicating any direct military confrontation with more powerful adversaries.

Critics in Washington and Israel describe these networks as destabilizing proxy forces.

Iranian leaders describe them as essential defense mechanisms in a hostile region.

Whatever the interpretation, one reality is clear: these alliances are central to Iran’s security strategy.

If Tehran were to abandon these relationships as part of a diplomatic bargain, it would lose leverage that cannot easily be rebuilt. Allies abandoned at one moment of negotiation may not be available again when circumstances change.

For the current regime in Iran, this risk is unacceptable. There are some in the West (notably the Europeans and their Arab partners) who quietly welcome the pressure Iran exerts on Israel via these proxies and see Iran’s actions to counter-balance Israel’s regional ambitions and behavior.

The Theater of Negotiations

Taken together, these dynamics create a peculiar diplomatic landscape.

Negotiations continue. Talks open and close. Diplomats meet in neutral capitals. Each round is framed as a possible breakthrough.

Yet the structural incentives surrounding the conflict remain largely unchanged.

Israel seeks a permanently weakened Iran. Gulf states benefit from Iran’s constrained economic role. The United States struggles with credibility and domestic political divisions. Iran refuses to abandon the strategic tools it believes ensure its survival.

Under these conditions, negotiations often resemble a kind of geopolitical theater—an elaborate performance in which each side participates but few truly expect a lasting resolution.

Diplomacy becomes simply a means of managing tensions rather than resolving them. There is every incentive to perpetuate this situation and NOT resolve it.

The Logic of Perpetual Confrontation

The result is a strange equilibrium.

Sanctions weaken Iran but do not collapse it. Iran resists pressure but does not fully integrate into the global economy. Periodic crises erupt and then subside. Limited military confrontations occur without escalating into full war. Strangely, the nuclear issue provides a useful perpetual pretext for continuous confrontation without resolution.  

Each side tests boundaries while avoiding catastrophic outcomes.

From a distance, the system looks unstable. Yet it has endured for decades.

This does not mean a major conflict is impossible. History is full of situations where prolonged tensions suddenly erupted into war.

But it does suggest that the current pattern—pressure, resistance, negotiation, and stalemate—may persist far longer than many observers expect.

This is a Conflict Without Resolution

The deeper issue is that the U.S.–Iran confrontation is not simply about nuclear centrifuges or sanctions lists.

It is about the structure of power in the Middle East. It involves Russia and China. They, too, would not want a transformative deal that would place Iran’s crucial (and vitally important) resources in the Anglosphere.

Is Iran a permanent outsider to the regional order, contained and constrained? Or is it eventually integrated as a major political and economic force?

Until that question is resolved, every negotiation will confront the same underlying contradictions.

Diplomats may adjust enrichment caps. Sanctions may be temporarily lifted or reinstated. Agreements may be signed and later abandoned.

Thus, if this regime remains in place, the strategic conflict will remain. Trump cannot sign an agreement with the current regime because, if he does (and here comes the kicker), he will have failed in every dimension; every objective he stated for the conflict he started.

An agreement itself will confirm that the regime has not collapsed; in fact, it has succeeded, rewarded its hardliners, and thus will become more extreme. Iran’s nuclear programs will remain (trading enriched ‘dust’ for Iran’s frozen assets does not spell an end to the programs). An agreement means Iran will become more potent and further expand its ballistic missile programs. An agreement will reward Iran’s discovery of a new way to fight back using the straits to conduct economic warfare.  

Ironically, years of economic warfare against Iran are being reversed with Iran’s economic warfare against the world by the closure of the straits. Years of false pretext to sanction and contain Iran for the benefit of these states around the Persian Gulf (and their European masters) are now being reversed by the de facto containment of these states by the closure of the straits. In essence, Iran can demand tariffs for the safe passage of its global exports and thus prosper by the prosperity it gained at others’ expense.

It’s a complete and utter abortion.

This is a total reversal of years of strategic planning. For 47 years, there has been a careful balancing of relations with Iran: on the one hand, US allies (Europe and Gulf states) wanted a sanctioned and contained Iran for their economic gains; on the other hand, Israel has wanted the destruction of Iran. And the US has walked a careful line between these two demands, always stopping short of war for decades. But now, if this regime collapses, the Europeans and Gulf states will be compromised. Iran will eat their lunch. If the regime stays, Israel will not achieve its goals. Iran will be emboldened and hardened. There is no win here for Trump with its allies.

Thus, the prospect of a durable and transformative agreement will always remain remote. Not impossible.  It will really take something dramatic for him to pull off an incredible transformational agreement – one that somehow includes regime change in Iran. It is extraordinarily unlikely.

Thus, war will continue – either hot or cold. My prediction is that Trump will grab his ball and walk away from the playground – and pretend he won the game. Nothing good will emerge. Don’t hold your breath. Everyone – including (especially) Iranians will be screwed by this – Americans, Europeans, Israelis, Arabs, etc. Only winners: Russia and China. And Trump will be eaten alive domestically.

Unless one thing happens: total war!! Trump, after realizing the circumstances, understanding he can’t make a deal, may find that total regime collapse is his best option. And elect to go all out and fight. There are signs that he may have already elected to do this!!

This would be catastrophic. A tragedy.

The confrontation between the United States and Iran has begun to resemble something more dangerous than a geopolitical crisis. It looks increasingly like a strategic farce—one driven less by coherent policy than by arrogance, political theater, and a cascade of miscalculations.

Washington entered this confrontation believing it held overwhelming leverage. Instead, it now finds itself trapped in a strategic position of its own making, unable to impose its will yet unwilling to acknowledge the limits of its power. What was supposed to be a show of strength has turned into a slow-motion exposure of strategic confusion.

The first round of negotiations between the United States and Iran collapsed exactly as one might expect when diplomacy is replaced by ultimatums. Rather than negotiating, American officials arrived with a take-it-or-leave-it demand: Iran must permanently dismantle its nuclear program.

Iran left it.

From Tehran’s perspective, the talks confirmed what many Iranian leaders already believed—that Washington was not interested in compromise, only capitulation. Diplomacy conducted under those assumptions rarely goes far.

The optics surrounding the negotiations did little to improve matters. While talks dragged on for more than twenty hours, Vice President J.D. Vance offered little explanation beyond reiterating American “red lines.” Meanwhile, Donald Trump appeared at a UFC fight, projecting the impression that the negotiations were little more than background noise in the theater of domestic politics.

But the real problem is not diplomacy. It is the strategic reality behind it.

Despite Washington’s rhetoric, the United States has so far failed to achieve any of its central objectives in the conflict. Attempts to seize or destroy Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles reportedly resulted in the most serious American air losses since the Vietnam War era. Far from demonstrating dominance, the operation revealed something much more uncomfortable: Iran’s asymmetric defense strategy is working.

For decades, Iran has prepared for precisely this scenario. Instead of trying to match American conventional power, Tehran invested in distributed missile systems, drones, maritime disruption capabilities, and proxy networks. These tools are not designed to defeat the United States militarily in a traditional sense. They are designed to make the cost of American intervention intolerably high.

That strategy now appears to be unfolding exactly as intended.

Washington’s remaining leverage rests largely on the threat of renewed large-scale military action once the fragile ceasefire expires. Yet even this threat looks weaker than it sounds.

The ceasefire itself was declared in large part because the war was already beginning to inflict severe economic damage. At the peak of the crisis, roughly twenty percent of global oil supplies were disrupted. Gasoline prices surged. Fertilizer supplies tightened. Even helium—critical for semiconductor manufacturing—became scarce.

Financial markets reacted immediately, rallying simply on the hope that negotiations might calm the situation. If the war resumes, markets will likely tumble again, shortages will intensify, and inflation—already creeping upward—will accelerate.

And at the center of this crisis lies one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints: the Strait of Hormuz.

In response to the stalled negotiations, Trump and his supporters have floated what they believe is a decisive next step—imposing a naval blockade on Iran to force compliance.

The idea has been championed in Washington policy circles as a kind of strategic masterstroke. Cut off Iran’s oil exports, the argument goes, and Tehran will have no choice but to surrender its nuclear ambitions.

The theory collapses the moment one examines practical realities.

First, Iran’s oil infrastructure is far more resilient than many Washington strategists assume. During the brutal eight-year Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, Iran’s primary export terminal at Kharg Island was repeatedly attacked and shut down. Yet Iranian oil exports continued through alternative routes.

Second, enforcing a blockade of Iran would mean stopping commercial ships from countries like China, India, and Russia. In other words, it would require the United States to physically interfere with the maritime trade of some of the world’s largest economies.

That is not merely a regional maneuver—it is an escalation with potentially global consequences.

Third, naval blockades historically take months or even years to produce meaningful economic effects. Domestic political pressure, energy price shocks, and financial market instability would likely force Washington to reconsider long before any blockade succeeded.

While Washington debates these ideas, Iran has already demonstrated a far more effective counterstrategy.

Rather than confronting American forces directly, Tehran has signaled its ability to expand the economic battlefield across the entire region. Iranian officials have suggested they could restrict commercial traffic not only in the Persian Gulf but across a vast maritime zone stretching through the Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea.

This does not require massive military operations. A few drones strikes against commercial shipping—or even credible threats—can dramatically increase insurance costs for vessels operating in the region. Once insurance becomes too expensive, shipping companies simply stop sailing.

The result is a silent blockade.

The strategic implications are enormous. The danger zone for global shipping would expand from the Strait of Hormuz into a massive corridor spanning the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea.

Saudi Arabia illustrates the problem clearly. To bypass the Strait of Hormuz, Riyadh has relied on an east-west pipeline transporting oil to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, where roughly four to five million barrels per day are exported.

But if the southern entrance to the Red Sea—the Bab al-Mandeb Strait—is threatened or effectively closed, that alternative route collapses.

Satellite shipping data already shows large crude carriers waiting near Yanbu for loading. Many of these ships cannot easily escape northward through the Suez Canal because of size constraints. If the southern exit becomes unsafe, they are effectively trapped.

In other words, Iran’s response transforms an attempted U.S. blockade into a much broader disruption of global energy trade.

The economic consequences extend far beyond oil.

Fertilizer shortages threaten agricultural production worldwide. Reduced fertilizer availability means lower crop yields, rising food prices, and increased risk of famine in vulnerable regions.

Meanwhile, reduced oil supplies ripple through the entire global economy, raising transportation costs, constraining industrial output, and increasing inflation.

In short, war is no longer just a regional conflict. It is becoming a systemic shock to the global economy.

And yet another factor is pushing the conflict toward escalation: Israel.

While Washington faces enormous economic and political pressure to stabilize the situation, Israel’s strategic incentives are very different.

From the perspective of Israeli leadership, continued confrontation with Iran serves a long-standing objective: weakening a regional adversary that has supported Hezbollah and other anti-Israeli forces for decades.

For Israel, the calculus is straightforward. A weakened Iran—economically battered, militarily degraded, and diplomatically isolated—would dramatically reduce the strategic pressure Israel faces in the region.

For the United States, however, the costs are global.

Energy markets are destabilized. Shipping lanes become war zones. Inflation spreads through the world economy. Food security is beginning to wobble.

The result is a dangerous divergence of interests.

Israel can pursue long-term strategic objectives with relatively limited economic exposure. The United States must absorb the immediate consequences of global disruption.

Yet Washington’s policies increasingly appear aligned with Israeli priorities rather than with the broader stability of the international system—or even the economic well-being of its own citizens.

That perception matters.

Because the costs of this conflict are not confined to the Middle East. They are being distributed across the entire world economy. Europe faces energy volatility. Asian manufacturing depends on stable shipping routes. Developing nations risk food shortages if fertilizer supplies tighten.

At some point, countries around the world will begin asking a simple question: why should the global economy pay the price for a regional conflict that some actors appear determined to prolong?

If that question grows louder, the fragile international coalition supporting Washington’s approach could begin to fracture.

And if that happens, the most significant strategic outcome of this war may not be Iran’s isolation.

It may be America’s.

At this point, reality is becoming impossible to ignore. The conflict has already inflicted enormous economic damage and carries the potential to trigger far greater instability.

What began as an attempt to impose American power is instead revealing its limits.

The longer this “stupid game” continues, the higher the price the world will pay.

In what should surprise absolutely no one who has watched five decades of Western military interventions in West Asia, Israeli intelligence has reportedly concluded that Iran’s new leadership is more extreme and ideologically rigid than the one it replaced.

The finding emerged from a closed-door briefing delivered by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. According to reports, Israeli military and intelligence officials warned lawmakers that Iran’s current leadership—shaped by war, assassination, and external pressure—has become more hardline, not less.

This outcome was not only predictable; it was practically inevitable.

The Rise of the IRGC Generation

Iran’s emerging leadership cohort is heavily drawn from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an institution that has steadily gained influence over the past four decades as external pressure on the country intensified.

These figures are widely viewed as more ideologically rigid than the previous political elite. Years of sanctions, covert operations, assassinations of senior officials, and now direct military confrontation have pushed power toward security institutions rather than civilian political networks.

War has a way of doing that.

In political systems under siege, the people who rise are rarely moderates. They are the ones who survived the battlefield, the intelligence war, and the internal struggle for power.

The result is a leadership class forged in confrontation rather than diplomacy.

Personal Stakes in the Conflict

The hardening of Iran’s leadership is not just institutional—it is also personal.

Many of the individuals now shaping policy have lost colleagues, family members, or close associates in recent strikes. Some have been wounded by themselves. Such experiences rarely produce conciliatory politics.

Instead, they reinforce a worldview that sees compromise as weakness and confrontation as a necessity.

Even the absence of Mojtaba Khamenei—the son of the slain Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—has fueled speculation about the direction of Iran’s future leadership. Reports suggest he may be even harder-line than his father, though he has not appeared publicly since the U.S.–Israeli attacks began.

Whether he ultimately plays a central role or not, the broader trend is unmistakable: Iran’s political center of gravity has shifted toward the security state.

History Repeating: The Lesson of 1980

What many policymakers appear to forget is that this dynamic has already played out once in Iran—and with remarkably similar results.

In 1980, when Saddam Hussein launched his invasion of Iran, the newly established Islamic Republic was in a deeply fragile state. The revolutionary government was divided internally, the economy was collapsing, and political factions were battling for control of the post-revolutionary order.

To many outside observers, the regime in Tehran appeared to be on the brink of collapse.

Saddam and his advisers believed the invasion would deliver the final blow. Iraqi intelligence assumed that Iran’s internal divisions would trigger uprisings and possibly even counter-revolution. In other words, they expected the Iranian state to fracture under pressure.

Instead, the exact opposite happened.

Rather than turning against the revolutionary government, Iranians rallied around it in the face of foreign invasion. Nationalism, religion, and wartime mobilization fused into a powerful political force that strengthened the regime’s legitimacy.

The war became what historians later described as the crucible that forged the Islamic Republic.

The Birth of the Security State

It was during this period that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) transformed from a revolutionary militia into the central pillar of Iran’s political and military system.

The war expanded the Guard’s power, numbers, and prestige. The Basij volunteer forces were mobilized. The state used wartime mobilization to consolidate control, suppress internal rivals, and deepen ideological indoctrination across society.

By the early 1980s, the regime that had once looked fragile had instead become far more durable and far more radicalized.

External pressure did not weaken the revolutionary state.

It hardened it.

The Pattern Reappears

Today’s developments appear to be following a similar trajectory.

Israeli intelligence now reportedly concludes that Iran’s new leadership—dominated by figures tied to the IRGC—is more ideologically rigid than the previous political elite.

But this outcome should not be surprising.

History shows that war rarely produces moderates in revolutionary systems. It tends instead to elevate the most disciplined, militant, and ideologically committed actors.

That is exactly what happened in Iran in the 1980s.

And it may be happening again now.

The Strategic Paradox

The paradox facing Washington and its allies is therefore familiar.

Efforts intended to weaken or destabilize Iran risk producing the opposite result: a more unified society, a more powerful security apparatus, and a more radical leadership.

The same pattern repeated across Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya.

And Iran’s own history suggests it may repeat there as well.

When a nation perceives itself under existential threat, politics shifts toward those who promise resistance rather than compromise.

In Iran, that almost always means the Revolutionary Guard.

The Eternal Fantasy of “Liberators”

Despite decades of evidence to the contrary, some voices in Washington continue to repeat the same refrain heard before the Iraq invasion in 2003:

The people will greet us as liberators.

History has repeatedly shown how detached that assumption is from reality.

It did not happen in Iraq.
It did not happen in Afghanistan.
And it is unlikely to happen in Iran.

Afghanistan offers perhaps the starkest example. After more than twenty years of occupation, trillions of dollars spent, and thousands of lives lost, the United States withdrew—only to see the Taliban regain full control of the country within weeks.

The grand project of nation-building collapsed almost overnight, leaving behind a fragile state that quickly reverted to the very movement the intervention was meant to defeat.

The Same Architects of Failure

What makes the current moment particularly striking is that many of the same policymakers who advocated for past regime-change operations are again calling for similar strategies in Iran.

These figures supported the interventions in Iraq, Libya, and Syria—policies that destabilized entire regions and produced prolonged conflict.

Libya descended into fragmentation and militia rule after NATO’s intervention.

Syria became a grinding proxy war that reshaped the region’s geopolitical landscape.

Iraq remains politically fractured more than two decades after the invasion.

Yet the lesson many of these strategists appear to have drawn is not caution, but persistence.

The Misreading of Iran’s Internal Politics

In the opening days of the recent bombing campaign, the Trump administration seemed to assume that Iran’s political system might collapse under the pressure.

The expectation—expressed implicitly and sometimes explicitly—was that mass protests would erupt and topple the Islamic Republic.

That did not happen.

Despite the loss of dozens of senior civilian and military leaders, the state has not fractured. Iran’s political institutions remain intact, and the country’s security apparatus continues to function.

President Trump has recently suggested that these losses amount to a form of “regime change.” But leadership decapitation is not the same as systemic collapse.

In many cases, it has the opposite effect.

External attacks often strengthen internal cohesion, consolidating power around the most disciplined and ideologically committed factions.

Diplomacy in the Shadow of War

Against this tense backdrop, diplomacy is tentatively underway.

Vice President JD Vance traveled to Pakistan for high-level talks involving Iranian officials, signaling an attempt to open a channel for negotiation even as hostilities continue.

Reports indicate that around seventy Iranian officials traveled with the Tehran delegation, suggesting an effort to present a unified negotiating front.

But expectations for a breakthrough remain low.

The two sides reportedly entered the discussions with positions that are far apart, reflecting the deep mistrust that has accumulated over decades of confrontation.

The Predictable Consequence

If Israeli intelligence assessments are correct—that Iran’s new leadership is more extreme than the one before—it should not be viewed as a mystery.

It is the logical consequence of sustained external pressure, assassination campaigns, sanctions, and military conflict.

When a nation is pushed into a permanent state of siege, moderates rarely gain influence.

Hardliners do.

That pattern has repeated itself across history and across regions. Iran may simply be the latest example.

And unless policymakers absorb that lesson, it is unlikely to be the last.

There isn’t a single objective that has been furthered in any way with this war.

If the objective was to denuclearize Iran – if anything – Iran now has more incentive to nuclearize, given an attack by two nuclear powers (who openly flaunt ‘nuking Iran’, ‘destroying its civilization’, and ‘turning it back into the stone-age’).

If the objective was to undermine America’s principal rivals, i.e., Russia and China, then, if anything, they have benefited from the war, and it has been the West that has suffered economically and splintered as a result.

If the objective was to decapitate the regime and bring about a new regime, if anything, Iran’s new government is now patently more hardline and militant. The consequences of this will be felt by the people of Iran and the region for many decades to come.

No matter how this ends, for the U.S., this war is a monumental, strategic disaster – caused by listening to Israel’s Netanyahu, instead of listening to America’s own experts (who were all fired en masse by the Trump administration under Israeli influence). Mark my words, this is a catastrophic own goal that historians will judge a key turning point for America.  

Wars often reveal uncomfortable truths. One of the clearest lessons from the current confrontation with Iran is that decades of U.S. policy toward Tehran may have produced outcomes that benefited America’s allies far more than the United States itself.

For over forty years, Washington has pursued a strategy of sanctions, isolation, and containment against Iran. The justification has always been framed in terms of security, nuclear proliferation, and regional stability. But the economic and geopolitical effects of that strategy deserve closer scrutiny. In many ways, the containment of Iran removed one of the most capable and resource-rich competitors from global markets—while allowing neighboring states and allied economies to flourish in the vacuum.

If the United States is willing to rethink its assumptions, the current crisis could become something very different: a strategic pivot that transforms Iran from adversary into opportunity.

Trump can take an impetuous, poorly planned, and executed war with no underlying military strategy and completely turn it around into a massive strategic win at the negotiating table.

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The Hidden Winners of Iran’s Isolation

Iran is not a marginal state. It is a country of nearly 90 million people with immense natural resources, strategic geography, and a long history of industrial and scientific development. In many ways it is the natural economic hub of West Asia.

Yet since 1979, sanctions and geopolitical pressure have largely removed Iran from global markets. The result has been a profound distortion of regional economics.

Several U.S. allies have benefited enormously from this situation.

The Gulf Arab states built global financial centers, aviation hubs, and energy empires in an environment where one of the region’s most capable economies was largely sidelined. Cities such as Dubai became logistical and financial gateways for trade that otherwise might have flowed directly through Iran.

Europe also benefited. With Iran constrained, European companies faced fewer competitors in energy markets and regional infrastructure development. At the same time, Europe could maintain lucrative relationships with Gulf energy producers while supporting sanctions policies toward Iran.

Israel, meanwhile, saw a strategic advantage in the continued isolation of a powerful regional rival.

None of these actors were acting irrationally. Nations pursue their interests. But the crucial point is that the structure of Iran’s isolation has often aligned far more closely with the interests of U.S. allies than with those of the United States itself.

For Washington, the costs have been enormous: decades of military deployments, trillions of dollars spent on regional security, and repeated crises that threaten global energy markets.

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America’s Strategic Blind Spot

A core principle of international politics is that allies are not altruistic. They cooperate when their interests overlap and diverge when they do not.

Yet U.S. policy toward Iran has often been shaped by the security concerns and political priorities of regional partners rather than by a cold assessment of American interests.

This has created a strategic blind spot.

By supporting a system that permanently isolates Iran, Washington has effectively prevented itself from accessing one of the largest untapped economic opportunities in the world. At the same time, it has shouldered the costs of maintaining the regional balance created by that isolation.

The irony is that the United States, the architect of many of these policies, has frequently been the least direct economic beneficiary.

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The Opportunity Hidden Inside the Crisis

Wars, while destructive, also create moments when entrenched assumptions can be reconsidered. The current conflict with Iran may be such a moment.

Instead of doubling down on a strategy that has produced forty years of stalemate, the United States could choose a radically different path: repositioning itself as a long-term partner in Iran’s reconstruction and development.

The scale of the opportunity is enormous.

Iran possesses some of the largest reserves of oil and natural gas in the world. Its population is highly educated, technologically capable, and entrepreneurial. The country sits at the geographic crossroads connecting Europe, Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East.

With proper investment and integration into global markets, Iran could become one of the largest emerging economies of the 21st century.

And if that transformation occurs, the question will be simple: which countries will participate in building it?

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The Reconstruction Opportunity

If hostilities eventually subside, Iran will face a massive need for reconstruction and modernization.

Sanctions have left major sectors of their economy underdeveloped or technologically outdated. Infrastructure—from aviation and rail networks to telecommunications and energy facilities—will require large-scale investment.

American companies are uniquely positioned to participate in this transformation.

The United States leads the world in engineering, energy technology, aerospace, digital infrastructure, and finance. From rebuilding transportation systems to modernizing energy production, American firms could play a central role in Iran’s economic revival.

Such cooperation would not only generate enormous commercial opportunities. It would also create the economic interdependence that underpins long-term political stability.

History shows that trade and investment often succeed where coercion fails.

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Iran as a Strategic Partner

Beyond economics, a shift in relations with Iran could fundamentally reshape the strategic landscape of West Asia.

Iran occupies one of the most important geographic positions in the world. It sits astride the routes connecting the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Basin, Central Asia, and the Indian Ocean. It borders key energy corridors and major emerging markets.

A constructive U.S.–Iran relationship could open new possibilities in regional stability, energy security, and trade connectivity.

It could also reduce the need for the massive and costly U.S. military presence that has defined American engagement in the region for decades.

Instead of acting as a permanent security guarantor for a fragile regional balance, the United States could help foster a more integrated and economically interdependent regional system.

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Learning the Lesson of Self-Interest

None of this implies abandoning existing alliances or ignoring legitimate security concerns. Rather, it requires acknowledging a fundamental reality of international relations.

Allies pursue their own interests.

The (Arab) Gulf states, Europe, and Israel will continue to advocate policies that they believe serve their strategic and economic priorities. That is entirely natural.

But American policy must ultimately be guided by American interests.

If maintaining Iran’s permanent isolation benefits others more than it benefits the United States, Washington should have the strategic flexibility to reconsider its approach.

Great powers succeed when they adapt to changing realities rather than remaining trapped by outdated assumptions.

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A Strategic Reset

Transforming the relationship with Iran would not be easy. Decades of mistrust, ideological hostility, and geopolitical rivalry cannot be erased overnight.

But history offers many examples of dramatic shifts in international relationships. The normalization of relations between the United States and China in the 1970s fundamentally reshaped the global economy. Former adversaries in Europe became the foundation of a stable and prosperous political union.

Strategic pivots are possible when leaders recognize that the old framework no longer serves their interests.

In the case of Iran, the potential rewards could be immense.

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From Adversary to Opportunity

The central question facing the United States is whether it will continue viewing Iran solely through the lens of confrontation—or whether it will recognize the broader strategic possibilities that exist.

A nation with vast resources, a large population, and a pivotal geographic position will inevitably play a major role in the future of West Asia. The only uncertainty is who will shape that future alongside it.

If Washington remains locked in a strategy of permanent hostility, other powers—China, Russia, or regional actors—will gladly step in to fill the economic and political space.

But if the United States is willing to rethink its assumptions, it could transform a decades-long rivalry into one of the most significant economic and strategic partnerships of the century.

What today appears to be a costly and dangerous conflict could, in retrospect, become the moment when American policymakers recognized a simple truth:

Sometimes the greatest opportunities emerge not from victory in war, but from the courage to change course afterward.

This Is a Major War

The United States is now fighting a serious war with Iran.

Not a “limited strike.” Not a “targeted operation.” A real war—with billions in military losses, surging energy prices, and open talk of escalation that could devastate an entire country. In fact, the President calls it a war in his social media posts. He declares, proudly, ” We will bomb Iran into the Stone Age.

Yet the body constitutionally responsible for deciding whether America goes to war—the United States Congress—has done nothing. Absolutely nothing.

It is one of the most stunning failures of political responsibility in modern American history.

When Donald Trump first launched strikes against Iran, the language was carefully crafted. Officials called it a “limited action.” A contained response.

That fiction has now collapsed.

Carrier groups and bombers are operating across the region. Advanced missiles and aircraft worth billions have been destroyed or expended. Military planners openly discuss expanded bombing campaigns and attacks on Iranian infrastructure.

That is not deterrence. That is the language of total war.

Americans Are Paying the Price

The consequences are already hitting Americans at home.

Energy markets have been thrown into chaos as the conflict threatens the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most important oil arteries on the planet. Oil prices are climbing. Gasoline prices are rising again.

Inflation—just as it was beginning to ease—is being pushed upward again by war-driven energy shocks. Americans are now paying for this conflict every time they fill their tank or buy groceries.

There are major global shortages of key commodities, such as urea (fertilizer), Sulfur, Helium, and aluminum. The cost of diesel and jet fuel has skyrocketed. Airlines are canceling flights and raising fares. Shipping costs are climbing.

And the direct financial cost of the war itself is staggering. Modern warfare burns money at a rate that would have seemed unimaginable a generation ago. Even short campaigns can consume tens of billions of dollars within months.

Yet Congress has never voted to authorize this war.

The Next Step Could Be Catastrophic

The truly dangerous part is what comes next.

Military escalation is already being discussed openly: wider bombing campaigns, attacks on Iranian infrastructure, perhaps even the first steps toward a ground invasion.

Iran is not Iraq in 2003. It is a massive country (5x the size of Iraq) with nearly ninety million people, formidable terrain, and the ability to destabilize the entire region.

A full war with Iran would be one of the largest conflicts the United States has ever entered. There are rumors of the President authorizing the use of nuclear weapons. The doomsday plane has been seen conducting maneuvers in preparation. This is serious.

And still Congress does nothing.

The Collapse of a Constitutional Guardrail

The founders placed the power to declare war in Congress for a reason. They feared exactly this scenario: a president dragging the nation into a massive conflict without debate or consent.

That safeguard now appears to be collapsing.

Instead of asserting its authority, Congress has chosen the safest political strategy available: avoidance. Lawmakers issue statements, appear on television, and criticize details—but they refuse to force the one decision that matters.

Should the United States be fighting this war?

They do not ask the question because they do not want to vote on the answer. Israel controls their voting patterns, and their allegiance to Israel over the United States will be revealed. This marks the total collapse of Congress as a guardian of America’s national interests.

A National Abdication

What makes this moment so alarming is the scale of the stakes.

This war is already shaking global energy markets. It is already costing billions. It is already affecting American households. And the trajectory points toward something far larger.

Yet the branch of government entrusted with the power to decide on war has effectively abdicated that responsibility.

If Congress will not act when the United States is sliding into a massive war with Iran, when exactly will it act?

Because at this point, the message from Capitol Hill is unmistakable:

The president can start a war. And Congress will fail to conduct its constitutional duties. This is a complete and total failure of the American system of governance.

Wars rarely escalate by accident. They escalate through signals—political, institutional, and rhetorical—that indicate a government is preparing to cross thresholds it previously avoided. In the current conflict between the United States and Iran, a series of developments over the past two weeks has triggered deep concern among analysts and lawmakers. Individually, each event might be dismissed as routine wartime friction. Taken together, however, they suggest that Washington is systematically preparing the political and institutional environment for a massive, potentially unprecedented escalation of Operation Epic Fury.

Whether that escalation remains within the bounds of conventional high-explosives or moves into historically uncharted territory is now the central question facing the world as we approach the mid-April window.

The Purge of Institutional Resistance

The first and most alarming signal is the sudden removal of senior officials who historically act as the “institutional brakes” on extreme military decisions. In the last 72 hours, the national security apparatus has undergone a tectonic shift.

The forced retirement of General Randy George, the Army’s top officer, effective immediately on April 2, 2026, sent shockwaves through the Pentagon. While the Department of War cited “gratitude for his service,” reports suggest his departure resulted from a direct clash with Secretary Pete Hegseth over the legality of “Phase 2” engagement rules. Simultaneously, the firing of Attorney General Pam Bondi—a staunch loyalist whose dismissal suggests that even her brand of loyalty had limits regarding upcoming executive orders—indicates a White House seeking a path of zero legal resistance.

Historically, when a government contemplates crossing a major strategic threshold, it must first silence the voices obligated to uphold international law. Military officers are bound to refuse unlawful orders; senior legal officials are tasked with vetting them. By replacing these figures with interim “acting” officials, the administration has effectively cleared the deck of any figure with the standing to say “no.”

The “Two to Three Week” Window

The second signal is rhetorical: the introduction of a defined, high-pressure timeline. In his national address on April 1, 2026, President Trump introduced a jarring contradiction. He claimed that U.S. “core objectives”—the destruction of the Iranian Navy and Air Force—were nearly complete, yet simultaneously promised to hit Iran “extremely hard” over the next two to three weeks.

This creates a specific “danger zone” between April 15 and April 22. In military language, the phrase “finish the job” implies that the 900+ strikes conducted since February 28 were merely preparatory. If the goal is truly to “bring them back to the Stone Age,” as the President stated, the force required to do so in a mere 21-day window suggests a move toward saturation bombing or the use of weapons with much higher yields than we have seen to date – i.e. Nukes. More than likely, Trump will wait for markets to close at 3 pm on Friday, April 17th, and then hit hard that night.

The Escalation of Language and “25x” Force

The third signal is the shift in the scale of promised violence. Rhetoric describing future attacks as dozens of times more powerful than previous strikes is a deliberate psychological tool. It prepares the domestic public for a “shock” and attempts to break the adversary’s will through terror.

However, this creates a strategic trap. When a leader promises force that dwarfs everything prior, and the adversary—now led by the hardline Mojtaba Khamenei—refuses to blink, the leader is often forced to deliver on that promise to maintain credibility. With Iran continuing to claim the downing of U.S. F-35s and maintaining its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the “ambiguity” of what constitutes “25x the force” is rapidly narrowing.

The strategic problem facing Washington is one of physics and geography. Iran’s most sensitive assets, particularly the Fordow enrichment site, are buried deep beneath solid rock. Conventional “bunker busters” like the GBU-57 have been utilised extensively throughout March, but intelligence suggests the most hardened lower levels remain intact.

This creates the “Strategic Crossroads.” Washington must either accept the limits of conventional power—thus leaving Iran with a residual nuclear potential—or seek the only other tools capable of reaching those depths, or alternatively, to hit a major target that would paralyse Iran’s capacity to fight back in any way.  If you do the math, 25x brings the bombing directly into the scope of a small nuclear weapon that the US does have in its possession. This is clear.  

When one performs the arithmetic, the answer begins to move out of the realm of conventional weaponry. Twenty-five times sixty tons of TNT would produce a blast yield of roughly 1.5 kilotons. That number is significant because it corresponds not to a conventional weapon but to the lower threshold of nuclear explosives.

Within the current American nuclear arsenal exists a weapon whose capabilities fall within precisely that range: the W76-2 nuclear warhead. This is considered the smallest nuclear warhead currently deployed in the United States stockpile. Designed as a “low-yield” option, the W76-2 has an explosive yield estimated at roughly 5 kilotons—though it can be configured for lower yields. It is typically mounted on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, providing the United States with what strategists call a “flexible” or “tailored” nuclear response option. Even at its smallest configuration, however, its destructive power dwarfs that of any conventional bomb.

To put the comparison in perspective, a five-kiloton nuclear explosion would have roughly 100 times the explosive force of a 30,000-pound bunker-buster. The arithmetic of Trump’s statement—twenty-five times the force already used—suddenly begins to resemble the threshold between conventional and nuclear warfare.

In other words, the implication embedded in rhetoric is unmistakable: the next step in escalation could involve the use of a small nuclear weapon. This technical reality, combined with the “Stone Age” rhetoric, is what has fueled the global panic regarding a potential shift in the nuclear posture.

The Nuclear Shadow and the Normalisation of the Unthinkable

For 81 years, nuclear weapons have been the “unusable” tools of last resort. The greatest danger we face today is not a single, mad decision, but the gradual normalisation of the unthinkable.

Each step over the last month—the killing of the Supreme Leader, the strikes on the Bushehr power plant, the firing of the Army Chief, and the setting of short-term ultimatums—has made the next, more violent step feel like a logical progression. When diplomacy is sidelined, and institutional dissent is purged, the path to catastrophe is not a leap, but a series of small, accelerating shoves.

Any dramatic escalation would immediately ripple through the global economy. Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz remains the ultimate “economic poison pill.” With April 6, 2026, as the final deadline of the current 48-hour ultimatum, the world is bracing for a catastrophic spike in energy prices. Any bombing action is likely to be followed by an invasion of strategic Iranian islands on the Persian Gulf. It will be part of an overall plan. So the timing has to coincide with the availability of resources to conduct beach landings – and that is why it is being pushed out a few weeks.

It is my view that Washington is moving to “Phase 2” strikes on or about April 17; they are not just attacking a regime; they are gambling with the stability of the global financial system. A “total blockade” response from Iran would turn a regional war into a global depression almost overnight. The whole world will be affected, and one must wonder what Iran’s response will be. Might they use their own secret weapons on Israel or other US allies? The catastrophe might expand far beyond Tehran.

The coming weeks will determine the face of the 21st century. The signals are currently flashing red. Washington has cleared the legal path, set the clock, and ramped up the rhetoric to its highest pitch. As the April 6 deadline expires and the mid-month window approaches, the world can only hope that the “signals” are still part of a high-stakes bluff—and not the final checklist for a catastrophic new phase of human warfare.

A Strategy Built on Isolation

For forty years, Western strategy in West Asia has rested on a peculiar form of geopolitical engineering: isolate Iran, redirect regional commerce, and construct an economic system centered on the small monarchies of the Persian Gulf. Iran was treated as the problem state—sanctioned, isolated, and pushed out of global markets—while Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and their neighbors were integrated into the international financial system and encouraged to expand their energy production, aviation networks, logistics industries, and sovereign wealth funds. It was a deliberate strategy, fueled by Arab states and their Western Allies. It has been a multigenerational program kept secret for almost 50 years.

And so, the Shah of Iran was deliberately toppled, and a firebrand cleric was handpicked and flown in from Paris, who proceeded to paint Iran as an extremist Islamist state. And, ironically, Iran’s nuclear program, which was originally developed and sponsored by the West, was then used as a pretext (a tool) to exercise this geopolitical engineering program. It was a very systematic and deliberate plan. These planners were the same people who peddled crack in America and then arrested 10 million African Americans for drug possession to keep them out of the voting booths (check out: War on drugs, Iran-Contra!!). Yes, very sick human beings.

For 50 years, the strategy appeared to work spectacularly well. Dubai became one of the world’s busiest trading hubs. Doha transformed into a crossroads of global aviation. Gulf sovereign wealth funds accumulated trillions of dollars and invested across the planet. Gleaming skylines rose from the desert and were hailed as symbols of modern economic success.

But the war with Iran is now exposing the deeper flaw in the entire strategy.

The global economy has effectively been built around a handful of small desert states sitting along one of the most volatile geopolitical fault lines on Earth. The result is what might be called the Persian Gulf paradox: the very system that produced the Gulf states’ extraordinary prosperity has also created one of the most fragile economic architectures in the modern world.

The Chokepoint at the Center of the System

The vulnerability begins with geography. The Strait of Hormuz—the narrow maritime passage between Iran and the Gulf monarchies—has become the most important energy chokepoint on the planet. Roughly one-fifth of global petroleum consumption moves through this corridor every day. A significant portion of the world’s liquefied natural gas follows the same route. When conflict threatens the Strait of Hormuz, energy markets convulse immediately, shipping insurance costs soar, and governments around the world scramble to stabilize fuel supplies.

The current war has demonstrated just how quickly a regional confrontation can send shockwaves through the global economy.

What is remarkable is that the world allowed such an extraordinary level of dependency to develop in the first place. The global energy system now relies heavily on a single narrow maritime corridor located next to a country that Western policy spent decades isolating and antagonizing. That was never a stable design.

Sanctions and the Rewiring of the Regional Economy

The rise of the Gulf states cannot be understood without the simultaneous removal of Iran from the regional economy.

Since the Iranian Revolution, Western sanctions have systematically restricted Iran’s access to international finance, aviation networks, shipping insurance, and foreign investment. Iran became one of the most heavily sanctioned countries in modern history. But these restrictions did not eliminate trade with Iran. They merely rerouted it.

Much of that commerce flowed through the Gulf.

Dubai became the region’s great commercial intermediary. Goods destined for Iranian markets frequently passed first through Emirati ports, companies registered in free zones, and banks operating in the gray areas of global finance. Iranian imports and exports were often routed through the United Arab Emirates before reaching their destination.

In effect, sanctions created a commercial detour that allowed Gulf economies to profit from Iran’s isolation.

The result was a strange economic dynamic. Iran’s exclusion from global markets helped fuel Dubai’s rise as a global logistics hub. The city prospered by sitting between Iran and the world economy, serving as a conduit for trade that sanctions had made indirect.

Aviation Logistics and Geography Were Ignored

Aviation followed a similar pattern.

Geographically, Iran should be one of the world’s most natural aviation hubs. Tehran sits at a high altitude, allowing aircraft to depart with heavier payloads and greater fuel efficiency. Even more importantly, Iran lies directly between Europe and East Asia, making it an ideal midpoint for long-distance routes. Under normal circumstances, Tehran could easily have developed into one of the major aviation crossroads connecting continents.

Sanctions changed that trajectory.

Iranian airlines were locked out of aircraft purchases, financing, and international route networks. Gulf carriers stepped into the vacuum. Emirates, Qatar Airways, and Etihad built massive hub-and-spoke systems linking Europe, Asia, and Africa through Dubai, Doha, and Abu Dhabi.

The aviation map of Eurasia was effectively redrawn—not by geography but by geopolitical engineering.

The Inversion of the West Asian Economy

This process produced a striking inversion in the regional economy.

Iran has more than 90 million people, a diversified industrial base, and significant manufacturing capabilities spanning automobiles, steel, petrochemicals, and pharmaceuticals. It has a massive pool of engineers, universities, and a large domestic market. It also sits at the heart of central Asia, with the capacity to deliver to a dozen landbound nations.

By contrast, the Gulf monarchies historically had small populations, limited industrial traditions, and economies centered on hydrocarbons and services. They are surrounded by desert.

Yet during the sanction era, it was the smaller states that became global hubs for aviation, finance, logistics, and tourism while Iran remained economically constrained.

The outcome was not purely the result of market competition. It was shaped by policy.

By removing Iran from the global economic system, Western sanctions effectively altered the competitive landscape of West Asia. Their largest regional competitor was sidelined, allowing Gulf states to capture industries that geography and scale might otherwise have given to Iran.

The Hidden Subsidy

Seen from another perspective, sanctions functioned as an indirect subsidy for the Gulf economies.

Every shipping container routed through Dubai rather than Bandar Abbas represented commerce displaced from Iran. Every intercontinental flight passing through Doha rather than Tehran reflected traffic diverted by geopolitical restrictions. Every financial transaction processed through Emirati banks rather than Iranian institutions marked another shift in economic gravity away from Iran.

The Gulf boom was therefore not simply the result of brilliant planning or entrepreneurial dynamism.

It was also the byproduct of Iran’s exclusion.

Fragile Foundations

But concentrating so much global infrastructure in the Gulf also created extraordinary systemic risk.

The region’s prosperity rests on infrastructure that is both highly visible and highly vulnerable. Major cities, airports, refineries, and ports sit directly along exposed coastlines. Energy facilities and export terminals are clustered in a few strategic locations. Key sectors such as aviation, tourism, and finance are extraordinarily sensitive to instability.

Much of the workforce consists of migrant laborers who could depart rapidly if conflict escalates.

In short, the global economy invested enormous strategic importance in countries whose economic models depend on the demise of Iran and, therefore, on inherent instability. This was never a win-win outcome; it was always designed as a zero-sum game in which Iranians had the short end of the stick. It was deliberate.  

This War Reveals the Structural Flaw

The war with Iran is now revealing how fragile this geopolitical design always was.

A single regional confrontation can disrupt global energy flows, sending oil prices surging and rattling markets across continents. It is not only oil and gas, i.e., energy, but the region produces many crucial commodities linked to its oil and gas industry and low energy costs. More than 30% of the world’s sulfur, helium, urea, aluminum, and other basic chemicals. Not to be ignored is how critical the region is for global data connectivity.

The Gulf states were supposed to represent stability.

Instead, they have become the most critical point of vulnerability in the global energy system.

And beneath this fragile structure lies an inconvenient truth: Iran’s underlying advantages never disappeared. Its population, industrial capacity, energy resources, and geographic position remain exactly where they have always been. For decades, geopolitical pressure suppressed those advantages. But geography cannot be engineered away indefinitely by backroom map makers and politicians. In the long run, the fundamentals always dictate outcomes.

The Persian Gulf Paradox

The Persian Gulf paradox is therefore becoming increasingly clear.

The West attempted to weaken Iran by isolating it from global markets while simultaneously building a regional economic system centered on its smaller neighbors. The strategy appeared to succeed for decades, generating enormous wealth in the Gulf and reshaping global trade routes.

Yet by concentrating so much of the world’s energy, chemical infrastructure, and commercial logistics in a narrow and volatile region, the same policy created one of the most dangerous structural vulnerabilities in the modern global economy.

In the end, the real irony may be this: in trying to redesign the economic geography of West Asia, Western policy did not eliminate Iran’s strategic importance. It merely built an entire (fragile) global system around avoiding it. And now that system—constructed on a narrow strait, fragile states, and artificially redirected trade—has begun to show the strain of its own design.

The Persian Gulf was supposed to be the foundation of global energy security. Instead, it has become the place where the false security they built has cracked under its own weight.

You Need to Fire Everyone Around You.

Wars are often born not out of necessity, but out of bad advice. Presidents do not usually wake up one morning and decide to plunge their country into conflict with a nation of nearly 100 million people. They do so because a circle of advisors, analysts, allies, and intelligence briefers assures them that the war will be manageable, that the risks are limited, and that victory is likely.

But what happens when those assurances turn out to be illusions?

If the United States has truly embarked on a war with Iran, then the most important question is not how the war will unfold. The most important question is this: what exactly did the president know before making the decision—and what did his advisors fail to tell him?

Because if even half of the following realities were overlooked, misunderstood, or hidden, then the president’s first act should not be escalated. It should be firing the entire strategic advisory apparatus that led him into this trap.

Below are ten things that any serious strategist should have understood before initiating a war with Iran.

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1. Removing Khamenei Would Not Moderate Iran — It Would Radicalize It – and replace him with his son (Khamenei)

One of the enduring fantasies in Washington foreign policy circles is that eliminating an authoritarian leader somehow moderates a regime.

History shows the opposite.

If Iran’s Supreme Leader were removed or killed, the likely outcome would not be a reformist successor. It would almost certainly produce more militant leadership, one hardened by war and driven by revenge. I should remind you that beyond the supreme leader, a complete overhaul has occurred in Iran’s leadership, along the same lines, i.e., more militant members. In Iran’s case, the next leadership has been drawn from the most militant factions of the Revolutionary Guard — people who have spent decades preparing for precisely this kind of confrontation.

To add insult to injury, I am sure you are aware that Khamenei’s son is now seriously injured and has lost his wife, daughter, father, and mother. To say he has a grudge is an understatement. His father lost his hand to a bomb planted by the MEK, and when he finally consolidated power, he killed over literally 10’s of thousands of MEK members that they systematically apprehended.

Power vacuums inside revolutionary systems rarely produce moderates. They produce hardliners who win internal struggles by demonstrating toughness. Did anyone tell you?

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2. Every U.S. Base in the Gulf Would Immediately Become a Target

The United States operates roughly a dozen military installations across the Persian Gulf region — in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, and elsewhere.

These bases are in an extremely vulnerable geographic area.

They are close to Iran. They are exposed. They are within range of thousands of Iranian missiles and drones.

Once a war begins, these bases stop being deterrents and start becoming targets.

Iran has spent decades preparing for precisely this scenario, developing layered missile capabilities designed to saturate defenses and overwhelm interception systems.

Any strategist should have anticipated that all these installations would immediately come under threat. Did anyone tell you this?

The assumption that they could operate safely during a major war with Iran is not well-planned. The US has not only lost billions of dollars’ worth of critical equipment and resources, but, more importantly, crucial defense systems that affect other theaters.

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3. The United States Does Not Have Enough Interceptors for This War

Modern missile defense is not a magic shield. It is a resource-intensive system that relies on expensive, limited, and slow-to-replenish interceptors.

Iran, by contrast, has built an arsenal designed around volume.

Thousands of ballistic missiles. Thousands of drones. Swarm tactics designed specifically to overwhelm defenses.

The uncomfortable truth is that missile defense becomes increasingly ineffective when the attacker can launch large numbers of relatively cheap projectiles.

If the United States has already begun diverting interceptors from other theaters — Europe, the Pacific, or homeland defense — simply to maintain defensive coverage in the Gulf, then the scale of the problem is obvious.

This is not a short campaign problem.

It is a sustainability problem. In other words, if the campaign was not going to be a quick in-and-out mission, any extension would pose huge strategic consequences in other theaters. Did anyone tell you this?

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4. Your Own Forces May Not Want This War

Wars are not fought by think tanks. They are fought by people.

And morale matters.

Reports of sailors sabotaging equipment, clogging toilets, or even triggering fires aboard carriers to force deployments to end may sound like rumors or isolated incidents. But even the perception of resistance inside the ranks reveals something deeper. This is serious.

Many American service members understand the strategic reality of a war with Iran.

They know it is not Iraq. They know it is not Afghanistan. They know it is not a quick strike operation. They fully understand that this was a war of choice.

And now, they realize that it could be a large, prolonged regional war.

When troops start signaling reluctance before a campaign has even fully begun, leadership should pause and ask why. What do they know that no one shared with you? What are they sharing with their friends and family back home? It could compromise not only this campaign but also domestic support. Did anyone tell you they were putting towels down toilets on ships, to screw up ship sewage systems to force redeployments outside the theater? Were you informed?

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5. Your Allies Were Not Prepared — and Many Do Not Want This War

Major wars require alliances. But alliances require consultation.

If Gulf states, European allies, and Asian partners were not fully briefed or prepared for escalation, then the United States risks fighting largely alone.

Many of these partners depend heavily on regional stability for their economies.

Tourism hubs like Dubai. Energy exporters like Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Trade gateways across the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The consequences are felt not only by these states around the Persian Gulf but also by global airlines, shipping companies, and banks… and the companies (and people) around the world that support them.

The war with Iran is not a strategic exercise. It is an existential economic threat.

Shouldn’t their reluctance be explored? Does this not signal any critical information? Launching a war, without consultation, isn’t intelligent; it robs the American people of vital feedback loops that only allies can provide. No one informed you of the consequences of your actions. No one around you pushed for this feedback.

6. Israel May Have Sold Washington a Fantasy

Israel has long warned about the Iranian threat, and its intelligence services are among the most capable in the world.

But allies also have interests.

And sometimes those interests include drawing the United States deeper into conflicts it cannot fight alone.

If Israel presented the war as quick, decisive, and manageable — while privately acknowledging that it would require major ground involvement — then Washington may find itself bearing the burden of the war largely on its own.

No ground invasion. No massive Israeli troop commitments. Just American forces absorbing the consequences, i.e., American blood and treasure.

If that is the case, then the United States has been handed someone else’s strategic problem.

Note that Israel’s offensive in Lebanon is designed fundamentally to offset a request by the US for assistance in a ground invasion of Iran. In other words, Israel is not only not providing troops but can easily deflect the request by saying it’s bogged down in Lebanon. It’s a very clever tactic.

You sent Kushner and Witkoff to negotiate with the Iranians and make recommendations – not realizing that they are also Israeli shills. You not only listened to Netanyahu but surrounded yourself with his agents. No one told you the truth, that after the war started, the US would be largely left on its own – without meaningful Israeli support. No one told you the truth, that Israel is a manipulative and useless ally. That the relationship is one-way and only benefits Israel. There is never ANY net gain in any involvement with Israel. They win. The US loses. (Yes, US politicians gain – personally, but American interests are hugely compromised).

No one had the balls to share this reality with you.  

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7. Iran Can Close Not One — But Two Global Chokepoints

Much attention focuses on the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil passes.

But the strategic map is bigger.

Iran and its regional allies also possess influence over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the gateway between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

A credible threat to both chokepoints simultaneously could disrupt an enormous portion of global energy flows.

And it does not require a massive naval fleet.

Sometimes the threat itself is enough.

Insurance premiums spike. Shipping routes change. Tankers stay in port.

Global markets react instantly. None of this is good for the U.S. The strategic consequences were never shared with you.

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8. War Would Disrupt Much More Than Oil

Energy markets are only part of the story.

The shipping lanes running through the Gulf and Red Sea also carry critical commodities that underpin modern industry. More than 30% of the world’s Urea (fertilizer), sulfur, helium, Aluminum… to name a few.

Fertilizer (Urea) shipments are essential to global agriculture. Helium is used in semiconductor manufacturing and medical technology. Sulfur produces sulfuric acid; a critical industrial feedstock used in virtually every chemical process. Aluminum is crucial to aerospace and industrial supply chains. These are not only critical raw materials, but strategic in so many ways. The US cannot build more armaments, i.e., sustain a war, without semiconductors or Aluminum.

Disruptions to these flows ripple across the global economy. American farmers feel it. Manufacturers feel it. Technology companies feel it.

This is how regional wars become global economic shocks. Did anyone tell you – this is about more than oil and gas?

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9. The Digital Backbone of the World Runs Through This Region

Less visible than oil tankers are the submarine fiber-optic cables that carry global internet traffic.

90% of East-West communications flow through these corridors connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

Damage to these cables — whether accidental or intentional — can degrade global connectivity.

Financial systems are slowed down. Cloud services degrade. International data transfers become unreliable.

And in a world increasingly dependent on data infrastructure, that matters enormously.

Even more concerning: major data centers themselves are becoming strategic targets.

If AI infrastructure, cloud networks, or digital logistics hubs are damaged in wartime, the effects extend far beyond the battlefield.

Global AI build-out — one of the largest infrastructure expansions in history — suddenly becomes vulnerable.

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10. Iran Is Not a Small Target

Perhaps the biggest strategic miscalculation of all is scale.

Iran is not Iraq. It is not Libya. It is not Serbia.

It is a country larger than Western Europe with nearly 100 million people, vast mountain ranges, and decades of preparation for asymmetric warfare.

Its missile forces are dispersed. Its facilities are buried in hardened bunkers inside mountains. Its militias and proxies span the region.

Destroying such a system quickly would require an enormous, sustained campaign.

And the assumption that Iranian citizens would welcome foreign military intervention ignores a basic reality of nationalism.

Many Iranians deeply oppose their government. But that does not mean they welcome foreign attacks on their country. Ordinary Iranians are not going to be pawns for the US and Israel. You can’t destroy their country, humiliate them publicly, threaten to steal their natural resources, and then expect them to put their lives on the line for you.

History shows that external threats often unite populations that were previously divided. This notion that Iranians would rise and force regime change was a mirage sold to you by the people around you (and Israel). And you believed them – didn’t you?

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The Strategic Question

War is sometimes unavoidable. But entering one without understanding the terrain, the adversary, and the consequences is not a strategy.

It is negligence.

If the president truly launched this conflict without fully understanding these realities, then the problem is not merely the war itself.

The problem is the system of advisors who assured him that it would be simple.

Because if those people failed to grasp even a fraction of the strategic landscape surrounding Iran, then they should not be guiding American policy.

They should be looking for new jobs. This includes Israel’s leadership, but especially those closest to you – i.e., Pete Hegseth!

Mr. President, this is an opportunity to clean house.